

*S/S Lt 71***FM 30-5**

Reference

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COMBAT INTELLIGENCE

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1. Purpose

This manual furnishes guidance to commanders, staff officers, and other personnel concerned with the production and use of combat intelligence at all levels of command from battalion to theater army.

2. Scope

a. The contents of this manual deal primarily with the intelligence organization; the functions of the intelligence officer; the intelligence sources and agencies; the intelligence aspects of terrain and weather; the planning, collection, processing, dissemination and use of intelligence; and the intelligence aspects of special environmental conditions (including internal defense and development operations), special operational methods, and special purpose operations. Intelligence aspects of employment of, and protection from CBR agents are included. The combat commanders' information needs encompass all categories of required intelligence, however, combat surveillance and

target acquisition essential information needs for all echelons of the field army are included in appendix S for ready reference.

b. The material presented herein is applicable without modification to both nuclear and nonnuclear warfare situations.

c. Users of this manual are encouraged to submit recommendations to improve its clarity or accuracy. Comments should be keyed to the specific page, paragraph, and line of the text in which the change is recommended. Reasons should be provided for each comment to insure understanding and complete evaluation. Comments should be forwarded direct to the Commanding Officer, U.S. Army Combat Developments Command Intelligence Agency, Fort Holabird, Maryland 21219. Originators of proposed changes which would constitute a significant modification of approved Army doctrine may send an information copy, through command channels, to the CG, USACDC, to facilitate review and follow-up.

CHAPTER 2

GENERAL

Section I. INTELLIGENCE

3. General

To a certain degree, every profession has a language of its own, a language which is used in the particular environment of that profession. The military establishment is no exception to this general rule. Therefore, when a soldier speaks of information or intelligence in general or combat intelligence, strategic intelligence, and counterintelligence in particular, he attaches to these words a specific meaning in a specific context. The reason for this special language is obvious—only in this manner will there be a common understanding of the communications involved. From this standpoint, a knowledge of the precise definition of these words is important. There is also a value in knowing their objectives and their interrelationships, and the environment in which they are found.

4. Intelligence Versus Information

“Intelligence” is the product resulting from the collection, evaluation, analysis, integration, and interpretation of all available information which concerns one or more aspects of foreign nations or of areas, and which is immediately or potentially significant to the development and execution of plans, policies, and operations. As such, it is to be distinguished from “information,” because information is unevaluated material of every description including that derived from observations, reports, rumors, photographs, and other sources which, when analyzed, produces intelligence. Military information itself may be true or false, accurate or inaccurate, confirmed or unconfirmed, pertinent or not pertinent, positive or negative. It is the raw material from which intelligence is produced.

5. Military Intelligence

Military intelligence is the knowledge of a possible or actual enemy or area of operation, and it encompasses combat intelligence, strategic intelligence, and counterintelligence. It is essential to the preparation and execution of military policies, plans, and programs by providing a basis for determining: timing and length of anticipated operations; combat strengths required; task organizations; combat support and combat service support requirements; phasing of support and its buildup; and actions and reactions of allies, neutrals, neighbors, and friendly elements.

6. Combat Intelligence

Combat intelligence is that knowledge of the enemy, weather, and geographical features (terrain) required by a commander in the planning and conduct of tactical operations. Combat intelligence is derived from the evaluation of information on the enemy (both his capabilities and his vulnerabilities), the weather, and the terrain. The objective of combat intelligence is to minimize the uncertainties of the effects these factors may have on the accomplishment of the mission. The commander employs combat intelligence to determine the best use of his available resources to accomplish his mission and to maintain the security of his command. In noncombat commands, combat intelligence provides a basis for security measures, for decisions as to the best use of the area of operations in accomplishing the mission, and for determining or anticipating future support requirements.

7. Strategic Intelligence

Strategic intelligence is that knowledge

which is required to serve as a basis for the formation of policy and military plans at national and international levels. Oriented on national objectives, it assists in determining feasible national objectives and in furnishing a basis for planning methods of accomplishing them. Factors which influence the military capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable courses of action of nations are considered components of strategic intelligence. Consequently, in the production of strategic intelligence, a large volume of detailed basic intelligence on nations is accumulated.

8. Interrelationship of Combat and Strategic Intelligence

a. Distinctions. The distinctions between strategic intelligence and combat intelligence are essentially in scope and in point of view. Both types of intelligence are concerned with a knowledge of foreign nations, and with areas of actual or possible military operations, and both are produced by the application of the same fundamental intelligence collection and processing techniques. Combat intelligence is concerned primarily with tactical operations, whereas strategic intelligence is required for the formation of military plans and development of policy at the national and international levels. The components of strategic intelligence are geographic, transportation and telecommunication, sociological, political, economic, scientific and armed forces intelligence. Combat intelligence, on the other hand, includes intelligence dealing with the enemy, weather, and terrain obtained through such means as interrogations, combat surveillance, reconnaissance and patrols, and counterintelligence and technical intelligence operations.

b. Derivation. Combat and strategic intelligence are treated as separate categories of military intelligence. There are, however, several functional categories of intelligence from which both strategic and combat intelligence are derived. Some of these categories of intelligence are listed below, but a more comprehensive list may be found under "intelligence" in AR 320-5.

- (1) Order of battle.
- (2) Technical.
- (3) Target.
- (4) Terrain.

(5) Weather.

c. Overlapping Interests. Many subjects of strategic intelligence are also of combat intelligence interest.

- (1) Information gathered and intelligence produced for strategic purposes are frequently useful in the conduct of tactical operations. In this category are maps and charts; descriptions and studies of beaches, ports, rivers, towns, and other terrain features; studies of transportation and communications systems; data on trafficability, cross-country movement, climate, and hydrography; political, sociological, and economic studies; and order of battle studies on foreign armies, navies, and air forces. Field commanders, particularly of amphibious and airborne operations, may have to depend almost entirely upon strategic intelligence for their initial knowledge of the enemy and the area of operations.
- (2) Information collected by combat units often assists in the production of strategic intelligence. Interrogation of prisoners of war (see FM 30-15) may provide strategic information on political and economic conditions within the hostile denied area. Technical characteristics of a newly encountered enemy weapon or other item of equipment, in addition to providing valuable combat intelligence, may be used in producing strategic intelligence to aid in determining the production of industrial or manufacturing centers (see FM 30-16). On the other hand, much of what would be strategic intelligence in a conventional war becomes combat intelligence in an internal defense action. Much of the classical distinction between types of intelligence becomes somewhat irrelevant within the environment of internal defense operations.

9. Counterintelligence

Counterintelligence is the security phase of intelligence covering all activities devoted to

destroying the effectiveness of inimical foreign intelligence activities and to the protection of information against espionage, personnel against subversion, and installations or mate-

riel against sabotage. Every military intelligence activity, therefore, has a counterintelligence or security control aspect, thus making the two operations inseparable.

Section II. OPERATIONS

10. General

Intelligence operations concentrate on those aspects of the operational environment pertaining to the enemy and to the area of operations which influence the commander's choice of a course of action. The enemy situation and the area of operations are analyzed to determine the key elements which affect military operations. Key elements include such conditions as extremes of weather and terrain; enemy use of particular forms of combat power; implementation of an enemy capability previously held in restraint; or use of resources and characteristics of the area which can make the accomplishment of the mission of friendly forces possible or easier.

11. Geographical Areas of Intelligence Operations

a. General. Areas of intelligence operations are assigned to units on the basis of areas of influence and areas of interest. Such assignment provides for continuous surveillance of the entire area of operations.

b. Area of Influence. The area of influence is that portion of the assigned zone or area of operations in which the commander is capable of directly affecting the course of combat by the employment of his own available combat power. Normally, each commander will possess the means for obtaining the information he needs from within his area of influence.

- (1) Although the area of influence can extend in any direction from the forward disposition of the command, the significant direction and dimension is that which extends forward from the FEBA. For practical purposes the limit of the area of influence is set by the effective range of the available weapon systems since a commander will not normally maneuver the subordinate elements of his command beyond the range of the supporting fires

available to him.

- (2) A weapon system includes the means to acquire targets for the weapon; consequently, the range of the system is just as effectively limited by the inability to acquire targets as it is by a lack of weapon range. The area of influence, then, is sensitive to terrain and weather conditions which reduce the target acquisition capability for the weapon system involved.

c. Area of Interest. Intelligence operations are concerned not only with the area of influence but also extend further to the area from which information and intelligence are required to permit planning for the extension of the area of influence or for the displacement of potential targets into the area of influence.

- (1) The area of interest includes the area of influence plus that area outside the area of influence containing enemy forces which, if employed in the area of influence, could jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission. The commander relies on higher and adjacent commands to conduct intelligence operations in that portion of his area of interest which is outside his area of influence.
- (2) The area of interest of a subordinate command is normally included in the area of influence of the next higher command. The next higher commander, therefore, has combat surveillance over it and provides the bulk of the surveillance required in that portion of the subordinate commander's area of interest which is outside the subordinate's area of influence. The relationship of the two areas is schematically depicted in figure 1.

12. Basic Principles of Intelligence Operations

Although the product of intelligence opera-

tions in the Army varies with the requirements posed by the operational environment, certain basic principles guide the conduct of all intelligence operations. These are as follows:

a. Intelligence operations and tactical operations are interdependent.

- (1) Intelligence operations within the Army are an integral part of the operations of all units. The degree of success achieved by any unit in accomplishing its mission will be directly affected by the intelligence which it develops and uses. Tactics and strategy are at the same time the cause and effect, respectively, of intelligence operations.
- (2) Staff agencies with responsibility and authority for preparing and issuing operational orders and those with responsibility for intelligence operations must work as one team. Only in this manner can orders and plans reflect available intelligence and take full advantage of available knowledge of the situation and of enemy capabilities and vulnerabilities. Responsibility for coordination rests jointly upon intelligence and other staff agencies.

b. Intelligence must be useful. Intelligence must increase knowledge and understanding of the particular problem under consideration in order that logical decisions may be reached.

c. Intelligence must be timely. The best intelligence is valueless unless it reaches the user in time to serve as a basis for appropriate action. Adherence to this principle may involve some sacrifice of completeness and accuracy in the intelligence product. Whenever this occurs, the user of the intelligence must be informed of the loss of completeness or accuracy.

d. Intelligence operations must permit flexibility in procedures. Standard procedures generally make intelligence operations more effective. However, intelligence operations are based upon reason and judgment; procedures must be flexible to meet unexpected requirements. Procedures which cannot be changed to meet the requirements of a given situation generally lead to failure.

e. Intelligence operations require imagination and foresight. Policies and procedures that limit the imagination or initiative of subordinate agencies are avoided. Intelligence personnel and agencies use resourcefulness so that all available information can be developed and exploited to produce intelligence for the user. Blind acceptance of the continuance of the current situation may be fatal.

f. The nature of intelligence requires constant security measures.

- (1) Unauthorized personnel must be denied information about operations of intelligence agencies, sources of information, and the intelligence product.
- (2) While the effects of compromise of complete intelligence studies and estimates are obvious, the cumulative effects of compromise of fragmentary information also are dangerous.
- (3) A clear distinction between security and secrecy is imperative to effective intelligence processing and use. Intelligence processing agencies must exchange information and intelligence freely and completely to permit production of the best possible and most timely product. Security measures must not hinder the timely dissemination of information or intelligence to those who need it.

13. Intelligence Cycle

a. The activities connected with intelligence operations follow a four-step cycle oriented on the commander's mission. The four steps are:

- (1) Planning and collection effort and preparing orders.
- (2) Collecting the information.
- (3) Processing the collected information.
- (4) Disseminating and using the resulting intelligence.

b. The intelligence cycle is continuous. At the same time that new information is being collected in response to direction, other information is being processed and intelligence is being used (see FM 101-5).




Figure 1. Relationship of area of influence and area of interest.

Section III. INFLUENCE OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ON INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

14. General

FM 100-5 presents a detailed discussion of the operational environment. While all elements of the operational environment do not necessarily influence every operation, each operation is influenced by the commander's mission, the nature of the conflict, the scale of use of nuclear and other weapons, the nature of enemy forces, the locale, the civil population in the area of operations, and the friendly forces available.

15. The Mission

The mission of the command is a paramount

consideration in conducting intelligence operations; hence, intelligence operations must be conducted to produce the intelligence necessary to insure the successful accomplishment of the mission. Requirements are therefore based on the mission, and the information obtained is analyzed and interpreted for its significance in relation to the accomplishment of the mission. This consideration makes it imperative that intelligence personnel have a thorough knowledge and understanding of the assigned mission. In the absence of an assigned mission, tentative and subsidiary ones are assumed in anticipation of the receipt of an actual mission.

16. Nature of Conflict

Intelligence requirements are similar for all forms of conflict. However, in a given type of conflict, emphasis is often placed upon certain aspects of these intelligence requirements.

a. Cold War.

- (1) Intelligence requirements in cold war situations are influenced by the non-combatant nature of military activities. Emphasis is given to the political, economic, technological, sociological, and psychological aspects of the area of operations. Simultaneously, a requirement exists for information of the covert and overt activities and capabilities of dissident elements. This information is needed to determine the nature of, and to initiate counteraction against, the cold war activities of these elements; to provide warning of an extension of the conflict to other forms of war; and to provide a capability for the immediate attack of targets in the event of open conflict.
- (2) Counterintelligence requirements are particularly significant. Covert enemy activities against friendly units are normal and therefore, a continuous effort must be made to counter-espionage and sabotage; political, social, and economic subversion; guerilla activity; and the combination of these activities which constitute insurgency. The counterintelligence effort extends from the individual and his unit at the lowest echelon to the highest headquarters.
- (3) Intelligence collection procedures and techniques vary with the nature of the cold war environment. Troop commitments will influence the scope of the operations; for example, in some cases regular military forces may be required to conduct what are essentially combat-preventive operations. In this cold war environment, which encompasses stages from simple political maneuvering between some countries to extremely hot insurgent

war in other countries, changes in conditions in turn demand a change in emphasis of procedures and techniques. As examples, the need to honor political boundaries often reduces the effectiveness of airborne technical devices and requires a modified use of these means and a greater emphasis upon covert collection techniques. Or, the nature of the early stages of insurgent war may limit the effectiveness of technical devices and combat intelligence techniques, and also require greater emphasis on covert collection techniques. For each situation, collection techniques must be selected in terms of their capability and suitability within the nature of the cold war situation.

b. Limited War. In a limited war, intelligence operations are primarily of a combat intelligence nature. Although the immediate emphasis in intelligence operations is determined by the requirement to support the existing operational situation, the consequences of a sudden extension of the conflict, particularly to a general war, dictate that intelligence operations be conditioned to this possibility. Intelligence operations must produce information and intelligence which will provide warning of an impending extension of the conflict. The overall system, which includes organization, equipment, and operations, must be maintained in such a condition so as to permit a ready transition from a limited to a general war.

c. General War. During the opening phases of a general war, the intelligence emphasis is on maintaining the security of the command; providing early warning of the start of major enemy tactical operations protecting intelligence collection means; and providing such evaluated information concerning the nature of the enemy, the weather, and terrain, as may be available and is required. When tactical operations begin, intelligence operations are oriented toward securing the intelligence necessary for accomplishment of the assigned tactical mission.

17. Use of Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Weapons-Munitions

a. General. The use of nuclear, chemical,

and biological weapons-munitions affects the nature of military operations which in turn changes the intelligence requirements. For example, the scale on which nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons-munitions are used affects the relationship between fire and maneuver. This relationship influences intelligence operations concerned with target acquisition. Similarly, the scale on which nuclear or chemical weapons-munitions are used affects the degree of dispersion required to provide adequate security to units and installations. The degree of dispersion also influences intelligence operations concerned with combat surveillance and the physical area of operations. Greater dispersion of targets may demand the use of weapons with large areas of effect. These weapons, delivering nuclear surface bursts and biological munitions, have weather-dependent effects. Prior to employment, detailed weather information is required. Even with weapons with smaller areas of effect, weather requirements are essential in determining what units or areas, other than the target, will be affected. The effects of chemical or biological weapons-munitions influence the use of defensive and protective equipment.

b. Use of Nuclear Weapons on Restricted Scale.

- (1) A restricted scale of use of nuclear weapons dictates that combat forces adopt measures which permit speed, dispersion, and mobility—of a high degree, on air and ground—on the battlefield. Intelligence requirements emphasize the importance of knowledge of the terrain, particularly the air and ground routes that influence courses of action. Target acquisition for nuclear delivery means is a major function. Political, social, and economic information of the area of operations is relatively less important to the conduct of the military operation than terrain and target acquisition data. The enemy, weather, and the terrain are the dominant intelligence factors that permit the commander to judge vulnerabilities, compare courses

of action, and arrive at prudent decisions.

- (2) Counterintelligence activities focus on measures to protect nuclear delivery means (and associated installations) and to reduce the effectiveness of enemy target acquisition.
- (3) Techniques and procedures must make maximum use of advanced technological equipment to provide the responsive intelligence operation necessary in nuclear warfare.

c. Use of Nuclear Weapons on an Unrestricted Scale.

- (1) In the use of nuclear weapons in the higher scales, firepower generally becomes the dominant element of combat power. In such situations, intelligence operations are concerned more with target acquisition and counterintelligence than with the influence of the area of operations on ground and air mobility.
- (2) Emphasis in target acquisition is on locating enemy nuclear delivery means and other nuclear targets.
- (3) Emphasis in counterintelligence operations is on preserving the integrity of the command and on protecting nuclear delivery systems by denying the enemy the ability to acquire targets.

d. Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons.
The employment of chemical and biological weapons introduces new factors into intelligence operations. The effectiveness of such weapons, the difficulty of immediately detecting their employment, and the surprise with which they can be delivered present a formidable intelligence problem. The nature of these weapons has created a requirement for special means of detecting biological aerosols and a better means of detecting chemical agents. The influence of weather, particularly micrometeorology, on the effectiveness of our CB munitions and on troop safety distances requires detailed and reliable weather forecasts, and observations. Until automatic chemical and biological detection devices are developed, emphasis must be placed

on obtaining information on the enemy's capability and intention to employ CB agents.

18. Enemy Forces

Enemy forces may vary from a well-trained, well-supported, highly mobile, and numerically superior force to one that is a loosely organized group of indigenous forces operating with little or no support. These latter forces can be expected, however, to exploit fully opportunities for guerrilla warfare, subversion, and sabotage, and be capable of maintaining sustained operations under favorable conditions. The diversity of possible enemy capabilities correspondingly increases the scope of the intelligence requirements of the commander.

19. The Area of Operations

An important intelligence task is to provide information about the area of operations. The magnitude of this task increases as the locale of military operations changes from a modern, well-developed, and well-documented area of the world to a more remote area on which little or no documentation is available. In such an area, a greater proportion of the collection effort must be expended on the collection of information about the area of operations (particularly terrain).

20. The Civil Population

a. The attitudes, actions, and capabilities of the civil population significantly affect intelligence operations. A friendly populace that actively assists the military force is an important asset in collecting information and in countering the enemy's intelligence activities. A vigorous well-planned civil affairs operations program, including community relations and civic action, will contribute to development of a cooperative attitude on the part of the populace. A hostile population, on the other hand, makes the collection of information more difficult, increases the scope and magnitude of counter-intelligence operations, and intensifies the requirements for information on the civil aspects of the area of operations. Hostile civilian activities constituting a threat to the security of activities or installations must be taken into consideration in planning for operations.

b. In internal defense operations, the civil

population (PEOPLE) are an important combat intelligence factor because the insurgent war revolves around the attitude of the PEOPLE toward the host government. Both insurgent and government forces attempt to win the loyal support of the population. The insurgent has directly associated the people with the insurgency through promises or threats in order to gain their loyalty and continuing support. The insurgent depends on the support of the people to sustain his manpower requirements, his logistical needs and his intelligence collection effort. This then provides one of the most important distinctions between internal defense operations and conventional warfare. Almost every action taken must be carefully considered as to its possible effect on the people, weighing immediate effects versus long range effects, and effects on the enemy as opposed to effects on the people. Consequently, PEOPLE are an important intelligence target on the same level as ENEMY, WEATHER, AND TERRAIN.

21. Friendly Forces

Intelligence operations are oriented primarily on aspects of the operational environment external to the command. However, the conduct of intelligence operations is affected by the means available to the friendly forces and the organization of the friendly forces.

a. Means Available.

- (1) The availability and capability of intelligence units and information collection devices of friendly forces are important influences in intelligence operations. For example, a limitation in the number of aerial vehicles may result in a reduction in the tactical air reconnaissance/aerial battlefield surveillance capability. This in turn may require a greater dependence upon collection by ground reconnaissance/surveillance means.
- (2) All military units are means for collecting information. The amount of effort devoted to this aspect of intelligence operations varies with the primary mission of the unit. Combat and combat support units normally devote a significant effort toward the collection of information, while other

types of units may collect information only to the extent that their normal activities provide as a by-product information of intelligence value.

- (3) The availability of support from other services also affects Army intelligence operations. In this respect, tactical air reconnaissance and meteorology are especially affected.
- (4) Other governmental agencies may be represented in the area of operations. The agencies most frequently represented are the State Department, Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, and the Defense Intelligence Agency.
- (5) Specific agencies which collect or process information are discussed in a later paragraph.

b. Organization of the Forces.

- (1) At times, the friendly force structure may dictate that a headquarters conduct intelligence operations which would normally be performed by a higher headquarters. In a small theater of operations, a field army headquarters may be required to perform the intelligence operations normally conducted by a theater army headquarters, or a reinforced division may be required to perform the intelligence operations of a field army.

- (2) In combined operations, which involve the armed forces of allied nations, certain intelligence operations may be assigned to a combined effort of all the participating nations. Combined intelligence operations may be an essential characteristic of internal defense operations.
- (3) In unified operations and joint actions, the basic intelligence function is unchanged. Intelligence functions, responsibilities, and procedures in unified operations and joint actions are conducted in accordance with Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication No. 2, "Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)."

c. Composition of Forces. The composition of a force determines some of its intelligence requirements. A predominantly armored force has somewhat different requirements for detailed terrain information than an infantry force. Weather information requirements of an airborne or airmobile force are different from those of mechanized, motorized, or conventional infantry forces. An enemy capability or vulnerability which is an important consideration to one force may not be equally important to others. These different intelligence requirements influence intelligence operations to include the determination of intelligence priorities and methods of collecting information.

Section IV. WEATHER AND GEOGRAPHICAL ENVIRONMENT

22. General

Combat intelligence, by definition, is that knowledge of the enemy, weather, and geographical features (terrain) required by a commander in the planning and conduct of tactical operations. Two of these three intangibles with which the commander is concerned, weather and terrain, are discussed in this section.

23. Weather

a. Types of Weather Conditions. A proper assessment of the military aspects of weather must commence with an examination of weather conditions. These conditions include:

- (1) *Visibility.* Fog, haze, and precipitation reduce visibility, and thereby provide varying degrees of concealment from ground and air observation, as well as attenuating the effects of thermal radiation resulting from the detonation of a nuclear weapon. These weather conditions normally favor the attacker. As a result, disrupting actions, feints, ruses, and other deceptive measures are particularly aided by poor visibility. Good visibility will, of course, be a detriment. On the whole, good visibility favors the defender by permitting him to observe

the approach of the enemy and to allow the bringing of fire upon him with maximum effectiveness. Other considerations being equal, good visibility tends to favor the side with superiority in air, artillery, and nuclear weapons.

- (2) *Clouds.* Clouds affect not only air activities, but they also affect other weather elements such as temperature—retard the loss of heat from the earth's surface due to radiational cooling. They also affect natural illumination by day or by night.
- (3) *Precipitation.* This is one of the most significant of the weather elements, because heavy snow or rain will affect mobility, as well as directly affecting personnel and equipment.
- (4) *Temperature.* Extremes of temperature are found in such terrain as deserts and mountains and adversely affect tactical operations by affecting both personnel and equipment.
- (5) *Wind.* Wind velocity materially affects the degree of cold in which an individual can survive. For example, with no wind personnel can be fairly comfortable at temperatures below 0° F., but a 5 mph wind at 20° F. or a 20 mph wind at 25° F. can cause exposed flesh to freeze. The wind can also indirectly affect air or ground observation by creating a dense screen of blowing sand, dust, or snow.

b. Effects of Weather on Personnel.

Weather has the following direct effects on the physical well-being and emotional state of personnel.

- (1) Physical disabilities such as heat exhaustion, frostbite, snow blindness, and mountain sickness are caused directly by weather conditions.
- (2) The resistance to many diseases is lowered by the effects of weather on metabolism, level of physical activity, and mental state of the person.
- (3) Seasonal patterns also occur in some types of diseases—common cold, influenza, and pneumonia.

- (4) The physical and mental strain on personnel is increased by prolonged exposure to extremes of temperature and humidity, to heavy or prolonged precipitation, to high winds, and to other harassing weather influences.
- (5) The incidence of communicable diseases is also affected by the influence of weather on the distribution of disease-causing and disease-carrying agents.

c. Effects of Weather on Equipment and Supplies. Weather may cause damage to, or destruction of, supplies and equipment.

- (1) Precipitation or high humidity may cause rotting or mildewing of rubber, leather, cloth, and rope.
- (2) Humidity, combined with high temperatures, causes a rapid deterioration of some types of electrical insulating material and causes corrosion of exposed metal such as small arms and artillery pieces.
- (3) Materials such as wood, paper, and leather are sensitive to extremes of humidity. Others, such as sugar, tobacco, and glue, have critical humidity levels beyond which they lose their desirable properties.
- (4) Many products, such as food, medicine, film, and photographic chemicals, require special handling in areas where extremes of temperature and/or humidity are encountered.
- (5) High winds may damage or destroy many types of unprotected equipment. Blowing sand and dust may damage painted surfaces and such things as engines and weapons.
- (6) Communication-electronic equipment, and devices, unless protected by adequate casings, are affected by weather, extreme temperature, and humidity.

d. Effects of Weather on Natural Features. Weather conditions affect natural features of the environment. Some of the most important of these are described below:

- (1) Soil trafficability is affected by precipitation, air and soil temperatures, wind, and humidity.

- (2) The amount of precipitation, coupled with rain runoff factor and, in season, thawing ice and snow, affects the stream levels and may cause floods. Temperature variations result in freezing snow and ice in winter and thaw and breakup of ice in spring.
- (3) Snow cover affects concealment and mobility characteristics of terrain for personnel and vehicles.

e. Effects of Weather on Manmade Features.
Weather affects all modes of communication and physical structures.

- (1) Lines of communication, such as railways and highways, may be seriously affected by heavy accumulations of snow, by heavy or prolonged precipitation, and by frost action in the soil.
- (2) Wire communication may be affected by heavy accumulations of snow, formation of ice on wire lines, strong wind, and frost action in the soil.
- (3) Buildings and other installations may be affected as follows:
 - (a) Heavy snow accumulations may collapse roofs.
 - (b) High winds, tornadoes, hurricanes, or severe thunderstorms may damage or destroy structures.
 - (c) Frost action may damage surfaced runways.
 - (d) Hail may break exposed glass, plexiglass, and similar materials.
 - (e) High temperatures may be injurious to paint.
 - (f) Heavy or prolonged rains may weaken foundations and may flood subterranean and other installations constructed in low-lying areas.

f. Influences of Weather on Tactical Activities. As discussed here, tactical activities are grouped into the categories of acquisition and exchange of information, movement, firing units, use of special equipment, consumption of supplies, and modification of environment. Each of these categories of activity is influenced by weather.

- (1) Acquisition and exchange of information involve reconnaissance and communication. Information concerning

the enemy and the area is procured by means of visual ground or air observation, aerial photographs, listening posts, sound ranging, radar, infrared, radio intercept, and other means.

- (a) Visual observation and photography are affected adversely by fog, smoke, dust, haze, and precipitation. Visual observation from the air is hindered or prevented by clouds between the observer and the object or area observed.
- (b) In addition to the above factors, dense clouds may reduce illumination to a point where attempts at photography are made difficult or impossible. However, a high, thin layer of clouds may make photo reconnaissance easier by reducing ground shadows. Reflection of sunlight from a snow surface may make it difficult to obtain clear photographs.
- (c) The effectiveness of listening posts is decreased by weather conditions such as thunder, heavy precipitation, and high winds that reduce audibility.
- (d) Sound-ranging operations are affected by changes in weather conditions, such as temperature, humidity, and wind.
- (e) Radar is affected by vertical distribution of temperature and moisture in the atmosphere. Clouds and precipitation also influence radar by producing "clutter" that obscures echoes.
- (f) Wire communication is affected by electrical discharges in the atmosphere. Excessive ground moisture reduces the range of field wire circuits using sound and battery-powered telephones.
- (g) High frequency radio is affected by electrical discharges. VHF and UHF radios are subject to abnormal propagation resulting from certain moisture and temperature distributions.

- (h) Messengers are affected by many weather factors, and their ability to move is also subject to weather effects.
- (i) Visual communication is affected by obstructions to vision such as fog, clouds, dust, haze, and precipitation.
- (2) Movement involves air or surface transport of personnel, equipment, and supplies.
 - (a) Movement by air is affected by clouds, visibility, temperature, and surface winds at terminals, and by clouds, visibility, temperature, wind turbulence, icing, and other hazards occurring over routes.
 - (b) Surface movement is affected by trafficability, conditions of line-of-communication features and visibility. Each is subject to the effects of weather conditions; however, the effect of weather on the various modes of travel (wheel, truck, and foot) will differ.
- (3) Weather influences the use of weapons by affecting delivery capabilities and by influencing the terminal effects of the fires.
 - (a) Muzzle velocity is affected by temperature.
 - (b) Trajectory is affected by wind, air density, and air temperature.
 - (c) The range and flight path of rockets and guided missiles are affected by wind.
 - (d) The employment of smoke is influenced by the wind direction and speed and temperature gradient. Precipitation and humidity influence the density and persistency of smoke screens.
 - (e) The effectiveness of incendiaries and flame is influenced by precipitation and strong winds.
 - (f) The effectiveness of chemical and biological agents is influenced in varying degrees by temperature, temperature gradient, precipitation, humidity and strong winds. In addition, biological agents are affected by sunlight.
- (4) The effectiveness of certain types of special equipment is influenced by weather.
 - (a) Clouds and obstructions to vision affect searchlight activities. Low clouds provide a reflecting surface that increases the effectiveness of searchlight illumination. Dense fog, precipitation, or other obstructions to vision decrease searchlight effectiveness by scattering and diffusing light.
 - (b) The use of loudspeakers in psychological operations is affected by any weather element that reduces audibility.
- (5) The rate of consumption of most supplies is directly influenced by weather conditions.
- (6) A great variety of activities related to strengthening defensive positions, facilitating movement, and obstructing enemy movement are performed by tactical forces. Included in these categories are such activities as construction of emplacements and fortifications, mine laying, and construction of roads, airstrips, and other facilities. Weather affects the speed with which such tasks can be completed and may provide concealment for forces carrying out such tasks near the enemy.
 - (a) Emplacements must be designed to withstand the weather. Alternate freezes and thaws of the soil prevent using materials that peel, scale, or crack. Prolonged or heavy rainfall softens the ground so that special foundations, bracing, and drainage are necessary to prevent cave-ins and flooding. Heavy rains or severe freezes slow or completely stop excavation.
 - (b) Rains may make mine-laying operations easier by softening the ground. Severe freezes may make digging difficult, and thereby, increase the time required for laying minefields. Concealment of mines

is difficult after a snowfall. However, falling snow quickly obliterates tracks and signs of digging.

- (c) The amount of rainfall affects plans for foundations and drainage systems for roads, airfields, and similar facilities. In addition, the weather influences methods used and time required for completion of construction.

24. Terrain

a. General. As long as wars are fought on the ground, terrain will exercise a dominant influence on tactics. Terrain is analyzed in terms of its five military aspects (observation and fire, concealment and cover, obstacles, key terrain, and avenues of approach) to determine the affect of terrain on the general courses of action available to friendly and enemy forces.

b. Observation and Fire.

- (1) Observation relates to the influence of the terrain on the ability of a force to exercise surveillance over a given area either visually or through the use of surveillance devices, both optical and electronic. The best observation generally is obtained from the highest terrain features in an area; characteristics of the terrain which restrict observation include hills, cliffs, and dense vegetation. Although the net effect of visibility and observation is manifested in the ability of a force to see (or its vulnerability to being seen), they are analyzed independently because the former varies with weather conditions which are transitory, whereas the latter varies with terrain conditions which are relatively permanent. For example, a high hill may provide excellent observation (an aspect of terrain) even though visibility (an effect of weather) is restricted by fog surrounding the hill at a given time. On the other hand, consider a well lighted, windowless room in which visibility is unrestricted but observation does not exceed the distance to the farthest wall.
- (2) Fire, a generic term, encompasses the

influence of the terrain on the effectiveness of direct and indirect fire weapons. The fires of high-angle weapons such as mortars and howitzers are affected primarily by terrain conditions within the target area which may influence the terminal effect of the projectile. Fields of fire for direct fire weapons such as machineguns and automatic rifles are primarily affected by terrain conditions between the weapon and the target.

- (3) The analyst identifies those terrain features within and adjacent to the area of operations which afford the friendly or enemy force favorable observation and fire. He considers them in his subsequent analysis of concealment and cover, key terrain and avenues of approach.

c. Concealment and Cover. Concealment is protection from observation; cover is protection from the effects of fire. The analyst determines the concealment and cover available to both friendly and enemy forces.

- (1) Concealment may be provided by terrain features such as woods, underbrush, snowdrifts, tall grass, cultivated vegetation or by any other feature which denies observation. Concealment from ground observation does not necessarily provide concealment from air observation or from electronic or infrared detection devices. Concealment does not necessarily provide cover.
- (2) Cover may be provided by trees, rocks, ditches, quarries, caves, river banks, folds in the ground, shell craters, buildings, walls, railroad embankments and cuts, sunken roads, and highway fills. Areas that provide cover from direct fires may or may not protect against the effects of indirect fire; however, most terrain features that offer cover also afford concealment.

d. Obstacles.

- (1) An obstacle is any natural or artificial terrain feature which stops, impedes, or diverts military movement.

(2) Consideration of obstacles is influenced by the mission. In the defense the intelligence officer identifies as obstacles those features of the terrain which stop or impede military movement within the battle area. In the attack he considers the obstacles within his unit's assigned or assumed zone of action.

(3) An obstacle may constitute an advantage or disadvantage. For example, obstacles perpendicular to a direction of attack favor the defender by slowing or canalizing the attacker. On the other hand obstacles parallel to the direction of attack may assist in protecting a flank of the attacking force.

e. Key Terrain. A key terrain feature is any locality or area whose seizure or control affords a marked advantage to either opposing force. As used in this definition, the term "seizure" clearly implies physical occupation of the terrain by a force, whereas the term "control" may or may not include physical occupation. Control can be exercised by the use of fire as well as by physical occupation. The critical element in determining whether or not a given terrain feature is key terrain rests in the judgment of the analyst as to what constitutes a "marked" advantage in a given situation. Recognizing that a terrain feature may afford a marked advantage in one set of circumstances but only a slight advantage or no advantage under other conditions, it becomes clear that the selection of key terrain varies with the level of command, the type of unit, and the mission of the unit.

(1) *Level of Command and Type of Unit.*

(a) As an example of the influence of the level of command on the selection of key terrain, consider a circumstance in which a given city provides a common terminus for a network of highways, railways and canals; to the field army commander seizure or control of the city would afford him the marked advantage of gaining control of a vital link in his line of communications; therefore, he might properly select the city as key terrain. On the other

hand, an infantry battalion commander within that field army gains no advantage from seizing or controlling the city and therefore would not consider it key terrain. The structure of friendly and enemy units also influences the analyst in the selection of key terrain. An airborne battalion, for example, may under proper circumstances select cleared areas as key terrain because seizure or control would permit their use as drop zones; to a tank battalion commander the same areas may be of little or no consequence.

(b) Types of terrain features which are frequently selected as key terrain for tactical units include high ground from which favorable observation and fire over a significant portion of the operation area may be obtained, bridges over unfordable rivers, assigned or assumed objectives and dominant terrain within a defensive sector. Obstacles are rarely selected as key terrain by two analysts although the same terrain feature may properly be analyzed as key terrain at one level of command and as an obstacle at another. An example of this is the city mentioned in the preceding paragraph; to the army commander, the city is key terrain whereas to the battalion commander it is an obstacle, but it is not both key terrain and an obstacle to the same commander. To examine this further, consider a circumstance in which the use of an unfordable river as a defensive line is appropriate to a commander who has been directed to defend; is the river key terrain because its seizure or control affords a marked advantage to the commander conducting the defense, or is it an obstacle because it stops or impedes military movement? At the tactical unit level, in normal terrain, the river is classified as an obstacle because of

its primary effect of stopping or impeding military movement and the adjacent high ground is key terrain because its seizure or control permits full utilization of the obstacle value of the river and it is this condition which constitutes the tactical advantage.

(2) *Mission of the Unit.*

(a) In the attack, key terrain features usually lie forward of the friendly dispositions and are often assigned as objectives. Terrain features in adjacent zones may be key terrain if their control facilitates the conduct of the attack or accomplishment of the mission. Terrain in an adjacent zone which gives the enemy effective observation along an avenue of approach which may be used by friendly forces may be key terrain. Key terrain may be selected within friendly territory when its control is essential to the success of an offensive operation. For example, if the enemy can attack before our attack and, by so doing, seize a terrain feature which prevents or hinders the launching of our attack, then the control of that terrain feature affords either force a marked advantage and is key terrain.

(b) In the defense, key terrain is usually located within the battle area. Infrequently key terrain may be forward of the defensive area or in adjacent sectors. A terrain feature forward of the battle area which gives the enemy a decided advantage of observation over defended localities, routes of communications, or enemy avenues of approach is key terrain. A terrain feature in an adjacent defensive sector which may give the same advantage may also be considered key terrain.

f. *Avenue of Approach.*

(1) An avenue of approach is a route for a force of a particular size to reach an objective or key terrain. To be con-

sidered an avenue of approach, a route must provide enough width for the deployment of the size force for which the avenue of approach is being considered. Intelligence officers above corps level consider avenues of approach which are adequate for at least a division. The intelligence officer at corps and lower levels usually considers avenues of approach adequate for the deployment of the major maneuver element directly subordinate to his headquarters. Thus, the corps G2 considers avenues of approach which are adequate for a division, the division G2 considers those which are adequate for a type brigade, the brigade S2 considers those which are adequate for a battalion and the battalion S2 considers those which are adequate for a company.

(2) The analysis of an avenue of approach at any level of command is based on the following considerations:

(a) *Observation and fire.* (Favorable observation and fire for the force moving on the avenue of approach.)

(b) *Concealment and cover.* (Provides favorable conditions of concealment and cover—this consideration is frequently in conflict with the preceding one.)

(c) *Obstacles.* (Avoids those which are perpendicular to the direction of advance and, whenever practical, takes advantage of those which are parallel to the direction of advance.)

(d) *Utilization of key terrain.*

(e) *Adequate maneuver space.* (Determination of required maneuver space is based, in part, on consideration of deployment patterns, means of mobility and the area required for maneuver to preclude presenting lucrative targets for nuclear fires.)

(f) *Ease of movement.* (This consideration includes such factors as relative length of the avenue of approach, directness of approach to

the objective, soil trafficability, steepness of slopes, obstacles, direction of terrain compartments with respect to the direction of movement and those aspects of the terrain which enhance or restrict command and control.)

- (3) It should be noted from the preceding paragraph that the analysis of an avenue of approach is based solely on terrain considerations. The ability of an opposing force (existing or assumed) to interfere with the use of an avenue of approach does not influence the analysis of that avenue of approach whether this analysis is being made by the commander, intelligence officer, or any other staff officer at any level of command.
- (4) In the attack, avenues of approach which lead from the line of departure to key terrain within the objective area are selected for analysis and the best avenue of approach available to the friendly force is identified. See figure 2.
- (5) In the defense, avenues of approach starting forward of the defensive position and leading to key terrain within the battle area are selected for analysis and the best avenue of approach available to the enemy is identified. Avenues of approach available to the enemy are described as terminating within that key terrain in the

battle area which, if seized by the attacker, will result in the defeat of the defender. Such an avenue of approach begins a reasonable distance beyond the initial disposition of the forward forces of the unit for whom the analysis is being made. This distance is usually equal to the forward extent of the defense sector. See figure 3.

25. Relationship of Weather and Terrain

The two earlier paragraphs discussed the elements of weather and terrain separately. These elements, however, interact and the results of this interaction affect the commander's mission. Examples of such interaction follow:

a. Changes in weather tend to alter the surface condition of terrain, but the same weather conditions, for example, rain, may have decidedly differing effects depending upon the type of terrain—a clay road becomes impassable, while a road of sandy soil becomes more firm.

b. Terrain relief affects weather conditions; for example, moist air moving rapidly up the slopes of a mountain, hill, or ridge often causes fog, mist, or low-lying clouds over the elevated terrain, while the nearby valleys remain clear. Moisture at higher elevations may result in snow, while the same amount of moisture may fall as rain at lower elevations. The terrain also influences other aspects of the weather, such as wind velocity and humidity.


Section V. ORGANIZATION

26. Organization of the Intelligence Section

a. General.

- (1) The commander relies primarily on the G2/S2 section of his own staff, the attached military intelligence organizations, and subordinate combat units for the combat intelligence that he requires. Consequently, a knowledge of these organizations—their composition, capabilities, interrelationships and personnel—is a necessity. Beginning with the intelligence section, generally speaking there are several factors which will

affect the duty assignments within, and the organization of, the section. One such factor is the requirement placed upon the intelligence officer to be responsible for the operations of the section. In order that he may best meet this responsibility, the detailed supervision of the section should generally be left to an assistant. Such a measure will assure the intelligence officer of the continued operation of the section in his absence and, furthermore, will provide him with the time necessary to analyze properly



NOTE:
IN THE ATTACK, AVENUES OF APPROACH WHICH LEAD FROM THE LINE OF DEPARTURE TO KEY TERRAIN WITHIN THE OBJECTIVE(S) ARE SELECTED FOR ANALYSIS AND THE BEST AVENUE OF APPROACH AVAILABLE TO THE FRIENDLY FORCE IS IDENTIFIED.


Figure 2. Avenue of approach in the attack.

the intelligence produced by the section and to use this as a basis for making sound recommendations to the commander.

- (2) Another factor that must be considered is the need for continuous (24-hour) operation of the intelligence section. The section must retain sufficient flexibility to meet peak

workloads without impairing the ability to continue operations during displacement. At division and above, the G-2 maintains personnel in the Tactical Operations Center (TOC) and may be required to assist in the manning of an alternate command post.

- (3) Finally, there are a number of issues



NOTE:
IN THE DEFENSE, AVENUES OF APPROACH AVAILABLE TO THE ENEMY ARE SELECTED FOR ANALYSIS AND THE BEST AVENUE OF APPROACH IS DETERMINED.

Figure 3. Avenue of approach in the defense.

that the G2/S2 will consider in actually organizing his section. He must form his own organization because the Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) specifies only the number of personnel authorized for the intelli-

gence section and does not prescribe a functional organization. Under normal circumstances the "type" functional organization, a flexible one, discussed in this paragraph is modified to meet the needs of the com-

mand in terms of the mission assigned, the scope of the intelligence activities to be performed, and the number of qualified personnel available. Under certain conditions it may be necessary to augment unit intelligence sections with representatives of other agencies, units, or services. This will be especially true under conditions of independent, semi-independent, or relatively stationary operations in a given area.

b. Brigade and Battalion. Because of the small number of personnel involved at these echelons, the S2 and S3 personnel must work together as a team in order to discharge their joint responsibilities. Personnel from either section must be prepared to assume the duties and functions of the other when necessary.

c. Division. Normally a "type" G2 section at division level (see figure 2) will consist of four functional branches—operations, G2 air, counterintelligence, and administration. These branches perform the functions described below:

- (1) *Operations Branch.* The operations branch accomplishes functions which encompass the entire spectrum of the intelligence cycle—planning the collecting and processing information, and disseminating the resulting intelligence. Along with these functions, the operations branch maintains the collection plan and publishes the commander's essential elements of information (EEI) in the form of orders and requests for information to units; maintains enemy situation maps; prepares daily journal summaries; plans reconnaissance and surveillance operations; develops target data; and prepares intelligence estimates, analyses of areas of operations, intelligence annexes, and intelligence reports. In addition to these functions, the branch engages in a variety of diverse but intelligence-related activities—conducting required research projects; arranging for liaison with higher, lower, and

adjacent headquarters; disseminating weather information; supervising prediction of radioactive fallout from enemy-delivered weapons and supervising the monitoring and surveying of radioactive contaminations from all weapons; supervising procurement and distribution of maps and map supplements; supervising the activities of the order of battle (OB) and interrogation prisoners of war (IPW) personnel of the attached military intelligence (MI) detachments; and providing intelligence training for division personnel.

- (2) *G2 Air Branch.* Personnel of this branch supervise the activities of all organic and supporting aerial reconnaissance elements. Included are the briefing and debriefing of all pilots and observers and monitoring of their airborne transmissions, and the establishment of priorities on requests for missions received from all units. As a part of this operation, the G2 air branch maintains aerial reconnaissance maps and other essential records. The reproduction of the aerial photography obtained is coordinated with the signal photo officer. Once the photographs are obtained, the G2 air branch supervises the imagery interpreters of the MI detachment in their interpretation of those prints. The intelligence obtained is then distributed by the branch, in coordination with the aforementioned operations branch, to all interested agencies.
- (3) *Counterintelligence (CI) Branch.* This branch is organized from the MI detachment and assists the commander in the discharge of his counterintelligence and security responsibilities. This includes the responsibilities of recommending and supervising general security and counterintelligence measures (counterespionage, countersabotage, countersubversion, and censorship); supervising the interrogation of personnel of CI interest;




Figure 4. "Type" G2 section (all levels division, corps, field army), with supporting units.

maintaining records of known and suspected enemy agents and collaborators; supervising the activities of the counterintelligence personnel of the attached MI detachments; preparing counterintelligence estimates, plans, directives, and reports; and supervising security training within the command in conjunction with the G3.

- (4) *Administration Branch.* The administration branch performs all of the administration, transportation, and housekeeping requirements of the G2 section. The branch administers to the needs of both assigned and at-

tached personnel. The branch is responsible for maintaining the section journal, central files and records, and duty rosters. It establishes a G2 message center for the handling of outgoing and incoming intelligence reports. Dissemination is to be given proper emphasis since the proper routing and timeliness of the intelligence may well determine whether or not a mission is successfully accomplished.

- (5) *Supporting Units.*

- (a) There are two major support elements available to the division G2

section. The first of these is an element attached from the U.S. Army Security Agency (USASA) parent unit to the division. This element is capable of furnishing signal intelligence to the G2 section and providing signal security assistance. In addition, this element also carries out certain aspects of electronic warfare.

- (b) The MI detachment is the second major support element available and is attached from the MI parent unit to the division. It has the mission of performing specialized intelligence and counterintelligence functions which require the employment of foreign languages or special skills, to include order of battle, interrogation of prisoners of war, imagery interpretation, and counterintelligence (see figure 5).


d. Corps. The functions of the G2 section at corps (see figure 4) are basically the same as those at division, but the scope of corps responsibilities is enlarged and the volume of information at corps is greater, with a consequent increase in personnel (TOE 52-1). The increase is necessary because the corps G2 section is concerned with the collection efforts of the collection agencies which penetrate beyond the zones that are of immediate interest to the divisions. Furthermore, the leadtime required for planning a future operation is greater at corps than it is at the division level. Because of the increased scope of its responsibilities and the greater volume of information handled at corps, the basic organization and the supporting elements are larger in size than those which are found at division level. For example, the USASA element is now a larger unit, the MI unit has an increase in strength in the form of editorial and technical intelligence personnel who operate under the supervision of the operations branch, and a new organization, the long range patrol company, provides a deep reconnaissance and target acquisition capability.

e. Field Army.

- (1) At this echelon, there is again a

significant increase in the amount and scope of activities compared to that found at division and corps levels (see figure 4) and the MI element has an increased strength and capability. Therefore, personnel authorizations are again increased (see TOE 51-1). Planning leadtime is greater, the area of jurisdiction and administration responsibility have increased tremendously, and the intelligence requirements have progressed beyond that of combat to strategic intelligence. In the latter case, there is a need for target information from deep within the enemy territory so that suitable targets may be located for long-range weapons available at army level; conversely, the army must also counter enemy air and missile capabilities.

- (2) To meet these increased responsibilities, there is a Tactical Operations Center (TOC), a central agency of field army headquarters where designated representatives of the general and special staffs coordinate closely to insure continuous and efficient integration of support operations with current tactical operations. Furthermore, the G2 section itself has a number of changes in both organizational and operational duties. Specialized intelligence support is received from the MI unit at field army.
- (3) The operations branch performs the same basic functions as at the lower levels plus strategic intelligence research and analysis (SIRA) and technical intelligence (TI) functions. Strategic intelligence research and analysis personnel provide interested agencies studies in fields of strategic intelligence interests, process information relating to areas of assigned interest, and disseminate the intelligence produced. Technical intelligence personnel plan and supervise the exploitation of captured materiel by technical intelligence specialists; coordinate activities of scientific and



*With Corps MI Detachment only.

Figure 5. Military intelligence detachment.

technical intelligence agencies in the field army area; assist special staff and technical service intelligence personnel in obtaining PW interrogation reports, translations of captured documents, photographs, and other available data on enemy technical and scientific materiel; prepare technical intelligence summaries and reports; and maintain collection directives and

plans, items-wanted lists, and technical intelligence files.

- (4) The field army G2 air branch is also responsible for the staff supervision of the imagery interpretation detachments operating with tactical air force reconnaissance squadrons.
- (5) The counterintelligence branch supervises the activities of censorship and counterintelligence personnel

teams and counterintelligence personnel from the MI unit.

- (6) In addition to the functions performed by the G2 sections at lower levels, the administration branch of the field army G2 section supervises the activities of the editorial section.
- (7) A plans branch is added to the G2 section at field army level. In line with the increased scope of responsibilities, this branch prepares and/or coordinates action on intelligence plans, intelligence collection memoranda, specific requests for information, EEI, and other intelligence requirements.
- (8) USASA and MI supporting units at field army are provided with an increased strength and capability.

27. Relationship of Intelligence Section with the Military Intelligence Units

a. General. The G2 section (division, corps,

and field army) is authorized (by TOE) a skeleton personnel force which requires augmentation. Specialist personnel are provided to the G2 section by an assigned (field army) or (attached corps and division) military intelligence unit (see figure 5). The military intelligence units place a minimal administrative burden on the supported units since administrative support is provided by the parent intelligence organization.

b. Attachment. To maintain a harmonious and close working relationship with the supported units, military intelligence detachments are activated and displaced concurrently with the supported unit of the field army. The units, minus linguist personnel and certain other intelligence specialists, are attached to the supported unit early in their joint training phases. As the MI unit displaces, administrative control over the unit is assigned or transferred from one MI parent unit to another, as required.

CHAPTER 3

THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Section I. GENERAL

28. Terms

The term "intelligence officer" is used here and elsewhere to include the assistant chief of staff, G2, of headquarters provided with a general staff, and, as appropriate, the intelli-

gence officer, or S2, of lower unit headquarters.

29. Scope

This chapter deals with a discussion of the relationships of the intelligence officer with the commander and other staff members.

Section II. COMMAND AND STAFF RESPONSIBILITIES AND RELATIONSHIPS

30. Intelligence Responsibilities of the Commander

The commander is responsible for all intelligence activities of his command, to include gathering and reporting information on the enemy and the area of operations; converting information into intelligence; and disseminating intelligence to higher, lower, and adjacent units. In connection with the security of his command, the commander is also responsible for taking appropriate counterintelligence measures.

31. Intelligence Responsibilities of the Intelligence Officer

a. The intelligence officer is the principal staff officer assigned to assist the commander to carry out his intelligence and counterintelligence responsibilities. As such, the intelligence officer assists the commander (and staff) by furnishing intelligence which is needed to make decisions and to plan operations. Intelligence is provided by the intelligence officer through written reports, estimates, and oral briefings.

b. The intelligence officer must plan ahead, making logical assumptions about probable missions which the command may expect to receive, and collect all necessary intelligence since the intelligence briefing is usually the first briefing called for by the commander. The advance planning can be facilitated by the

intelligence officer if he maintains close contact with the other staff members of his own headquarters and with G2/S2 of the next higher headquarters.

c. Once a mission has been received, the intelligence officer reevaluates the intelligence that he has on hand and determines what additional intelligence is needed by the commander for planning operations and making decisions. The needs are usually related to enemy capabilities, enemy vulnerabilities, and the area in which the operation will occur. These intelligence requirements are reported to and approved by the commander, and they form the bases for the collection effort.

d. The intelligence officer provides information, estimates, and intelligence plans during the planning phase of an operation. He also prepares, coordinates with the G3/S3, and recommends to the chief of staff pertinent fragmentary orders to initiate or modify intelligence operations.

e. During the execution phase of an operation, the intelligence officer supervises and coordinates intelligence operations to insure the successful execution of the commander's collection orders and to develop information of the enemy situation as rapidly and completely as possible. Intelligence derived from the enemy situation is of critical importance to the commander in deciding when and where to employ

reserves of combat power in the exploitation phase of the offense and in making counterattacks during defensive operations.

32. Relationship of the Intelligence Officer to the Staff

a. Primary general staff responsibility for any particular activity is assigned by the chief of staff to only one general staff officer. However, many activities are closely related and require close coordination and cooperation between several, and sometimes all, of the assistant chiefs of staff, G1 through G5.

b. The G2 prepares the analysis of the area of operations and the intelligence estimate; both are used by all staff officers in estimating the effect of weather, terrain, and possible enemy courses of action in their fields of interest. All general staff sections furnish, in turn, information to the G2. For example, the G5 furnishes information within the political, social, economic, and psychological fields for inclusion in the analysis of the area of operations and otherwise assists in intelligence activities involving civil affairs, such as civil censorship, identification and recommendation of potential sources and agencies, detection of enemy agents within the civilian population, and procurement of indigenous civilian equipment and supplies required for military intelligence operations.

c. Other specific intelligence data are furnished to meet the needs of various members of the staff. Staff members who need specific intelligence state these needs to the G2 so that he may include them in his collection plan. Specific intelligence needs include such items as target intelligence, technical intelligence, reconnaissance requirements, and maps.

d. All the assistant chiefs of staff recommend to the G2 essential elements of information (EEI) on enemy capabilities, vulnerabilities, and area characteristics which have a major effect on activities falling within their primary staff responsibilities. The G2 uses these recommendations and his own determination of intelligence requirements as a basis for the EEI to be recommended to the commander.

e. The G2 assists the G1 by providing information on which to base personnel loss estimates for the whole command. In turn, the G1 assists the G2 by insuring the availability

of intelligence specialists and by maintaining the strength of reconnaissance units.

f. The G2 is closely associated with the G3 in combat operations. At division, corps, and field army, they operate a joint staff facility (G2-G3 operations) as part of the tactical operations center (TOC).

33. Relationship of the Intelligence Officer to Higher and Lower Units

a. The intelligence officer furnishes intelligence to subordinate units and to higher headquarters. This intelligence may have been produced by the G2 and his section or received from higher, lower, or adjacent units. Intelligence is fully processed before it is disseminated; however, information is disseminated without being processed when time and importance of the information warrant such action.

b. The intelligence officer develops the plans and orders that govern the conduct of intelligence activities and collection efforts of the command. Orders are issued in the name of the commander, and the intelligence officer sees to it that these orders are properly executed.

c. The intelligence officer assists subordinate commanders and other intelligence staff officers to anticipate and to resolve or to minimize problems arising in the intelligence field. Such assistance frequently requires continuous coordination with other members of the general staff.

d. The intelligence officer maintains very close liaison with the S2 or G2 of the next higher headquarters to obtain early information regarding planned future operations. This liaison permits the intelligence officer to collect information and to prepare analyses and estimates needed by the commander, other members of the staff, and subordinate units to make their own estimates and plans. The intelligence officer at the next higher headquarters will be able to obtain and to furnish needed intelligence not otherwise available; for example, to provide advice as to the availability of specialists and intelligence detachments. The intelligence officer of the lower headquarters may then contact the G1/S1 or the G3/S3 of his own unit and request action to obtain additional intelligence support for a given operation, with the knowledge of its availability.

34. The Intelligence Officer as a Staff Section Chief

a. The primary function of the intelligence officer (G2) at echelons of division or higher is to supervise the overall intelligence effort in such a way as to effectively advise and assist the commander. To do this, the G2 will generally remain unencumbered by the daily routine of operations. He will, instead, channel his concerted effort to organize and to supervise the intelligence section and to control the attached intelligence units to obtain that intelligence necessary for the commander to successfully accomplish his mission. Above all, the G2 must remain responsive to the desires of the commander.

b. The effective utilization of available personnel resources may be the key to a G2's success. As means to that end, the G2 must constantly evaluate the strengths, weaknesses, and peculiarities of his personnel and relate these to their achievements. This evaluation will allow the G2 to better judge the intelligence produced by specific individuals and agencies and to better anticipate their future performance. The evaluation must be a deliberate and systematic one, and should not be limited to personnel. It should be extended to include sources and agencies as well. Normally such an evaluation should not be used as a basis for remedial action, unless such a step is clearly indicated. Another means of insuring effective utilization of personnel is to weight the need and to establish a priority for each intelligence task, thereby precluding the eventuality of unnecessarily dissipating limited personnel resources. And, once a task is determined to be necessary, it must be accomplished only in the order and to the degree required. Thus, the G2 can assure the commander of the timely, clear, concise, and accurate intelligence that is a must to achieve success in combat.

c. In addition to supervising and coordinating intelligence operations, the G2 must also coordinate closely with other staff heads. To facilitate planning for these missions, he will keep in close touch with the chief of staff, the G3, and other staff officers of his own headquarters, as well as the G2 of the next higher headquarters.

d. In the furtherance of the overall intelligence effort, the G2 should carry out a number of periodic and scheduled, personal liaison visits to related intelligence organizations. Such a step should prove to be mutually beneficial—a closer working relationship can be established. The quality of intelligence should also be improved as each agency obtains an understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the other and how each can provide support to others to resolve or minimize existing problems.

35. Intelligence Officer Functions in Intelligence Operations

a. The major G2/S2 functions in the field of intelligence (discussed in greater detail in later chapters) are:

- (1) Planning the collection effort and preparing orders;
- (2) Collecting the information;
- (3) Processing of collected information into intelligence; and
- (4) Disseminating and using the resulting intelligence.

b. In planning the collection effort and preparing orders and requests, a collection plan keyed to the mission of the command and enemy situation must be developed. Based on this plan, orders and requests for the collection of specified information are sent to selected units and organizations (collection agencies). A typical collection plan is discussed in detail later to show how it is related to the mission through the EEI and other intelligence requirements, and to reveal the logical thought processes by which the intelligence officer produces the specific orders and requests to be sent to the collection agencies.

c. Collecting the information is the next step. After the agencies with a collection capability have been selected and sent specific orders and requests, the intelligence officer or his assistant supervises the collection effort to verify that orders and instructions are executed effectively and with dispatch. This supervision can be facilitated by maintaining close contact with the intelligence staff officer and/or commanders of the units and organizations concerned. Such contact provides the intelligence

officer and his assistants with the latest information and permits a continuing review of the collection plan, which may need modification as the enemy situation changes or as the enemy situation becomes better known.

d. Processing is the third step. As the information is collected and received by the intelligence officer and his assistants, it is processed into intelligence. Processing consists of—

- (1) Recording;
- (2) Evaluating the information to determine its pertinence, reliability, and accuracy; and
- (3) Interpreting the information to determine its meaning and significance.

e. Disseminating and using the resulting intelligence are parts of the final step. Once intelligence has been produced, it is disseminated for use by all concerned. Dissemination is made by means of analyses, summaries, reports, estimates, briefings, and situation overlays. The intelligence officer, in addition to disseminating intelligence, uses his own product. He uses it primarily in making intelligence estimates for the commander and other members of the staff, in evaluating and interpreting other information, and in providing further direction to a new cycle of intelligence operations.

f. Although a single intelligence activity usually follows the sequence of the intelligence cycle as explained, it is not to be assumed that all activities in each phase of the cycle must be completed before passing to the next phase. Rather, there usually are concurrent activities occurring in all four phases—while the collection of new information is being planned and called for, other information is being processed and intelligence is being used.

g. At higher echelons, the production of military intelligence is an operation whose

magnitude and complexity require a more thorough, integrated, and systematic effort than is necessary at division and lower echelons. Sources are more numerous and varied, agencies produce larger volumes of information and intelligence, and the intelligence picture is so complex that it may be misinterpreted unless the collected information and intelligence are properly integrated into a meaningful whole.

h. At lower echelons the commander demands the maximum effort from his intelligence officer (S2) in the production of intelligence on enemy capabilities and in determining the effects of those capabilities on the unit's mission as well as on the operation plans prepared for the mission. The enemy capabilities are expressed at division and higher levels in terms too general for application to the missions of brigades and lower echelons. The commander at the lower echelon has the primary problem of ascertaining ways and means of countering the enemy's capabilities and accomplishing his mission successfully. To do this, he must have the answers to specific questions. The S2 must devote his time and effort to answering the commander's specific questions on such subjects as strength, disposition and identity of enemy units and the location of enemy weapons, mine fields and defensive installations. Concurrently, the S2 must determine the enemy's capabilities and probable courses of action. The S2 must coordinate most closely with the S3. At these levels the S2/S3 relationship can best be described by the term "dual function." That is, it is imperative that the S2 and the S3 possess a firm, clear and realistic understanding of each other's functions, and each must be prepared to assume for short periods of time the functions of the other concurrently with his own.

CHAPTER 4

COLLECTION OF INFORMATION

Section I. GENERAL

36. Introduction

a. In his capacity as a staff officer, the G2 directs his efforts toward the support of the planned or anticipated mission. This chapter provides the G2 with guidance in determining and understanding the intelligence requirements of the commander, sources of information, the various agencies which are available to obtain the information, and the coordination necessary for effective collection efforts.

b. The collection of information is made difficult by the fact that the enemy makes every practicable effort to defeat collection attempts. Accordingly, strengths, dispositions, and movements are concealed; censorship and communications security measures are enforced; false information is disseminated and tactical measures designed to deceive are adopted.

c. In order to penetrate the enemy's countermeasures, every conceivable source of pertinent information must be continuously exploited.

37. Planning and Executing the Collection Effort

a. The first step in planning and executing the collection effort is to determine the in-

telligence required for decisions and plans. The second step is to determine the priority of need for each one of the different intelligence items. The third step is to determine those enemy activities or characteristics of the area of operations which would indicate the answer to the intelligence requirement. The fourth step is to determine specific items of information, the presence or absence of which would affirm or refute pertinent indications. Collection agencies are then selected and appropriate orders are prepared and dispatched. The collection effort is supervised to insure that the required information is obtained in time to be of use.

b. To plan efficiently and to supervise the execution of the collection effort, the intelligence officer must thoroughly understand—

- (1) The mission of the command.
- (2) The area of operations.
- (3) The nature of available sources of information and the capabilities and limitations of available agencies.
- (4) The steps in planning and executing the collection effort.
- (5) The tactics, organizations, and characteristics of the enemy.

Section II. REQUIREMENTS

38. General

The commander's intelligence requirements are those facts which he needs to know, concerning the weather, terrain, and enemy in order to successfully execute his assigned mission. The collection capabilities of a command are, however, seldom sufficient to satisfy concurrently all intelligence requirements.

Therefore, collection resources of a command are directed toward definite intelligence objectives in the priority of their need. Such priorities should reflect the criticality of the need for a particular type of information. Unfortunately no formula can be provided to automatically determine priorities. The determination is largely one of judgment, for an

intelligence priority in one situation or for one command may not be a priority in another situation or for another command. These intelligence requirements generally can be divided, however, into two broad categories—essential elements of information (EEI) and other intelligence requirements (OIR).

39. Essential Elements of Information

a. The term “essential elements of information” is defined as those critical items of information regarding the enemy and his environment, needed by the commander by a particular time, to relate with other available information and intelligence in order to assist him in reaching a logical decision. The decision is of a type which involves the mission of the command and the choice of a course of action which can be taken to accomplish the mission. Any enemy capability or characteristic of the area which is a governing factor in the choice of a course of action will be an EEI. Enemy capabilities or area characteristics which may affect but which will not prevent the accomplishment of the mission, regardless of which course of action is chosen, will qualify as other intelligence requirements.

b. The relationship between an EEI and a command decision at a particular time dictates that the establishment, modification, or cancellation of an EEI must have the commander's approval.

c. Although EEI have a special relationship to the needs of the commander, at division and higher levels they may be originated by the staff in the form of recommendations. These recommendations are coordinated and presented by the intelligence officer for command approval.

d. An item of information or intelligence specified in the unit standing operating procedure (SOP) for collection or dissemination may become an EEI. For example, an SOP may require all units to report immediately such items as “known or suspected targets suitable for nuclear attack or indications of their existence or development.” Whether or not such an item is in the unit SOP, it becomes an EEI if it is needed by the commander at a given time in order to make a decision.

e. The nature and number of EEI will vary

with the type and phase of an operation and the extent and accuracy of the available information and intelligence. For example, in the planning phase of an airborne operation, there might be two EEI: (1) “What drop or landing zones exist in our objective area? Special attention . . .” (2) “What are the enemy's air defense dispositions? Special attention to . . .” During the execution phase of the same operation, the EEI might be reduced to one, the nature of which would be directed toward the enemy's nuclear capability.

f. When the available information and intelligence are complete enough to satisfy the commander's needs, he may have no further outstanding priorities. However, seldom is the available information or intelligence so complete that additional requirements do not exist.

40. Other Intelligence Requirements

a. After the allocation of means to collect the information required to satisfy the EEI, the remaining means are used for the collection of information on other enemy capabilities, vulnerabilities, and characteristics of the area which also could materially affect the successful accomplishment of the mission. Collection agencies may be able to collect information needed to satisfy “other” intelligence requirements concurrently with the collection of information needed to satisfy EEI. In such a case, the agencies may properly be assigned collection missions designed to satisfy multiple requirements. In addition, such information of the enemy and of the area of operations which is needed to aid in the interpretation of the results of the collection effort must be collected.

b. Other intelligence requirements are derived from command requirements which do not qualify as EEI, and from staff requirements. The formulation and/or announcement of intelligence requirements and the allocation of collection means to meet these requirements are staff responsibilities of the intelligence officer.

41. Stating Intelligence Requirements

a. When announced to the command, EEI and other intelligence requirements should be stated in such a manner that they will provide guidance to the agencies to allow formulation

of orders and requests for specific information. They should be stated clearly and concisely as specific questions dealing with—

- (1) Enemy capabilities, including time, place, strength, or details;
- (2) Enemy vulnerabilities, including nature, extent, permanence, or other details;
- (3) Enemy order of battle factors;
- (4) Terrain, including natural and artificial obstacles;
- (5) Weather; and
- (6) Information desired by higher, lower, or adjacent headquarters.

b. EEI are not announced in the foregoing manner to units which do not have an assigned intelligence officer. For example, the battalion S2 does not announce EEI to a company commander in the broad terms described above. He will, instead, present specific requirements for information based on the EEI.

42. Dissemination of Requirements

a. EEI and other intelligence requirements are disseminated to subordinate, higher, and adjacent commands to guide them in preparing collection plans and evaluating information by acquainting them with the commander's priority intelligence needs.

b. Because the subordinate unit receiving the EEI is a collection agency of the higher headquarters, due consideration is given to the EEI by the receiving subordinate unit even though the EEI are obviously outside the capabilities of that unit.

c. The intelligence requirements announced by another headquarters are analyzed by the receiving headquarters to determine whether or not that unit is physically capable of obtaining information pertinent to the requirements and whether or not the collection of that information is compatible with its mission. If not, the receiving headquarters does not repeat the requirements to its subordinate elements. The intelligence needs of higher headquarters are modified by a lower unit as required. For example, a corps EEI may ask, "Where are possible crossing sites on the COTTONWOOD River in the corps zone? Special attention to area between CRATERVILLE and TRAIL CITY." Subordinate di-

visions repeat the corps EEI, restricting it to the division zone and directing special attention to only specific parts of the river line within the division boundaries.

d. Intelligence requirements are disseminated by fragmentary orders or listed in paragraph 2 of the intelligence annex to an operation order, and they may be included in the coordination instructions of paragraph 3 of the operation order (see FM 101-5).

43. Cancellation or Modification

EEI and other intelligence requirements are cancelled or modified by fragmentary orders or by a new list published in an operation order. Those which are concerned with the enemy's adoption of a course of action prior to a specified time are automatically canceled when that time arrives.

44. Intelligence Requirements for Attack

a. *General.* Most of the commander's initial requirements must be satisfied during the planning phase so that plans may be properly formulated. Subsequent requirements, that is, information which is needed during the attack, must provide the basis upon which the commander can decide on movement of his reserves, employment of supporting weapons or units, and modification of his operation plan.

b. *Specific Requirements for the Planning Phase.*

- (1) *Location, type, and strength of enemy units on line and in reserve.* The locations of the enemy in contact should be established down to the lowest unit practicable. The type and strength of the enemy are indicative of the manner in which the area will be defended, the extent of enemy resistance, the force necessary to overcome the resistance, and the capability of the enemy to counter this force by employment of his reserves.
- (2) *Location, type, nature, and extent of enemy defensive installations, to include supporting weapons, screening units, and obstacles.* The magnitude and the complexity of the enemy's installations will help to de-

termine the choice of areas for the main attack, routes to the objective, areas for secondary attacks, and required destruction of obstacles or installations necessary to the accomplishment of the mission. The density of supporting weapons, their caliber or delivery capability, and resupply of ammunition help determine the preattack preparation fires necessary and the main area of attack. Screening units and obstacles must be taken into account in planning the phasing of an operation, the special units and/or equipment necessary to overcome obstacles, the timing of the attack, and the use of deception or counter-measures.

- (3) *Location, type, and strength of enemy reserves.* The commander will be concerned with those enemy reserves which have the capability of reinforcing in time to affect the accomplishment of his mission. For this reason it is essential to locate, identify as to type, and determine the strength of enemy reserves in the area of operation. It is the intelligence officer's responsibility to determine the movement capabilities of these enemy reserves and to keep the commander informed as to these capabilities.
- (4) *Location, number, and type of enemy automatic weapons.* Prior knowledge of the location, number, and type of enemy automatic weapons positions is of obvious advantage to the attacker. The density of automatic weapons in portions of the enemy's defensive area, together with the observation and fields of fire available, will influence the commander's choice of areas for his main attack, along with the planning of supporting fires to overcome this factor. The volume of fire power anticipated will also aid the commander in determining attachments of supporting elements to subordinate units to overcome enemy resistance.

- (5) *Location, number, and types of enemy supporting weapons.* The weapons included in this category include mortars, direct fire weapons, artillery, tank guns employed in a fire support role, antitank guns, or weapons assisting or protecting units of which they are not an organic part, but which are within the range of weapons controlled by the commander. The amount of mortar and other fire support within the enemy defensive area must be considered in assessing his overall defensive strength. Knowledge of this aspect of enemy strength and the location of these weapons enables the commander to plan for reducing the effectiveness of these fires by the employment of his own fires, the choice of routes for his attacking force, the timing of the attack, and the use of other counter-measures such as smokescreens.
- (6) *Location of enemy outposts.* An enemy may use outposts to prevent close ground observation of his main battle position, to indicate a false location as to his main battle position, or to mislead the opposing force as to the location of his main defensive position. The commander can apply the principle of surprise in his operations when he knows the location of the enemy's outposts by denying them observation, by cutting them off from the main body, by reducing them through fire, or bypassing them. When a commander possesses this knowledge, he has a wider choice of actions upon which to base his decision regarding the attack.
- (7) *Location of enemy command posts.* Locating and neutralizing enemy command posts aids in the reduction or elimination of command control over enemy subordinate units. This action may be carried out through harassment, destruction, isolation, or a combination of these means. The commander may physically isolate enemy

command elements from their units by tactical maneuver and/or by disrupting communications.

- (8) *Location of enemy boundaries.* When the commander plans an attack, the intelligence officer's function is to analyze the significance of enemy boundaries. If the enemy has recently moved into an area, shifted boundaries, or replaced units, he may be vulnerable along boundary lines. Enemy boundaries reveal much concerning the enemy defense and may have a bearing on the time of our attack, routes of advance, and the general employment of subordinate units.
- (9) *Observation.* Determination of the enemy's observation capability, his aerial and ground surveillance, and his electronic surveillance means and capabilities helps the commander plan effective countermeasures, determine attack timing, and plan for destruction, screening, or neutralization of these capabilities.
- (10) *Concealment and cover.* In planning for the attack, consideration will be given to those routes leading to the objective which offer concealment from the enemy's observation and cover from his fire. These factors must be viewed from the standpoint of the enemy's dispositions and his ability to counter the apparent advantage of concealment and cover along routes available.
- (11) *Location of obstacles.* The presence and location of natural or artificial obstacles are usually determined by means of map, aerial, or ground reconnaissance, or a combination of the three. The intelligence officer analyzes the relationship between obstacles and the enemy's dispositions to determine the degree to which these factors will influence the accomplishment of the assigned mission. The commander applies this analysis in planning, particularly in choosing

routes to the objective and in the timing of the operation.

- (12) *Weather and terrain.* Specific terrain features which, when held or controlled by friendly forces, will have an especially favorable effect on the outcome of the mission, are important factors in attack planning. These, coupled with an analysis of the weather and its effect on the operation, help determine the scheme of maneuver.
- (13) *Avenues of approach.* In planning an attack, the commander is concerned with the choice of direction of attack. The avenues of approach available will influence the choice of direction, when considered with available observation and fire, concealment and cover, obstacles, maneuver space, ease of movement, utilization of key terrain, enemy disposition, and weather.
- (14) *Location, number, and types of CBR and nuclear delivery means.* In the planning of an operation, consideration must be given to the possibility of enemy use of chemical and biological munitions and nuclear weapons. Plans must be made to insure a continuous collection of data on the enemy's capability to employ CBR agents. Based upon the enemy's capability, appropriate plans for protective measures and countermeasures must be made.

c. Requirements During the Attack.

- (1) *Movement of enemy units.* Units may be moved for deception, reinforcement, replacement, counterattack, blocking or withdrawal. The direction of movement, the location of the vacated area and the newly occupied area all provide important indications of the enemy's defensive plan.
- (2) *Displacement of weapons.* The displacement of enemy weapons provides indications of the enemy's plan of action. For example, weapons dis-

placing to the rear or disposed in depth may indicate a planned or deliberate defense. Other configurations may point to a counterattack.

- (3) *Degree of resistance of units on contact.* The degree of resistance which the enemy offers and the manner in which he may withdraw give indications of the type of defense he will employ, whether he intends to hold at all costs or withdraw, whether he plans a counterattack, and the degree of disorganization of the enemy.
- (4) *Expenditure of ammunition and resupply activities.* The amount and type of ammunition which the enemy expends provide indications of the area that the enemy most strongly desires to defend, of his fire plan, of the degree of his resistance, and of his resupply capability. Other resupply activities may indicate the area to be most heavily defended, the type of defense action, and the possible shortages which may illuminate weak points in the defense.

45. Intelligence Requirements for Defense

a. *General.* In the defense, many of the factors (of weather, terrain, and enemy situation) included in planning for an attack are considered; however, most of the factors take on a new meaning, and they must be interpreted in a different light. Whereas heavy rain may have impeded an attack, the rain may be an aid in defense because of its equal effect on the enemy's capability to attack. Indeed, most of the points to be considered in planning the defense center of enemy activities or potentials.

b. *Specific Requirements for the Planning Phase.*

- (1) *Location and strength of enemy units in contact, in reserve, or in position to influence the action.* Just as in the attack, the strength of the enemy has a critical bearing on planning the defense. Location and type of the enemy units serve as indications of an impending attack and help determine the planned location of the main attack. Especially important indications come from enemy unit movements. These tend to show the progress of plans for an attack and provide indications of weakened areas in the line of contact. The number, type and location of reserve units help determine likely areas of attack and potential reinforcements.
- (2) *Location of potential enemy assembly areas.* The location of enemy assembly areas is influenced by the terrain and by the distance from the line of contact. The primary terrain considerations are those of cover and concealment and routes into and out of the area. The distance between assembly areas and the line of contact tends to change as the attack plan progresses. Early in the planning phase the assembly areas are usually farther to the rear, but they may move successively nearer the line of contact as the time of attack nears. If such a pattern of movement is detected, it will further indicate an area selected for the attack. Determination of assembly areas is of prime importance in target acquisition for the employment of both conventional and nuclear weapons.
- (3) *Location of enemy boundaries.* The location of enemy boundaries is of significance due to its influence on the enemy plan of attack. A knowledge of boundaries provides indications as to the size of the force which may participate in the attack and, possibly, the depth of echelons. Consideration of boundaries, along with the locations of enemy units, both in contact and in rear areas, provides an overall picture of the enemy situation.
- (4) *Number and routes of enemy reconnaissance and/or combat patrols.* To execute his attack most advantageously, the enemy must collect information on the location of our security elements, our line units, our fire support weapons, and our reserves. Dur-

ing his preparation for the attack, the enemy usually will stress reconnaissance. He will thus attempt to locate and to exploit gaps in our defensive positions. He may execute raids on our positions or installations, possibly even in our rear areas through successful infiltration. Destruction missions may be expected prior to the commencement of the enemy's main attack. Extensive patrolling, as a countermeasure, may be employed by the enemy to cover or misrepresent other enemy activity, as a show of strength to cover weaknesses, or as a measure to force our forward outposts and listening posts back. In any case, an analysis of the missions, routes, number, and probable objectives of the enemy patrols will provide valuable intelligence.

- (5) *Location and type of supporting weapons.* The location and type of supporting weapons used by the enemy help the commander to determine the likely areas of attack and to estimate the degree of force which the enemy may use. Movements of weapons may also help to determine his scheme of maneuver and the timing of the action.
- (6) *Observation and fire.* An accurate determination of the most advantageous observation sites and fields of fire available throughout a sector with special emphasis on the avenues of approach is important in defensive operations.
- (7) *Location of natural and artificial obstacles.* The commander employs natural and artificial obstacles to strengthen his defensive position. Natural obstacles within the enemy area should be considered with reference to the limitations which they impose on enemy mobility and, consequently, on his choice of avenues of approach.
- (8) *Weather and terrain.* As in the at-

tack, the effects of weather and the features of the terrain play a highly important role in the defensive effort. Just as certain pieces of key terrain often must be secured in order to attack successfully, so must they be held in order to defend. Weather also plays a key part in the operation, and the same condition may have an entirely different effect depending upon whether an attack or a defense is planned.

- (9) *Avenues of approach.* The avenue of approach of most concern to the defending commander is the route most advantageous to the enemy in his main attack. Enemy reconnaissance activity may provide indications of consideration of avenues of approach. Coupled with this, the commander considers avenues of approach for use by friendly forces in a counterattack. He also considers natural obstacles in the area with reference to their limitation on enemy mobility and on friendly counterattack.

c. Requirements During the Defense.

- (1) *Areas of enemy's main attack and secondary attacks.* Movement of enemy units, displacement of weapons, routes of movement, type and size of units involved, movement of reserve units, and location of unidentified or enemy caused nuclear bursts serve as indications of the areas under main attack and secondary or diversionary attacks. These are also factors to be considered in planning counterattacks, displacements, withdrawals, and the employment of reserves.
- (2) *Enemy tactics.* Coupled closely with the foregoing factors are those indicators which disclose the enemy's scheme of operations. Unit movement, weapon disposition, formation, depth of echelon, and the type and size of units committed are significant considerations for early determination of enemy tactics.

46. Intelligence Requirements Pertaining to Enemy Capabilities

a. General.

- (1) Enemy capabilities are usually the first consideration in determining intelligence requirements and their priorities, because of the commander's concern with intelligence which confirms, alters, or refutes the existing estimate of enemy capabilities and probable courses of action. All enemy capabilities are not necessarily the subject of intelligence requirements. Enemy capabilities which are apparently impossible of implementation, or are not likely to be implemented, are not considered in formulating EEI or other intelligence requirements. For example, when a delaying action is being conducted against advancing superior enemy forces, priorities concerning enemy defense, delay, and withdrawal are not stated.
- (2) Each enemy capability listed in the current intelligence estimate is usually the subject of either an EEI or some other intelligence requirements. If knowledge of the implementation of the particular enemy capability or course of action is not available, and this knowledge is needed by the commander at the time in order to make a reasonable decision, then that enemy capability is an EEI rather than another intelligence requirement.
- (3) EEI and other intelligence requirements pertaining to enemy capabilities are not answered completely until the enemy has committed himself to a course of action. Partial answers are produced continually and result in progressive changes to the intelligence estimate. For example, efforts to determine in what strength the enemy may reinforce troops in contact often produce changes in the strength estimate of available enemy reinforcements, and of the enemy's capability to reinforce. Similarly, evidence that

the enemy has reinforced certain units changes the estimate of the number of committed forces.

b. *Attack Capability.* An intelligence requirement concerning an enemy attack directs specific attention to definite areas and usually to specified times. The areas to which attention is directed are usually avenues of approach determined by analysis of the area of operations and enemy dispositions. If the enemy can attack using several avenues of approach, only one requirement is stated with the different avenues of approach indicated as areas to which special attention is directed. Specified times are most frequently stated when the command's course of action is to attack. Time may be given precisely or may be stated as "before our attack," depending upon whether the time of the attack has been determined.

c. *Defense Capability.* Requirements concerning enemy defense specifically state the line or area concerned.

d. *Withdrawal Capability.* Requirements concerning enemy withdrawal usually indicate the line or area beyond which the enemy's withdrawal is of particular interest and may direct attention to a line or area to which the enemy might withdraw and the withdrawal route.

e. *Delay Capability.* Requirements concerning enemy delaying actions also specify the lines or areas along which delaying positions may be formed.

f. *Reinforcement Capability.* Requirements concerning reinforcement ordinarily do not distinguish between reinforcement of an attack and a defense. They simply ask when and where available reserves may be employed. Other requirements ask specifically whether the enemy will attack or defend. Requirements concerning reinforcement direct specific attention to known reserves.

g. *Nuclear Capabilities.* When the enemy has a tactical nuclear capability, the stated requirement may be, "Will the enemy employ nuclear weapons against us? If so, when, where, how many, of what yield, and by what delivery means? Special attention to very heavy artillery units in the vicinity of GROTE and possible missile launchers in the vicinity of AVON."

h. Chemical and Biological Capabilities. When the enemy has a CB capability, the stated requirement may be, "Will the enemy use chemical or biological agents against us? If so, what agents, when, where, and by using what delivery means? Special attention to artillery, mortar, and rocket units."

i. Air Capabilities. Requirements as to enemy air capabilities are rarely listed at division, corps, and comparable units in the communications zone. Normally intelligence on enemy air capabilities is disseminated by the field army and by headquarters at levels above field army, because units subordinate to these headquarters do not have the means to obtain the desired information. In airborne and amphibious operations, where enemy air activity is a significant factor, a corps or division commander may appropriately designate an air EEI, especially during the planning phases of the operation. However, heavy reliance will be placed on higher headquarters to provide answers to such an EEI.

j. Miscellaneous Capabilities. Stated requirements concerning other enemy capabilities might be—

- (1) "Will the enemy employ guerrilla forces in conjunction with his attack? If so, when, where and in what strength? Special attention to the heavily wooded area north of MASLEM."
- (2) "Will the enemy infiltrate our lines? If so, when, where, and in what strength? Special attention to the swampy area east of HAYS."
- (3) "Will the enemy employ airborne forces in our sector? If so, when, where, and in what strength? What will be the direction and altitude of approach? What drop or landing zones will be used? Special attention to the area south of YORK."
- (4) "Will the enemy employ amphibious forces on our south flank? If so, when, where, and in what strength? How many landing vehicles of what type will be employed? Special attention to the beaches at SAVANAH and GEORGETOWN."

47. Intelligence Requirements Pertaining to Enemy Vulnerabilities

a. Requirements may be designed for developing knowledge of enemy vulnerability to attack and of other conditions or circumstances which make the enemy liable to damage, deception, or defeat. Such requirements are to develop intelligence as to the nature, extent, permanence, or other details of the conditions or circumstances which produce the vulnerability.

b. The details desired may be listed in the stated requirement or may be omitted if they are numerous and routine. For example, for analyses of nuclear, chemical, or biological targets, information is desired as to size, shape, composition, concentration, vulnerability, recuperability, and permanence. Since these requirements are both numerous and normal, details pertaining to them are properly omitted. The statement may simply ask what nuclear, chemical, or biological targets exist in our zone and direct attention to a specific area of activities. When enemy vulnerabilities result from faulty dispositions, logistical inadequacies, or administrative deficiencies, the degree of permanence of the condition may have to be established before tactical plans to exploit the vulnerability can be prepared. Hence, intelligence requirements may ask "if" and "when."

48. Weather and Terrain Information Requirements

a. General.

- (1) The military commander must consider the effects of weather and terrain on his mission when he plans for and executes an operation; as a result, he strives for a thorough and accurate knowledge of these factors. This knowledge, considered together with the enemy capabilities, is required to insure the accomplishment of the assigned mission.
- (2) An analysis of the effect of all of the conditions of weather and terrain upon our own forces and the enemy constitutes the basis for estimates which may be made by the commander and his staff. The answer sought is the best utilization of the weather

and terrain based on a deduction of the most likely capability of the enemy.

- (3) Terrain and weather influence the application of the principles of war, such as the ability to mass and maneuver. Properly exploited, terrain and weather may allow a numerically inferior force to achieve relative superiority of combat power. For example, a mechanized, well-equipped, heavily-armored force drawn into marshy or rugged terrain may well be defeated by a smaller, lightly-equipped force, because the smaller force is able, through mass, maneuver and surprise, to apply superior combat power at the point of decision.

b. Weather.

- (1) There are two types of weather information requirements—those established by the Army and passed to the

USAF Air Weather Service (AWS) for action (weather forecasts, studies, and summaries), and those established by the USAF AWS and passed to the Army for action (local weather, temperature, and wind). The establishment, coordination, and consolidation of Army requirements are intelligence responsibilities. Figure 6 lists the usual requirements for weather information required at all echelons within the theater army in terms of the various forecasts, studies, and summaries.

- (2) At brigade or battalion level, the intelligence officer coordinates the requirements of his command for weather information and interprets weather information received from higher headquarters in terms of its application to the local terrain and situation. When weather information

Weather information	Command area				
	Company	Brigade, regiment, separate battalion, squadron	Corps, division	Army	Communications zone
1. Climatic Information:					
a. Climatic summaries-----		X	X	X	X
b. Climatic studies-----		As rqr	As rqr	As rqr	As rqr
2. Weather forecasts:					
a. General:					
(1) 3-5 day-----		X	X	X	X
(2) 48 hour-----		X	X	X	X
(3) 24 hour-----	X	X	X	X	X
(4) 12 hour-----	X	X			X
b. Special:					
(1) 24 hour area flight-----		X	X	X	X
(2) Aviation route and terminal-----		X	As rqr	As rqr	X
(3) Nuclear weapons-----		X	X	X	X
(4) Radiological defense-----			X	X	X
(5) Severe weather-----	X	X	X	X	X
(6) For engineer officer-----			X	X	X
(7) For chemical officer-----		X	X	X	X
c. Long range trend-----			X	X	X
3. Weather Observations:					
a. Current weather-----	As rqr	As rqr	As rqr	As rqr	As rqr
b. Airstrip observations-----		X	X	X	X
c. Ballistic observations-----			X	X	
4. Weather Summaries-----	As rqr	As rqr	As rqr	As rqr	As rqr

Note. See paragraphs 102 through 105 for discussion of weather forecasts and climatic summaries and studies.

Figure 6. Requirements for weather information within the theater army.

is required but has not been made available, the intelligence officer should request such information from the intelligence section of the next higher echelon. When regularly distributed forecasts are inadequate to satisfy particular requirements, such as planned chemical or biological operations, special weather forecasts may be requested.

- (3) Weather forecasts normally are of three types; these are—
 - (a) Short period, covering periods of from 0 to 2 days.
 - (b) Long period, covering periods of from 3 to 5 days.
 - (c) Extended period, covering periods longer than 5 days.
- (4) At higher headquarters, climate and weather information is included in the analysis of the area of operation (app B).

c. Terrain.

- (1) Normally the smaller the unit, the greater the interest in details of the terrain. The higher headquarters

may think in terms of mountain ranges, a lower headquarters in terms of hill complexes, and a small unit in terms of small ridges and draws on a single hill.

- (2) Terrain is normally evaluated in terms of the following factors to determine their effect on military operations:
 - (a) Observation and fields of fire.
 - (b) Concealment and cover.
 - (c) Obstacles.
 - (d) Key terrain.
 - (e) Avenues of approach.
- (3) At higher headquarters, information on terrain is included in the Analysis of the Area of Operation (app B), reports of surveillance and reconnaissance, PW interrogation, hydrographic charts, trafficability reports, imagery interpretation, and a number of other sources. At lower echelons, information may be provided by higher headquarters, adjacent units, friendly natives, patrols, ground reconnaissance, and aerial surveillance.

Section III. DETERMINATION OF INDICATIONS

49. General

a. Although EEI and other intelligence requirements announce the intelligence missions of the command, collecting agencies normally are assigned specific tasks in the collection of information of enemy activity or of characteristics of the area of operations.

b. Particular enemy activities or characteristics of the area of operations indicate various courses of action open to the enemy. The determination must be made as to which of these enemy activities or area characteristics should comprise a part of the mission of intelligence collection agencies. This determination is based upon the theory that probable enemy courses of action can be deduced from the knowledge that certain enemy activities such as movement of units, building of bridges, or stockpiling of supplies do or do not exist. Such knowledge forms the basis for deducing the

relative probability of various enemy courses of action. This theory is extended to include enemy capabilities, vulnerabilities, units, and installations.

c. A necessary step in planning the collection effort is, therefore, to determine those enemy activities or characteristics of the area of operations which will indicate the answer to the intelligence requirement. This procedure is called "determination of indications" and is a function of the intelligence officer.

50. Indications

a. An indication is any positive or negative evidence of enemy activity, or any characteristic of the area of operations, which points toward enemy vulnerabilities or the adoption or rejection by the enemy of a particular capability, or which may influence the commander's selection of a course of action.

b. Indications include conditions and circum-

stances which result from previous actions or from enemy failure to take action. For example, current enemy dispositions may indicate the adoption of a particular enemy capability or the existence of an enemy vulnerability. Similarly, the enemy logistical situation may favor the adoption of a particular enemy capability or may influence our selection of a course of action by indicating an enemy vulnerability. The destruction of large enemy forces by nuclear attack may result in a vulnerability which favors our resumption of the offensive. Destruction of river-crossing means in one area by friendly forces may lead to forcing the enemy to cross elsewhere. The presence of obstacles in a specific area may influence the adoption or rejection of a course of action by either force.

c. Indications provide the basis for orders and requests. The specific information which collection agencies are directed or requested to supply is the information which will confirm or deny the indication.

51. Analysis of EEI and Other Intelligence Requirements

a. EEI and other intelligence requirements are analyzed to determine the indications which by their existence or nonexistence provide an answer to an intelligence requirement. Normally, these are indications which are likely to exist when the enemy prepares to adopt or does adopt any particular capability. Thus, a requirement which asks in part, "will the enemy

attack" is analyzed by determining the indications of attack which may exist during the preparation or launching of offensive actions. These indications frequently include forward movement of hostile units, forward displacement of artillery, and strengthening of counterreconnaissance screens.

b. The analysis requires a thorough knowledge of the enemy and of the characteristics of the area of operations which can affect military operations. Particularly valuable is detailed knowledge of the enemy organization, equipment, tactical doctrine, and logistical methods; the probable enemy knowledge of the area under friendly control; the personalities of the opposing enemy commanders; and the past performance of the opposing enemy units.

c. At every headquarters, lists of enemy activities peculiar to each indication are compiled. The lists are disseminated to higher, lower, and adjacent units. For training exercises, FM 30-102 lists activities pertaining to operations of the maneuver enemy-aggressor.

d. Having identified those indications which will reveal the answers to the intelligence requirements, the intelligence officer next determines those specific enemy activities which by their very nature and location, will, if present, establish each of the pertinent indications. These specific items of information constitute a basis for orders and requests to agencies.

Section IV. SOURCES OF INFORMATION

52. General

a. For the purpose of this manual, a source is defined as the person, thing, or activity from which information is originally obtained. Sources may or may not be under friendly control.

b. The source of information to be selected to fulfill a given intelligence requirement is an important consideration. For this reason, a knowledge of what sources of information are available is essential to the planning of a collection effort.

c. The most common sources of information for intelligence purposes are enemy activities,

prisoners of war, local residents, refugees, evacuees, displaced persons, civilian agencies, recovered military personnel, captured enemy documents and materiel, enemy signal communications and non-communications electromagnetic emissions, duds, shell and missile fragments, craters, areas contaminated by CBR agents, nuclear bursts, imagery, maps, weather forecasts, studies and reports.

d. Other sources of information include informants; intelligence reports and studies prepared by higher, lower, and adjacent units; and reference materials prepared by the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,

Department of the Army, and the other armed services and governmental agencies.

53. Enemy Activity

a. Enemy activity is the subject of much information of combat intelligence value obtained from sources. Activities such as movements of troops, the presence of armor, weapons displacement, movement or stockpiling of supplies and materiel construction, and the amount and types of weapons fire, all provide valuable combat intelligence information.

b. Conversely, the lack of enemy activity or the fact that the enemy has not engaged in certain activities is often of great value. For example, the information that the enemy has not moved his reserves or that he has not displaced certain support units may influence the commander's course of action.

c. The volume and type of information available from enemy activities are limited by the capabilities of the means to detect and observe them and the measures taken by the enemy to mask his activities. As examples, since radar is limited to line of sight observation, the enemy may use hills to cover troop movement and may use the noises of artillery fire to cover the sounds of vehicular movement.

54. Prisoners of War

a. Prisoners of war are valuable sources of information, particularly of the immediate battle area and of the effects of our psychological operations. Maximum information is obtained through skillful handling of prisoners of war from the time of capture until the interrogation is completed. Interrogation personnel are carefully briefed on the information desired and are provided with aids, such as maps and aerial photos. As sources of information, deserters are interrogated in the same manner as prisoners of war.

b. Prisoners of war are interrogated briefly at company, battalion, and brigade levels for information of immediate tactical value. Detailed interrogation of selected prisoners of war usually takes place at division and field army within the combat zone. However, in internal defense operations, interrogations will probably be required at the lower levels. Normally, corps is bypassed in the chain of PW evacua-

tions. A corps PW cage, however, may be established for the temporary retention of selected PW at corps for special interrogation or for interrogation of those who may be captured by corps troops. (See FM 30-15 for guidance in PW interrogation.)

c. When sick or wounded prisoners of war are detained at a medical treatment facility, suitable arrangements for interrogation should be made.

d. Procedures for interrogation and handling of prisoners of war are fully discussed in FM 30-15 and FM 19-40.

55. Civilians

a. Civilians who have been within enemy controlled areas may be valuable sources of information. Civilians in recently seized areas often give information readily. However, they must be screened carefully to detect line crossers and stay-behind agents. The term "civilian" includes local inhabitants, line crossers, tourists, missionaries, partisans, displaced persons and repatriots. Generally, the longer the delay in questioning, the less valid is the information obtained.

b. Civilian sources can provide information on terrain in enemy-controlled areas and may be able to provide information of enemy installations and activities. They may provide data on climate, economic, sociological and psychological factors, and local resources. Law enforcement agencies may provide information on guerrilla and dissident forces, line crossers, and stay-behind elements. Civilians are particularly valuable sources of information in cold war operations and of information on immediate areas of operations for division and smaller units.

c. The civilian population is the most lucrative source of intelligence information in internal defense operations. Some of the population, although appearing as innocent civilians, will in reality be the guerrilla fighter, the terrorist, and the political organizer. The insurgent directs his efforts to gaining the support and the control of the people, with the majority of his operations conducted to achieving this goal. Therefore, the civilian population's knowledge of the insurgent and his activities is broader than in conventional warfare. The amount of

intelligence information which may be derived from the population will largely depend on their existing loyalties which normally are accorded to the force which provides the greatest promise of security.

56. Recovered Military Personnel

Recovered military personnel are sources of information on the area of operations and enemy dispositions and activities. Escapees and evaders are sources of information on successful evasion techniques. Interrogation of recovered military personnel is conducted in accordance with regulations prescribed by the theater headquarters. Within the limits prescribed, interrogation of such personnel at division and lower levels is usually limited to obtaining information of immediate tactical use.

57. Captured Enemy Documents

Maximum collection of enemy documents is insured by appropriate training and supervision of small units and individuals. Captured documents furnish information that is generally reliable. However, enemy plans may be based on false assumptions or may have been changed. Documents also may contain enemy propaganda or may have been prepared and planted by the enemy to be captured in an effort to confuse and deceive. Enemy dead must be searched for documents and marks of identification; observation of the KIA's for appearance, condition of clothing, and equipment will provide additional information of value. (See FM 30-15 and FM 30-16 for further information as to categories of documents and procedures for handling captured documents.)

58. Enemy Materiel

Captured enemy materiel may provide technical intelligence information of immediate value to target intelligence, order of battle intelligence, or to the determination of enemy capabilities and vulnerabilities. The production of technical intelligence is facilitated by a continuous collection and exploitation effort by both combat troops and support troops. (See FM 30-16 for information about the handling of enemy materiel.)

59. Enemy Signal Communications and Other Electromagnetic Emissions

Enemy signal communications and other electromagnetic emissions are valuable sources of information of enemy plans and orders, unit identification and locations, locations of fire control and surveillance devices, and similar data. Exploitation of these sources extends the depth of intelligence and contributes significantly to target acquisition (FM 32-10).

60. Duds; Shell and Missile Fragments; Craters; Areas Contaminated by CBR Agents and Residual Radiation; and Nuclear Bursts

a. Duds and missile and shell fragments are sources of information on the type and caliber of enemy supporting weapons. This information is an aid to determining order of battle intelligence and to ascertaining enemy capabilities and vulnerabilities. Duds and crater analyses are used in target acquisition by providing direction to firing positions.

b. Examination of areas contaminated by chemical and biological agents and analyses and identification of the agents used, assist in developing countermeasures and in evaluating enemy capabilities. Information of areas contaminated by residual nuclear radiation or chemical agents is required in determining terrain use and troop safety factors.

c. NBC attack information of nuclear bursts is essential to commanders and staffs at all echelons for estimates of the situation and for fallout prediction. The information required includes time of burst, ground zero, height of burst, yield, cloud dimensions, and observed effects (see app H).

61. Imagery and Ground Surveillance Radar Reports

a. Imagery obtained by ground and airborne sensors is an excellent source of graphic information for terrain evaluation, damage assessment, and enemy activities such as fortifications, weapon positions, organization or tactical locations, movements, and locations of assembly areas and their extent. Current types of image-producing sensors are the camera, infrared detector, and radar. Each of these

types of image-producing sensors operates in a different portion of the electromagnetic spectrum and each will detect and record different data.

b. Imagery obtained by ground-based sensors, for intelligence purposes, includes panoramic views of areas, large-scale coverage of specific objects and terrain features, flash recordings, and repetitive imagery of specific areas for comparative purposes. A special type of coverage, for example, is that provided by comparative motion pictures with the capability of using selected frames as still pictures rather than in a motion picture sequence. Another type of coverage is panoramic imagery taken from a dominant terrain feature. It provides terrain information which may be used to supplement maps and aerial imagery for coordinating observation plans, ground reconnaissance activities, artillery fires, and orientation of personnel of subordinate echelons.

c. Imagery obtained by sensors operating from airborne platforms, manned or unmanned, is particularly useful to combat elements in operational planning. Properly exploited, it is an excellent means for collecting information to assist in—

- (1) Locating enemy offensive and defensive installations; supply installations and lines of communications; and armored, motorized, and personnel concentrations.
- (2) Analyzing terrain.
- (3) Confirming or denying intelligence information obtained from other sources or agencies.
- (4) Preparing target folders.
- (5) Assessing damage.
- (6) Preparing mosaics and panoramas for planning purposes.
- (7) Correcting maps and making map supplements.

d. Ground surveillance radar teams, organic to infantry, mechanized, airborne, armored, and airmobile battalions, the armored cavalry squadron, and division artillery, are a valuable source of information to the battalion on the movement of enemy personnel and equipment within the battalion area of interest. These radars are especially valuable during periods

of poor visibility. Moving targets detected by these radars should be reported to the battalion S2 with the exception that the division artillery radar section reports to the division FSE or to the battalion FDC or the supported unit. Intelligence originating in these radar reports is processed through normal intelligence channels.

62. Maps

Maps are a principal source of terrain information. Map accuracy is determined by the data used in the preparation of the map. Maps are supplemented by aerial or ground photographs, SLAR imagery, sketches, visual observation, trig lists, gazetteers, and other information. Trig lists are publications containing the exact location and elevation of benchmarks and other survey points, together with a complete description of their characteristics. Trig lists are of particular value to artillery and engineer units and are required for locating and orienting certain surveillance devices (see TM 5-248).

63. Weather Forecasts, Studies, and Reports

a. Weather information is provided to the Army by the Air Weather Service (AWS) of the United States Air Force. Within the Army, weather information is disseminated through intelligence channels.

b. The Army is responsible for satisfying certain requirements of its own such as ballistic-meteorological data and fallout wind data. This responsibility is carried out by field artillery target acquisition units, meteorological sections, certain chemical units for their own use, and army aviation. Artillery meteorological sections can measure or determine current surface and upper air winds, pressure, temperature, and humidity. Some chemical units can normally furnish information of surface winds. Army aviators report weather conditions within their areas of flight operations. All units can provide weather data obtained by visual observation and, if required, they may be equipped with instruments for collecting additional weather data.

c. AWS detachments maintain tactical weather stations at field army, corps, and division. AWS detachments—

- (1) Maintain continuous surveillance over weather conditions in the operational areas of the units served, and advise commanders and staff officers of significant changes and developments in the weather situation.
- (2) Provide weather observations, detailed operational and planning forecasts, weather briefings for combat missions, reports of current weather, weather summaries, and climatological information as required to meet

- the needs of the organizations served.
- (3) Provide experienced weather personnel as required for consultation on special weather problems.
- (4) Collect, evaluate, and further disseminate weather data generated within the area.

d. These detachments send out tactical observer teams to make weather observations required to refine large area forecasts. Tactical units may be required to assist by supplying local weather data.

Section V. AGENCIES

64. Agency

a. An agency is any individual or organization which exploits a source to collect or process information. An agency may collect, process or do both. No distinction is made between those agencies which collect information and those which produce intelligence; all are regarded as agencies. Each subordinate, adjacent, and higher headquarters, as well as certain intelligence personnel, are considered to be agencies (see app C). Individual soldiers of the command afford the lower echelon intelligence officer his most direct and basic means of collecting information.

b. Collection agencies use varying methods to collect information. The more common methods are interrogation; examination of documents; use of observation and listening posts, ground and airborne surveillance devices, and air and ground reconnaissance; reconnaissance in force and by fire; chemical and radiological monitoring and survey; and interception of enemy communications and non-communications electromagnetic emissions.

65. Selection of Agencies for Collection Tasks

a. General. After determination of the specific information required, available agencies are selected to obtain the information. In making this selection, the factors of capability, suitability, multiplicity, and balance are considered.

b. Capability. An agency must be physically capable of providing the desired informa-

tion. An armor unit in reserve is not asked for identifications of units in contact, nor is artillery asked for information which can be obtained only from prisoners of war.

c. Suitability. The collection task assigned to a unit must be compatible with its primary mission. Only the agencies best suited to furnish the desired information are used. For example, information most readily secured by dismounted patrols should be obtained by infantry units rather than armor units. Economy of personnel and materiel also is considered. Dismounted patrols are not used to collect information that can be obtained equally as well by available air reconnaissance.

d. Multiplicity. Evaluation of information requires that it be compared with information received from other sources and agencies. Consequently, subject to considerations of capability and suitability, more than one agency is used to obtain each item of required information.

e. Balance. Within the limits imposed by other considerations, the collection workload is balanced among agencies. Balance is a minor consideration, however, when compared with the importance of other factors.

66. Troops

All units have capabilities which can be exploited for collecting information. Combat and combat support units are especially useful for collecting information of the enemy and of the area of operations forward of the FEBA. Some units, such as armored cavalry units, are speci-

fically organized to collect information by conducting combat operations. Other units, such as certain Army aviation units, air defense units, and field artillery target acquisition units are organized to collect information by observation. Some combat service support units are capable of collecting significant amounts of information during the conduct of their normal operations. Virtually every military unit—combat, combat support and combat service support—has intelligence collection capabilities in the internal defense environment since the enemy can be presumed to be everywhere.

67. Military Police Units

Due to their characteristic employment and nature of activities throughout the field army area of operations, military police units are valuable collectors of information. Military police units will have intimate knowledge of information of interest to intelligence and counterintelligence agencies in the following military police areas of responsibility:

- a. Physical characteristics of the friendly territory.
- b. Enemy prisoners of war and civilian internees.
- c. Crimes and offenses in the area of operation.
- d. Operations of patrols, checkpoints, and information posts.
- e. Operations of confinement facilities and rehabilitation centers.
- f. Liaison with other civil and military law enforcement agencies in the area.
- g. Physical security of key facilities and installations, including special ammunition escort and security.
- h. Assistance in rear area security operations.
- i. Circulation control to include traffic control.

68. Civil Affairs Units

Civil affairs units acquire much information of both the physical and nonphysical characteristics of the area through contact with the civilian population, the government, the economy, and the institutions of the area. It is of importance that the collection effort of civil

affairs units be conducted discreetly and not become readily apparent to sources concerned in order not to jeopardize the civil affairs mission in the area.

69. Military Intelligence Personnel

Some military Intelligence personnel are also collection agencies. Typical of these are prisoner of war interrogators, imagery interpreters, language interpreters, document analysts, counterintelligence personnel, area intelligence specialists, and strategic intelligence research and analysis personnel (see FM 30-9 and FM 30-9A for guidance in the use of the military intelligence personnel and FM 30-15 for guidance in the use of prisoner of war interrogators).

70. Army Security Agency Units

Army Security Agency (ASA) units support field armies, corps, divisions, and independent brigades by providing information in the fields of signal intelligence (SIGINT), signal security (SIGSEC), Acoustical Intelligence (ACOUSTINT), and Electronic Warfare (EW). Integration of SIGINT at the earliest practical moment into the intelligence collection effort is a requirement for the most effective target acquisition, surveillance and reconnaissance support to the tactical commander. SIGINT information can complete, confirm or refute and, in many instances, tipoff other reconnaissance and surveillance elements. SIGSEC support denies the enemy information/intelligence from the commanders communications network and electronic equipment (see AR 10-122 and FM 32-10).

71. Special Army Intelligence Collection Units

Special Army Intelligence collection units, usually controlled at field army, furnish information on activities in enemy rear areas. These units furnish a liaison team to accomplish coordination with the command in whose area they are operating (FM 30-9A).

72. Technical Intelligence Units

a. Technical intelligence elements operate in the field army to perform the following functions:

- (1) Collect, identify, and examine captured enemy materiel.
- (2) Make preliminary tests and reports on capabilities, limitations, use, and effectiveness of enemy materiel.
- (3) Arrange for evacuation of selected enemy materiel and recommend disposition of enemy materiel of no intelligence value.
- (4) Prepare questionnaires for prisoner-of-war interrogation.
- (5) Instruct on recognition characteristics, use, maintenance of enemy materiel, countermeasures, and interchangeability of our own and Allied materiel.
- (6) Evaluate effectiveness of our own and Allied weapons and ammunition against enemy materiel.
- (7) Investigate intelligence targets to evaluate enemy scientific and technical achievements in research, development, production, and storage so that further detailed analyses may be made by appropriate personnel.
- (8) Collect, evaluate, and interpret information affecting the health and welfare of man and animals in actual or possible areas of operation which is immediately or potentially significant for military planning.

b. Capture of special-interest equipment including munitions, such as chemical or biological agents or protective equipment, is reported to an appropriate technical intelligence team as indicated in appendix D. The team either arranges for the item to be evacuated for examination, examines the item at the location where it was captured, or directs other dispositions of it.

c. Technical intelligence elements at army level receive information and actual items from army units as indicated. They evaluate and report on these items, as appropriate, within their capabilities and assigned missions. They also arrange for evacuation of appropriate items to the communications zone or the United States

as necessary. Details of the operations of technical intelligence personnel are contained in FM 30-16.

73. Special Staff Officers

Special staff officers or elements having troops under their control can obtain information of intelligence value in the conduct of their normal duties, and they furnish the intelligence officer with such information and intelligence. All special staff officers are capable of advising on enemy activities which are similar to those within their own areas of interest. The following special staff officers can furnish information of the types indicated:

a. *U.S. Army Security Agency (USASA) Officer.* Information and advice pertaining to signal intelligence (SIGINT), signal security (SIGSEC), Acoustical Intelligence (ACOUST-INT), Electronic Warfare (EW) may be obtained from the USASA officer. This USASA staff officer is provided at field army, corps, and division. He will have a close and direct relationship with ASA supporting elements and with his counterpart at each echelon.

b. *Chemical.* Information and intelligence are provided on location, time, number, and extent of reported enemy or unidentified nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) attacks; on location, size, duration, and effects of chemical and biological contamination; and on location, extent, and degree of radiological contamination caused by or expected from nuclear weapons (see FM 21-40 and FM 3-12).

c. *Engineer.* Information and intelligence are provided on terrain, enemy fortifications, engineer troops, tactics, materiel, and capabilities. Terrain information includes stream data (width, depth, condition of banks and bottom, and rate of flow); landing beach data; trafficability studies; traffic and road conditions within the area of operations; port, railroad, canal, pipeline, airfield, and bridge data; and data concerning target acquisition and site selection for atomic demolition munition (see FM 30-10). Special engineer units, including engineer terrain detachments, prepare terrain studies, topographic maps, terrain models, and map supplements. Engineers also provide flood warning service (FM 5-30).

d. Medical. Information is provided on medical and public health aspects to include health hazards due to weather or disease; and on capabilities, limitations, and vulnerabilities of enemy medical materiel and methods. Medical data from documents pertaining to enemy personnel under medical treatment also furnish valuable information.

e. Maintenance and Ammunition. Information and intelligence are furnished on the capabilities, limitations, and vulnerabilities of enemy materiel; maintenance methods and weaknesses; and locations and compositions of enemy ammunition stocks.

f. Provost Marshal. Information is provided on incidents involving enemy agents, saboteurs, guerrillas, bypassed units, enemy raiding parties, and other security threats.

g. Supply. Information is furnished on the location and size of enemy petroleum and general supplies stocks; recognition aspects of enemy uniforms and insignia; and capabilities, limitations, and adequacy of enemy quartermaster-type materiel and services.

h. Signal. Information is furnished on the capabilities, limitations, and vulnerabilities of enemy signal equipment and personnel to include the presence and use of special equipment such as radar, infrared, and other sensory devices; and the status of civilian communications systems in the area of operations.

i. Transportation. Information is provided on status of enemy transportation; operational characteristics; capacities, adequacy, and military use of transportation routes; and on equipment in the area of operations to include railroads, highways, waterways, ports, and beaches, with particular reference to troop movement capabilities.

j. Staff Weather Officer. Climatic information, to include weather observations and weather summaries, are provided by the staff weather officer (provided by the Air Force Air Weather Service).

74. Stay-Behind Units

Stay-behind units are combat elements isolated in the enemy rear, either deliberately or as a result of combat operations. In either case, they are valuable for collecting information of enemy activities or for target acquisition. To be most effective, stay-behind units should be given special training and equipment, especially suitable communication means.

75. Agencies for Operation Behind Enemy Lines

a. Target acquisition and the collection of information of enemy activity deep in enemy territory are highly suitable missions for long range reconnaissance patrols, aerial surveillance units, target survey teams, clandestine agents, U.S. Army Special Forces, and guerrillas.

b. Long-range reconnaissance patrols, raiders and target survey teams are usually controlled by field army corps. U.S. Army special Forces and guerrillas are usually controlled by the theater headquarters. In requesting the use of an agency, the requesting headquarters must consider the time required to process the request to the controlling headquarters and the time required for the desired information to be collected and reported back to the requesting agency.

c. The principal factors that limit the operations of these agencies are limited mobility and the necessity to escape detection. Generally, these agencies depend upon foot mobility; thus, they cannot move rapidly from one area to another in search of information. Furthermore their movement is limited by the threat of detection and by logistical problems. The threat of detection also limits their communications capabilities.

d. Collection facilities of the Air Force and Navy include air reconnaissance and many other means which collect large quantities of information useful in producing intelligence to meet Army requirements.

Section VI. COMBAT SURVEILLANCE, RECONNAISSANCE AND COUNTERRECONNAISSANCE, AND TARGET ACQUISITION

76. Combat Surveillance

a. General.

- (1) Combat surveillance is a principal means by which enemy objects and activities are detected. It encompasses all techniques of accomplishing a continuous (all-weather, day and night) systematic watch over the battle areas to provide timely information for tactical ground operations.
- (2) Ground surveillance is characterized by generally severe line-of-sight limitations, dependence upon terrain for movement routes and site locations, and a generally inadequate capability of surface transport to displace surveillance means in time to be responsive to immediate requirements in new areas. These limitations notwithstanding, ground surveillance is essential to all-weather, day-and-night surveillance of the battle area.
- (3) Aerial surveillance is characterized by a capability to extend line-of-sight to become independent from terrain for movement routes and site locations, and to adjust to new requirements rapidly. The mobility of aerial surveillance platforms and their ability to operate at high elevations provide a capability to conduct surveillance over large areas or to adjust to new situations rapidly. Generally, visibility restrictions and inclement weather will reduce the effectiveness of aerial surveillance. Problems of coordination and control of the use of the airspace may impose further limitations on the use of aerial surveillance.

b. Combat Surveillance Requirements Within Field Army.

- (1) *Division and lower echelon requirements.* At division level, and especially at the lower levels, surveillance requirements are characterized by the immediacy of operations. Continuous

surveillance is required to detect or obtain information of movements into or within the area of influence, enemy dispositions, employment of supporting weapons, electromagnetic emissions, nuclear detonations, CBR or air threats, weather, and topographical features. Periodic area surveillance is required for general information of the enemy and terrain to supplement current general intelligence. During fluid situations, continuous area surveillance is required. During static situations, periodic coverage of the area may suffice.

- (2) *Corps requirement.* At corps level, surveillance requirements are generated by both immediate and future operations. They are characterized by deep penetration of the enemy territory and a general reliance upon aerial surveillance means. Continuous surveillance is required to detect or obtain information of movements of enemy reserves into or within the corps area of influence, location of enemy reserves and fire support weapons in the corps area of influence, missile attack, CBR and air attack, nuclear detonations, electromagnetic emissions, and weather. Periodic area surveillance is required for supplemental information on the enemy and terrain required for planning the next operation. During fluid situations, continuous area surveillance is required to assist in determining the enemy's course of action and the location of his main efforts. In static situations, periodic area coverage may suffice.
- (3) *Field army requirements.* At field army level, surveillance requirements are characterized by the depth of penetration required and a lesser need for continuous surveillance coverage. Enemy objects and activities subject to

surveillance include movement and location of major reserves, long-range missile sites, command posts and combat service support complexes, and electromagnetic emissions. Other surveillance requirements include information of the terrain, weather, nuclear detonations, and contaminated areas. Normally, periodic surveillance will suffice. The length of time between missions will vary with the situation. In fluid situations, continuous surveillance of given activities or objects for short periods may be required.

c. Combat Surveillance Means. Combat surveillance means available to the commander consist of personnel such as patrols, forward observers, aerial observers, observation posts, specially trained units, and devices such as optical instruments, battlefield illumination, aircraft, drones, cameras, radar, infrared, magnetic, radiac instruments, chemical detector kits, and sound.

d. Combat Surveillance Planning.

- (1) Combat surveillance is under the staff supervision of the intelligence officer at all echelons. The G2, in coordination with G3, assigns mission priorities similar to that for processing reconnaissance requests.
- (2) The G2 has the primary general staff responsibility for—
 - (a) Planning the systematic watch of the battle area.
 - (b) Assigning mission priorities in coordination with the G3.
 - (c) Coordinating and integrating all surveillance activities.
 - (d) Developing intelligence from the information that is acquired.
 - (e) Furnishing to users the resultant intelligence data.
- (3) The G3 has the primary general staff responsibility for—
 - (a) Designating units for conduct of surveillance in accordance with the mission priorities established by G2.
 - (b) Furnishing information on friendly forces, to include their location, activities, and plans.

- (c) Specifying target characteristics that are compatible with the mission.
- (d) Procuring information required for damage assessment.
- (4) All surveillance means are integrated to provide for their effective application and coordinated use in covering the commander's area of influence. This is particularly necessary in view of the ever-increasing enemy capabilities to deny use of the airspace and to impair or to deny use of electronic detection and communications devices.
- (5) In assigning orders and requests for specific information, the capabilities of the surveillance means available to collecting agencies are considered in the same manner as the capabilities of other collection means. When the desired use of subordinate unit collection means is incompatible with the assigned mission of the unit to which the means belong, then the lowest subordinate headquarters controlling the means may be placed under the higher commander's control. For example, if the mission assigned to a division armored cavalry squadron does not permit use of certain ground radars of the squadron, as desired by the division commander, the particular radar unit may be temporarily placed under division control.
- (6) Detailed control, coordination, and supervision are necessary to guard against gaps or similar deficiencies in the combat surveillance coverage of the area of influence. Provisions are made for inspections, reports, maintenance of patrol, reconnaissance and surveillance plans, and surveillance capability overlays.

77. Reconnaissance and Counterreconnaissance

a. General.

- (1) Reconnaissance is a mission undertaken to obtain information, by visual observation or other detection methods, about the activities and resources

of an enemy or potential enemy; or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic or geographic characteristics of a particular area.

- (2) Counterreconnaissance includes all measures taken to prevent hostile observation of a force, area, or place. One method is to seek out and destroy enemy reconnaissance elements; another is to deny the enemy access to certain areas. In both cases, counterreconnaissance becomes more difficult as the dispersion of units increases.
- (3) All units have reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance capabilities and responsibilities. These responsibilities may be limited to short patrols or defensive counterreconnaissance measures during the conduct of normal mission activities, or they may extend to offensive operations involving specific reconnaissance or counterreconnaissance tasks. Certain units are specifically organized for such operations.
- (4) Reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance cannot be readily separated. This is so because effective reconnaissance helps security, and counterreconnaissance activities also provide reconnaissance information. Forces executing reconnaissance missions may be employed simultaneously on both types of missions. Orders given to the unit should, however, state which one of the two missions is to receive priority (see FM 17-36).

b. Planning and Coordinating Reconnaissance Activities.

- (1) The intelligence officer plans and coordinates reconnaissance activities with the operations officer and consults with the entire staff to insure coordination of reconnaissance with other activities. Several factors should be taken into consideration in the planning stage. These include the formulation of the plan itself, the selection of a unit, and coordination. In preparing the plan, broad generalizations such as "report strength and

disposition of the enemy" are to be avoided. The specific time that the information is desired, or the latest time that the information will be of value, should be included in the order or request. Where more than one mission is assigned to a unit, definite priorities should be stated. Where appropriate, plans should include provisions for interrogation of participating personnel after the reconnaissance has been completed.

- (2) Once a unit is selected, in coordination with the operations officer, the unit should be allowed sufficient time to prepare its own plans, to conduct the mission, and to report the results. The assigned mission should be within the capability of the reconnaissance agency.
- (3) The intelligence officer also should coordinate reconnaissance activities with other staff members. Adjacent and supporting units are also informed of reconnaissance plans to preclude duplication of reconnaissance efforts. Coordination is of major importance in the accomplishment of night reconnaissance missions.

c. Principles of Conducting Reconnaissance.
The reconnaissance techniques used by the combat arms are described in branch field manuals. The principles for reconnaissance patrolling are—

- (1) *To gain surveillance contact as soon as possible and maintain it continuously.* Ground reconnaissance elements gain and maintain observation of the enemy; and by working continuously to the front, flanks, and to the rear, attempt to determine the location, identification, disposition, and strength of the enemy force and the approach of enemy reinforcements. Army aviation is used to assist ground reconnaissance.
- (2) *To maneuver freely in conformity with operations.* Patrols and reconnaissance units maneuver freely and keep pace with the activity of the enemy. Reconnaissance units orient

on the enemy and not on other friendly elements. Reconnaissance of other portions of the assigned area, in addition to canalized routes such as roads, valleys, and ridge lines, will result in procurement of maximum information.

- (3) *To fight only when necessary to gain information.* Reconnaissance is conducted preferably by stealth and observation of the enemy without his knowledge. Combat is resorted to only when necessary to prevent destruction or capture, when prisoners are desired, or when the mission requires combat to obtain the desired information. Reconnaissance forces are provided with the means to accomplish their mission by close combat if necessary.
- (4) *To report all items of information as soon as possible.* Much information has importance that is not obvious at the time of its collection. Negative information shows where the enemy is not going, or where he is not located, at a given time.

d. Principles of Counterreconnaissance. The principles of counterreconnaissance operations are as follows:

- (1) Operations are adjusted to and oriented on the friendly forces being screened.
- (2) Enemy reconnaissance elements are destroyed or neutralized by combat.
- (3) Screening forces are echeloned in depth to provide mutual support and to limit penetrations by enemy reconnaissance elements. The counterreconnaissance screen prevents enemy reconnaissance forces from entering certain areas or places. It may be a moving or a stationary one depending upon the activities of the force being screened.

e. Agencies.

- (1) Ground reconnaissance agencies consist of personnel manning ground observation posts or surveillance devices, elements of all arms, and units speci-

ally organized or designated to perform air and ground reconnaissance. Infantry, armor, and engineer elements are suited for patrolling. Armored cavalry reconnaissance units are suited for reconnaissance deep in enemy areas. The depth at which reconnaissance patrols may operate in enemy-held areas is increased by the use of air cavalry, helicopters and other transportation means to deliver and retrieve patrols. The ability of ground patrols to produce timely information depends in part upon their mobility and upon their communication means for transmitting information and receiving new instructions.

- (2) Ground units specifically organized for reconnaissance include the —
 - (a) Ground surveillance section in each infantry battalion headquarters and headquarters company.
 - (b) Scout platoon in each tank and mechanized infantry battalion.
 - (c) Reconnaissance platoon in each infantry battalion.
 - (d) Armored cavalry squadron in each division.
 - (e) Cavalry squadron in each airmobile division.
 - (f) Armored cavalry regiment in the type corps and type field army.
 - (g) Long range patrol of the corps and field army.
- (3) Air reconnaissance agencies are discussed in later paragraphs.

78. Reconnaissance in Force and by Fire

a. Reconnaissance in Force. A reconnaissance in force is a limited objective operation by a unit to discover and to test the enemy's disposition and strength, or to develop other intelligence. If the enemy situation must be developed along a broad front, a reconnaissance in force may be conducted using strong probing actions to determine the enemy situation at selected points. The size of the force used is of such strength as to cause the enemy to react sufficiently to disclose his location, disposition, and strength. Reconnaissance in force

operations may result in unacceptable losses, may disclose the commander's ultimate intentions, or may provoke an unwanted general engagement. When the enemy possesses appropriate nuclear delivery means, the risk of presenting a profitable target may outweigh the value of the information desired.

b. Reconnaissance by Fire. This is a reconnaissance method in which fire is placed on a suspected enemy position to destroy camouflage or to cause the enemy to react either by movement or by return of the fire. The enemy reaction permits observation of his locations, dispositions, and strength. This method has been frequently found productive in internal defense operations where rough terrain and heavy foliage degraded more conventional means.

79. Tactical Air Reconnaissance/Aerial Battlefield Surveillance

a. Tactical Air Reconnaissance. Missions undertaken in direct support of tactical operations, using aerial platforms or vehicles equipped with visual, optical, electronic and/or other sensory devices, to obtain specific information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic characteristics of a particular area.

b. Aerial Battlefield Surveillance. Missions undertaken by use of aerial platforms or vehicles equipped with visual, optical, electronic and/or other sensory devices to—

- (1) Maintain a continuous all-weather, day and night systematic watch over the battle area to provide timely intelligence information for tactical ground operations. Aerial surveillance in its broadest sense encompasses day/night observation over the entire area as contrasted to air reconnaissance which is a mission in time and place to obtain information of the enemy, terrain or weather.
- (2) Perform target acquisition to identify targets, by precise and timely location in three dimensions with respect to Army weapons which are able to engage those targets.

c. Visual Aerial Surveillance. Visual sur-

veillance is defined as the gathering of information through observation by aircraft crews. Although current information of the enemy and the area of operations can be obtained rapidly by this means, it is limited by the speed and vibration of the aircraft, the distance from which observation must be made, the enemy's air defenses and concealment measures, and the existing visibility. Many of these limitations may be overcome by use of sensory devices to verify and to supplement visual sightings. The value of visual aerial surveillance lies in the speed with which information of fleeting targets can be relayed to friendly units capable of attacking such targets. There are five general types of visual observation—area search, specific search, route reconnaissance, artillery adjustment, and contact reconnaissance. Visual air reconnaissance/aerial surveillance by crews intimately familiar with the terrain is often extremely effective in internal defense operations.

d. Permanent Record Imagery Reconnaissance. Permanent record imagery is essential before, during, and after an operation. All commanders require information concerning the location and disposition of the enemy. Aerial imagery can normally meet this requirement by providing recorded images which are studied, analyzed, and interpreted by trained imagery interpreters. Such analysis is more detailed and more accurate than that derived from visual observations. The use of permanent record imagery requires sensory recording equipment of various degrees of complexity. The time lag between acquisition and interpretation of permanent imagery may reduce or negate the value of information collected concerning transient and fleeting targets. Permanent imagery may be obtained through use of—

- (1) Cameras—the general types of coverage are shown in figure 7.
- (2) Emission detectors (light and heat in the infrared portion of the electromagnetic spectrum).
- (3) Radar.
- (4) Electromagnetic intercept devices.

e. Weather Reconnaissance. Weather reconnaissance by the tactical air force is the action taken to obtain weather data over areas where

(1) Photo coverage	(2) Major uses	(3) Types of photos	(4) Area of coverage	(5) Frequency	(6) Distribution
Initial record.	General intelligence requirements, such as basic information on terrain, routes of communication, and enemy activities. Planning Operations. Mapping.	Usually vertical stereo pairs.	Projected areas of operations.	As necessary to show seasonal changes.	Normally requested by field army which makes automatic initial distribution to subordinate units according to areas of interest. Supplementary issues are made as the campaign progresses. See FM 101-10 for typical allowances.
General intelligence record.	Conduct of current tactical operations. Target acquisition.	Usually vertical stereo pairs.	Unit area of influence and specified portions of the unit area of interest.	As required by the tactical situation, terrain characteristics, and other variables. At times, daily coverage of only portions of the battle area is required. In moving situations, only coverage specified areas and immediate objectives may be required.	Normally requested by divisions and higher headquarters. See FM 101-10 for typical allowances.
Detailed intelligence record.	Study of specific targets or objectives for information for immediate requirements and for specific planning.	As required.	As required.	As required.	As required.
Mapping record.	Preparation and revision of maps.	Usually small scale vertical stereo pairs.*	As required.	As required.	Normally requested by corps and higher headquarters and distributed to topographic units.

*Often supplemented with large scale photos of culturally developed areas.

Figure 7. Types of aerial photographic coverage.

weather reports are not available. Weather reconnaissance is accomplished to obtain—

- (1) Weather data for use in preparing weather analysis and forecasts. These missions fall into two general classes as follows:

- (a) Scheduled missions which make weather observations, to include atmospheric soundings at predetermined locations and at scheduled times.
- (b) Unscheduled missions to investigate doubtful weather conditions that will affect the battle area.

- (2) Special reports of weather conditions along the routes to, and in, the vicinity of targets for proposed air operations. These reports are required to permit immediate operational decisions such as diversion, change of flight track, or cancellation of mission.

f. Use of Radar and Infrared Devices.

- (1) Portrayal methods used by radar and infrared devices include scope presentation for instantaneous viewing, imagery recording for retention and detailed study, and transmission to a ground station. Airborne radar and infrared sensory devices can produce acceptable imagery during most conditions of visibility, but they are particularly valuable during periods of poor visibility.
- (2) Airborne radar can provide acceptable imagery during periods of darkness and in conditions of light rain, smoke, haze, fog, mist, and dust. It is valuable as a moving target indicator. Information thus obtained is normally supplemented by use of other means, such as visual observation and photography, which can better determine the nature of the activity detected by the radar. Airborne radar can quickly cover large areas. Side-looking radars can operate from behind the forward edge of friendly dispositions. Airborne radar is dependent upon line-of-sight and may be detected and jammed or spoofed.

- (3) Airborne passive infrared, ARDF, and thermal detection devices are valuable in penetrating camouflage and collecting information at night. As with airborne radar, the information obtained by these devices is normally corroborated by other means, such as visual observation and photography, which can better determine the nature of the detected activity. Airborne passive infrared and thermal detection devices are not designed for coverage of large areas and provide imagery only of that area beneath the flight path of the aircraft. Passive infrared and thermal detection devices are invulnerable to countermeasures but are susceptible to enemy deception measures. The effectiveness of these devices is reduced by fog, clouds, and precipitation (FM 30-20).

80. Air Reconnaissance and Aerial Surveillance Agencies

a. Army Aviation. Within the field army, corps or separate task force, where required, is an aerial surveillance company which provides sustained all weather, day and night, surveillance of that portion of the area of influence for which the army has primary aerial surveillance responsibility. Through use of visual observation, organic sensors (IR, SLAR, and Photo) and imagery interpretation, the company produces and disseminates all available information and intelligence obtained or developed. Additional visual observation is available to combat battalions, brigades, task forces, and to divisions or corps through use of aerial observers in organic or supporting LOH aircraft.

b. Supporting Services.

- (1) Tactical reconnaissance wings of the tactical air force (TAF) normally support Army operations. Air reconnaissance wings support the field army from dispersed airfields. The reconnaissance wings include both reconnaissance-fighter type and reconnaissance-bomber type aircraft. Reconnaissance-bomber type aircraft

normally provide night photographic, radar photographic, weather, and limited visual reconnaissance information. Information on significant sightings made during all reconnaissance missions is transmitted in flight over the TAF tactical air observation net which is monitored by the spot report receivers at Army units and appropriate Air Force agencies. TAF high performance reconnaissance aircraft, with fighter cover when required, can perform air reconnaissance missions over the forward areas as well as at great distances beyond the forward edge of the battle area.

- (2) Naval and Marine Air may provide reconnaissance support for all types of Army units.
 - (a) Navy and Marine carrier-based air reconnaissance support is normal in amphibious operations. The Navy/Marine Corps system for requesting and coordinating air reconnaissance requests is used.
 - (b) In all other types of operations, Navy and Marine air reconnaissance support may be used when aircraft carriers or other air facilities are within range. Usually, Marine and Navy air reconnaissance activities are coordinated by the tactical air force; normal Army-Air Force requests and coordinating procedures are used. In some cases, Navy and Marine air units may provide direct support to Army units in accordance with specially established procedures.
 - (c) Because of limited imagery reproduction facilities on aircraft carriers, Army reproduction elements may be required to support naval air reconnaissance units. Imagery may be delivered to Army units by Navy, Marine, or Army couriers. Army imagery interpreters and liaison officers are normally located with supporting Navy or Marine air reconnaissance units.

- (3) Cryptologic service elements of the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy, to include the U.S. Marine Corps, may provide support in the form of signal intelligence and electronic warfare services depending on geographical proximity and specially established procedures as developed by a joint or unified command.

81. Target Acquisition

a. General.

- (1) Target acquisition is that part of combat intelligence specifically concerned with the detection, identification and location of a target in sufficient detail for the effective employment of weapons.
 - (a) Detection determines the existence or presence of a target.
 - (b) Identification determines the nature, composition and size of the target.
 - (c) Location consists of determining the position of the target with respect to known points or weapons, i.e., with respect to a common grid.
 - (d) The amount of detail required to acquire a target is dependent upon many variables, e.g., type of target, effect desired (neutralization, destruction, harassment, break-off of attack), means to be used to attack, or if the target is to be preplanned or one of opportunity. In any case, the sufficiency of the detail is determined in the process of target analysis, whether this be an immediate analysis accomplished by a fire direction officer in response to a target acquired by a forward observer, or a deliberate analysis accomplished by a target analyst or intelligence officer in response to future operational planning.
 - (e) The weapons to be employed are often construed to mean artillery, but must be considered to mean all weapons, e.g., machine gun, mortar, anti-tank, armed helicopter, tactical aircraft, smoke generators, or

even maneuver elements. The weapons to be used and the effect desired will be determined through analysis.

- (2) Target acquisition is accomplished either through the application of direct target acquisition means or through indirect target acquisition, that is, through the process of target development. These two methods supplement and complement each other, each at times satisfying the requirements implicit in the function of the other.

b. Direct Target Acquisition.

- (1) Traditionally, direct target acquisition has been thought to be accomplished only by the application of means designed for that purpose, e.g., forward observers, observation posts, aerial observers, counter mortar/battery and surveillance radars, flash and sound ranging devices, and radio direction finding equipment. These means are an integral part of the artillery fire support system and are designed to be employed specifically to acquire targets for the artillery and other fire support means. Implicit in the application of these means is the requirement for a great degree of accuracy, sufficient information for target analysis (i.e., if and when to engage target, by what method or means and by whom) and immediate response when required (see FM 6-121).
- (2) Direct target acquisition can be, and is, accomplished by other means, i.e., by units in contact, ground surveillance radars, patrols of all types, survey parties, imagery acquired by aerial means, ground and air reconnaissance elements and virtually anyone who sees a target and has the capability to communicate the required information to a reaction means. Additionally, at times many of these means will be given the specific mission to acquire targets, e.g., long range patrols, aerial

imagery, or surveillance radars which have been surveyed into the common grid. Although all of these various means are not formally organized into a recognizable target acquisition system, they play an extremely important part in target acquisition.

c. Target Development.

- (1) Target development, sometimes termed Indirect Target Acquisition, is the detection, location, and identification of suspect, probable and/or confirmed targets through the process of analyzing and correlating information from all intelligence collection means. Targets so located may provide the basis for further directing the collection effort, planning operations, committing maneuver forces, executing harassing and interdicting fires and/or attacking (immediately or preplanned) by fire support means. The development process is one of continuous refinement of detail; i.e., it may progress from a suspect target located only generally, through successive stages until a confirmed target is located accurately and identified exactly.
- (2) Target development differs from direct target acquisition, not in the end results attained or sought, but in the manner of achieving the end result. It is a unique aspect of normal intelligence production with the specific purpose to develop targets. The force intelligence officer must not only accept staff responsibility for this function, but he must actively participate and coordinate the effort to insure its efficient and meaningful operation.
- (3) Force commanders must provide resources to accomplish this important function. Intelligence personnel and fire support personnel charged with this function should be collocated and their efforts and unique capabilities integrated. This will facilitate the free flow and rapid exchange of information. It will also insure that

pertinent targeting information is not delayed or derogated from by other intelligence information which may be of equal importance but not as perishable.

d. Target Acquisition Planning.

- (1) Early in the planning stage of an operation, a list of potential targets is developed. Such factors as mission, information on the enemy, characteristics of the area of operations, and enemy tactics and practices are studied to select areas in which targets are probable.
- (2) The collection effort provides systematic combat surveillance to detect targets. Areas of particular importance to operational plans are subject to more intensive surveillance than other areas. Target folders should be developed and maintained by inclusion of target intelligence and other material related to planning and executing action against a specific target.
- (3) The target acquisition effort is then directed toward securing information to verify, identify, accurately locate, or disprove the presence of suspected targets. This is accomplished by assigning suitable collection tasks to collection agencies.
- (4) The collection plan, observation plans, air reconnaissance plans, and patrol plans are used to assist in coordinating the target acquisition effort.

e. Requirements for Detail and Accuracy.

- (1) Requirements for detail and accuracy will vary with the weapon to be employed (e.g., air, artillery, maneuver force, ADM), the type munition (e.g., HE, chemical, biological, or nuclear), the type fire (e.g., indirect or direct, unobserved or observed) and the effect desired (e.g., neutralization, destruction, harassment). Conversely, the detail and accuracy furnished by target acquisition means will, in turn, have an influence on each of these variables.
- (2) For the above reason, it must be

stressed that target information/intelligence must be reported as completely and accurately as possible in consonance with the capabilities of the acquisition source, timeliness requirements, and the existing situation. This is not to imply that incomplete information should not be reported. On the contrary, it plays a major role in target acquisition. For example, the artillery continually stresses the requirement for the location of a target to be given in three dimensional coordinates x =easting, y =northing, z =altitude). However, the altitude (z) is, more often than not, provided by the fire direction agency from the map rather than by the target acquisition means. Further, the report of vehicles entering and leaving a wooded area may be sufficient information to confirm the location of a previously suspected target.

f. Requirements for Timeliness.

- (1) Requirements for timeliness vary. Several factors to be considered include the weapons to be employed, operational plans and the nature of the target, i.e., whether it is permanent, semi-permanent or mobile; whether it is building up or dispersing; and whether it is an immediate or future threat to the accomplishment of the mission.
- (2) To insure timeliness in target acquisition, all commands and target acquisition agencies must be authorized to report information directly to whatever agency has the capability to react rapidly. Every effort should be made to prevent any unnecessary delay in reporting target information/intelligence. Delays are created by excessive intelligence processing or the use of circuitous reporting channels without regard for timeliness.
- (3) Highly accurate target information/intelligence is particularly valuable for general intelligence purposes. Thus, information acquired by target

acquisition, though obtained primarily for use in the attack of targets, should receive thorough consideration for dissemination to higher, lower, and adjacent commands.

(4) The general considerations discussed under the formulation of orders and requests (para 90) are particularly important to a successful target acquisition effort.

Section VII. INTELLIGENCE PLANNING

82. General

Like any other staff section, the intelligence section plans all activities for which it is responsible. Intelligence planning is a continuing process, but planning for a specific operation is initiated on receipt of the mission or when a contingency mission is developed. Intelligence planning begins before the planning of other staff sections. Until an intelligence estimate is available, detailed operational planning cannot be completed. The intelligence officer must be ready to provide an estimate for the next operation and to revise the current estimate to meet changed operational conditions.

83. Coordination in Planning

a. Only rarely can the intelligence officer conclude his actions without coordination with one or more general or special staff sections. No intelligence action that affects the commander's decision can be concluded without coordination with one or more staff agencies. An intelligence officer who fails to recognize where coordination is necessary may cause confusion and delay in his headquarters, with consequent confusion and delay in operations.

b. The following list exemplifies some of the staff coordination necessary in planning by the division intelligence officer:

- (1) Interrogation of prisoners of war: G1, G4, staff judge advocate, provost marshal, and surgeon.
- (2) Censorship: G1, G5, AG, and public information officer.
- (3) Operations: All.
- (4) Use of combat troops for intelligence missions: G3.
- (5) Escort, supervision, and briefing of visitors: G1, G3, public information officer, and headquarters commandant.
- (6) Location and construction of obser-

vation posts: G3, engineer, and artillery officers.

- (7) Examination of captured equipment: G4.
- (8) Needs for maps, photos, and studies: All.
- (9) Map procurement, storage, and distribution: G3, engineer and support commander.
- (10) Air reconnaissance, photo and visual: G3, air liaison officer, and artillery officer.
- (11) Civilian internees: G1, G5, staff judge advocate, and provost marshal.
- (12) Intelligence training: G3.
- (13) Procurement and replacement of intelligence specialist: G1 and MI unit commander.
- (14) Signal intelligence: ASA staff officer.

84. Intelligence Planning Phases

a. *General.* Intelligence planning is a continuing process. Based on an analysis of planning tasks, periods are established for the completion of certain tasks before the plan is further developed. Further division of each planning period into phases facilitates coordination between staff sections. The sequence of intelligence planning phases, like that of the other staff sections, is generally outlined in the following paragraphs.

b. *Preliminary Phase.* Before the completion of a current operation and before the commander receives any directives or orders for further action, his staff considers what this further action is likely to be. This applies particularly to the intelligence officer, for when the commander receives a directive or warning for further action, the intelligence officer must have sufficient information immediately available for the commander to analyze the prob-

able mission and to issue preliminary planning guidance. A similar situation may exist when a headquarters is activated or at the beginning of any war, campaign, or operation.

c. Initial Phase. When a unit receives a new mission, information of the enemy and the area of operations is furnished to the commander and the staff so that definite operational, administrative, and logistical planning may be initiated. The security measures contained in the unit SOP are reviewed to determine whether they are adequate for the security of the planning and the operation. Additional information is presented at the initial staff conference to assist the commander in analyzing the mission and providing definite planning guidance.

d. Subsequent Phases. These phases consist of *preparation, approval, publication, and execution*. Preparation, approval, and publication refer to the operation plan and its various annexes; and execution is a final, preoperational stage during which subordinate units complete their planning and conduct rehearsals. These phases, which start the definite planning period, feature the concurrent preparation of various plans and studies. The most important of these, from the intelligence viewpoint, follow:

- (1) Preparation of a counterintelligence plan for security of the operation.
- (2) Completion of plans to obtain all necessary information not immediately available.
- (3) Preparation of a plan for securing and distributing intelligence aids. These aids include materials such as charts and models of the area of operations, maps, photos and mosaics, imagery interpretation reports, sketches and diagrams, hydrographic charts, and intelligence reports.
- (4) Revision of the intelligence estimate after evaluation and interpretation of all available information. The estimate, which is based on initial and subsequent assumptions and changes in the known enemy and friendly

situation, is constantly revised throughout the planning phase.

- (5) Revision and recommendation of EEI and other intelligence requirements, including those prepared earlier which are still applicable and those that concern the operational phase.
- (6) Preparation of a collection plan, based on the EEI that were approved by the commander, and on other intelligence requirements. This plan is used by the intelligence section to develop collection missions.
- (7) Preparation of an intelligence plan as an annex to the operation plan. (The operation plan becomes the operation order; thus, the intelligence plan becomes the intelligence annex to the operation order.)

e. Intelligence Planning is Continuous. Existing intelligence is revised as new intelligence is developed. The collection plan is altered as the situation develops so as to reflect current intelligence needs. Finally preliminary planning again commences in anticipation of future actions.

85. The Intelligence Annex to an Operation Plan or Order

a. General. The intelligence annex (see app O) is one of several annexes to an operation plan. The purpose of this annex is to present the details pertinent to intelligence, and thereby, keep the body of the operation plan clear and concise.

b. Scope. Many factors are considered to determine the detail to be included in this annex. Some of these factors are the mission, area of operations, established practices, combat experience of the command, standing operating procedure, and new procedures.

86. Field Army Intelligence Planning

a. The field army G2 is concerned with strategic and technical intelligence, as well as combat intelligence, and his planning reflects this concern. Moreover, the scope and projection of field army operations and the simultane-

ous planning for a number of operations interject into army intelligence planning a number of factors that warrant consideration.

b. The scope and the long range of field army operations affect intelligence planning in preparation for combat as follows:

- (1) Preliminary and initial intelligence planning is based largely on assumptions. As planning progresses, particularly as operational details are made firm, the assumptions can either be substantiated as fact or, if erroneous, discarded.
- (2) Intelligence planning is flexible, although with respect to gathering information of weather and terrain in the probable area of operations, it is not so flexible as in the cases of personnel and operational or logistical planning. The further an operation is projected into the future, the more likely are the changes in the situation that may radically alter the plans. Provisions are therefore made for all foreseeable contingencies.
- (3) Concurrent planning by subordinate echelons is not ordinarily feasible in the early stages of planning for an operation scheduled far into the future due to the involvement in the operation in progress and the planning for the next operation. Sufficient data usually are not available to give the corps.

c. The conduct of current operations and the simultaneous planning of two or more future operations taxes the ability of the G2 section to operate on a 24-hour basis. Therefore, for more efficient operation during peak workload periods, consideration must be given to reorganization for planning. One method is to provide intelligence representation from each branch to a headquarters planning group. Another is to organize within the G2 section an intelligence planning group representing each branch. A third solution is to continue under the normal organization and concurrent-

ly plan and operate. The intelligence officer must decide which system to use based on requirements and the personnel available.

87. Corps Intelligence Planning

Intelligence planning at corps is based on army plans and is primarily a matter of determining how, by whom, and when the intelligence functions of the corps will be performed and setting forth the details in a logical, understandable fashion. Each of the phases is generally the same as it is for the field army, but the time available to corps will be less than that available to the field army. During the execution phase of an operation, the corps G2 section is primarily concerned with the fulfillment of those functions which pertain directly to the operation. It will also be engaged in planning for future operations. Generally corps planning does not require the establishment of a separate planning staff or a separate planning group within the G2 section.

88. Division Intelligence Planning

The intelligence planning at division in preparation for combat is based on plans of the next higher headquarters. The same planning phases are applicable, although the preliminary phase will be considerably shortened. In addition to absorbing and disseminating the intelligence made available as a result of intelligence activities at higher headquarters, the division G2 develops intelligence requirements, levies requests for information and exploits any other sources available to him. In view of the reduced time available to prepare for combat, the division G2 must keep himself currently informed as to planning being undertaken at the next higher echelon.

89. Lower Unit Intelligence Planning

As at the higher levels, essentially the same planning is carried out. Because of the sizes of the units involved and their areas of interest, however, there will be a reduction in the number of operational plans and planning leadtime. Normally, operational planning at the lower levels is relatively informal.

Section VIII. ORDERS AND REQUESTS

90. Formulation of Orders and Requests

a. Orders and requests for specific information are based on indications. Collection agencies are directed or requested to supply the information which will confirm or deny the indications, but they are not given the responsibility for determining whether or not the information obtained does confirm or deny an indication. If the location of hostile artillery in depth is a defense indication, collection agencies are not ordered to "report whether or not hostile artillery is located in depth." Instead, they are ordered to "report locations of hostile artillery in your zone." Determination of whether the indication has been substantiated is then based on the information collected. Orders and requests for information deal with a specific enemy activity, location, or characteristics, or a specific terrain feature or weather condition. These orders and requests are specific as to what information is desired and where it may be found. For example, the forward movement of hostile troops has been determined to be an indication of reinforcement. An analysis of the road nets, communications centers, and locations of enemy forces—integrated with a knowledge of the enemy's tactical doctrine—indicates what routes the enemy will most probably use and where the effort of available collection agencies should be concentrated. A proper order to collecting agencies is "report volume, type, and direction of traffic on the following roads:***."

b. Orders and requests based on indications of enemy vulnerabilities are formulated in the same manner. For example, a battalion-sized troop unit disposed within a given area may have been determined to be the minimum target suitable for nuclear attack. Collection agencies are not ordered to report locations of battalions vulnerable to nuclear attack; instead, they are ordered to report location, composition, disposition, size, shape, and nuclear defense measures of battalion-sized troop units.

c. Orders and requests for specific information frequently deal with specific characteristics of the area of operations. For example, an intelligence requirement may ask, "What

obstacles exist in our zone?" A map study reveals that streams cross the axis of advance. This is an indication that natural obstacles may exist. The extent to which a located stream is actually an obstacle becomes the subject for orders and requests for specific information. Accordingly, the order or request to a collection agency may state, "Report width, depth, velocity, and condition of banks and bottom of JOH River between WALIS and HERMANN."

d. Collection agencies do not restrict their efforts to items specifically mentioned in orders and reports from higher headquarters. All pertinent information, even if not specifically requested, is reported.

91. Dissemination of Orders and Requests

Orders and requests for specific information are transmitted either as fragmentary orders or by means of the intelligence annex. Security must be provided in the transmission of orders and requests, because enemy knowledge of our requirements would furnish him with a basis for reducing the extent of our knowledge of his situation and our possible intentions.

a. Fragmentary orders are used most frequently because information requirements continually change.

b. Intelligence and intelligence instructions, to include orders and requests for the collection of information, are disseminated by means of the intelligence annex. This annex normally accompanies each complete operation order issued by division and higher commands. An example of an intelligence annex is shown in appendix O.

- (1) Paragraph 3 of the intelligence annex, "Intelligence Acquisition Tasks," implements the collection plan. It contains a complete list of current orders and requests for information. Except for collection orders which are a part of the unit SOP, previously issued collection orders and requests not repeated in the intelligence annex are automatically cancelled. When orders

and requests are lengthy, they may be placed in an appendix to the intelligence annex.

- (2) Paragraph 4 of the intelligence annex, "Measures for Handling Personnel, Documents, and Materiel," lists

under a separate subparagraph the items which require action different from those prescribed in the unit SOP. In preparing paragraph 4, the intelligence officer consults supporting intelligence agencies, as appropriate.

Section IX. THE COLLECTION PLAN

92. General

a. The collection plan is a means whereby an intelligence officer takes the intelligence requirements, as announced by the commander, and by following a logical, orderly process, analyzes the intelligence requirements for indications and translates the indications into specific missions or requests directed to collection agencies, together with the designation of the time and place the information is to be reported. It is supplemented, as required, by workbooks and other plans such as air and ground reconnaissance plans and observation plans.

b. The collection plan assists the intelligence officer in the coordination and integration of the collection efforts of the collecting agencies and in keeping all elements of the intelligence section informed of collection activities directed by the headquarters.

c. The collection plan covers an entire operation. Since the collection effort involves continuous planning, an entirely new collection plan is seldom prepared except when a unit first enters combat. The collection plan is continually revised as required. In effect, it is a slate on which new entries are written as necessary and obsolete entries are removed.

d. Because information requirements are more complex at higher levels of command, the collection plan is normally more extensive at such levels. At any level, however, collection planning is essentially a mental process and the collection plan—regardless of the format being used—is merely an aid to assist the intelligence officer. It is not a substitute for thinking, and is maintained only to the extent that it assists the intelligence officer in planning and supervising the collection efforts.

93. Format

a. The collection plan is not made up in any prescribed form. It can range from a fragmentary worksheet to a long, detailed plan or it may be a mental plan alone. Although an experienced intelligence officer can formulate his collection plan mentally, the planning of the collection effort is facilitated and is less subject to error when a formal, written collection plan is used.

b. The type and makeup of the collection plan will depend upon the size of the unit, the mission, the situation, and the personalities concerned. At brigade and battalion levels, because of time and operational limitations, the collection plan must take the simplest form possible, consistent with operational necessity. For example, the format of the plan recommended for use at division and higher levels (fig. 8), may be modified by eliminating columns 1, 2, and 5. Greater flexibility and mobility in future operations, together with the need for increased speeding the flow of information, may well preclude a formal written collection plan. Regardless of what form of plan is chosen, it must be patterned to meet the intelligence officer's needs at any given time.

94. Contents of the Collection Plan

a. A collection plan includes the following items (fig. 8) :

- (1) The EEI and other intelligence requirements—usually stated in question form.
- (2) The indications pertinent to the EEI and to other intelligence requirements.
- (3) The specific information sought in connection with each indication. This information is the basis for orders and requests to collection agencies.

UNIT:

Period covered: From: _____ To: _____

(1) Essential elements of information and other required intelligence items	(2) Indications (analysis of items in column (1))	(3) Basis for specific orders or requests	(4) List all available agencies						(5) Place and time at which information is to be reported	(6) Remarks
			List all available	agencies to be	used in the	collection of	required information			
List the EEI announced for the operation or period and other required intelligence items, spaced sufficiently to permit entry in column (2) of all indications pertinent to each item.	List opposite each item in column (1) those indications that best provide an answer to the question asked or implied by each item.	List the specific information sought in connection with each indication.	Place a cross (X) under each agency that has or can get the information bearing on each indication. The agency (or agencies) finally selected to obtain the information is indicated by circling (X) except for SOP items for agencies under the control of the unit.						Place: Headquarters or staff section to which information is to be reported if other than the insuing headquarters. Time may be a specific time, periodically, or as the information is obtained.	Notes for future actions and to indicate progress of the collection effort.

Figure 8. A collection plan.

- (4) The agencies to be used to obtain the required information.
- (5) The place and time the information is to be reported if not specified in the unit SOP.
- (6) A column to indicate the progress of the collection effort and notes for future action.

b. Appendix E is an example of a partially completed collection plan.

95. Basis for Specific Orders and Requests

The wording of an order or request is not necessarily the same as that used in column 3 of the plan. Several entries may be combined into a single order or request, because the same specific information may be sought in connection with several different indications. For example, indications of attack may include "location of artillery well forward;" indications of defense may include a requirement to determine the "location of artillery laterally and in depth." In both of these cases, the specific information desired from collection agencies is location of artillery by type and caliber.

96. Available Agencies

a. All available collection agencies usually are listed at the top of column 4. Military intelligence agencies such as prisoner of war interrogators and imagery interpreters may be specifically listed or grouped together. Supporting intelligence collection agencies also are listed.

b. Opposite each basis for specific orders or requests, an X is entered in the column of each collection agency capable of furnishing the required information. The factors of suitability, multiplicity, and balance are applied and circles are drawn around the X's of the agencies to be ordered or requested to furnish the information. An exception to this technique is the handling of SOP items for agencies under the control of the headquarters.

c. The intelligence officer specifically selects those agencies with which he has direct communication. Where information is desired from an agency of a higher or lower headquarters, normally the headquarters itself should be listed.

97. Place and Time of Reporting Information

a. Information may be required by or at a specified time or times, at specified intervals, or upon the occurrence of specific events. A one-time report, for example, the condition of a river bottom, may be required by a specified time. Reports on certain enemy activities may be desired at specified times. Such reports may be required daily at the beginning of morning nautical twilight and at the end of evening nautical twilight. Reports of other enemy activities, such as movement along particular roads, may be required periodically, that is, "every four hours beginning at 0800." Reports of identification of new units, enemy aerial activity, artillery bombardment, nuclear activity, and similar items, are usually required as obtained. Periodic negative reports pertaining to specified activities may also be required.

b. Entries in column 5 are determined in consultation with the operations officer. Information which arrives too late is of no value. Information received too soon may be inaccurate by the time it is used.

c. When the collection agency requires time for preparation before undertaking the task, allowance is made for the time needed to issue orders, prepare personnel for the mission, execute the mission, and report the results.

98. Remarks

a. Miscellaneous notes on the progress of the collection effort and notes for future action are recorded in column 6, "Remarks." A code consisting of plus and minus signs, check marks, and crosses may be used for designating whether positive or negative reports were received, whether the information received was adequate, or whether the indication concerned has been substantiated.

b. Notes on future cancellation or implementation of orders and requests, modifications of EEI and other intelligence requirements upon the occurrence of specific events, or other actions to be taken as the collection effort progresses are also entered in column 6.

99. SOP Items

a. As the collection plan is a means of facilitating analysis of the EEI and other intelli-

gence requirements and insuring that pertinent orders and requests have been issued, entries are also made concerning information items specified by unit SOP (see FM 61-100 and FM 101-5). For example, the SOP ordinarily direct subordinate units to report newly obtained identifications immediately. Nevertheless, the collection plan is completed with respect to new unit identifications exactly as it would be if the SOP did not require such reporting. For such items, however, the X's under agencies to be used need not be circled and the abbreviation

"SOP" may be entered in the "Remarks" column to indicate that an order is not necessary.

b. If the basis for specific orders or requests directs attention to a specific area, the item is treated as if it were not an SOP item even though it may be information of a type covered in the unit SOP. For example, the unit SOP may prescribe reporting the location of hostile minefields, demolitions, and other defensive works. However, a requirement for reporting the location of minefields in the vicinity of a specific area is not treated as an SOP item.

Section X. SUPERVISION OF THE COLLECTION EFFORT

100. General

Active supervision of the collection effort by the intelligence officer is necessary to insure the success of the collection effort. This is particularly true of the collection agencies organic to or attached to brigade and lower units. Supervision can be best achieved by personal staff visits—by the intelligence officer himself or by members of his staff. For example, an S2 may brief members of a patrol before departure and debrief them, as a group, upon their return.

101. Significance

Because his primary function is to keep the commander and others informed of the enemy situation and capabilities and the area of operations, the intelligence officer is faced with the

problem of efficiently employing all available collection agencies to gather information. The commander requires on a continuing basis, reliable information on the disposition, strength, composition, and movement of hostile forces as well as information on the area of operations. All means are employed to gain information of the enemy forces in his zone and in other areas which may affect the preparation of plans and the accomplishment of the mission. Failure to exploit properly each source of information may deny important information of hostile dispositions, movements, and operations and prevent the exploitation of enemy peculiarities and weaknesses. Supervision of the collection effort must, therefore, be an integral part of the intelligence officer's responsibilities in the collection of information.

CHAPTER 5

PROCESSING OF INFORMATION

Section I. INTRODUCTION

102. General

Processing is the step in the intelligence cycle whereby information becomes intelligence. Processing consists of three operations—

a. Recording. The reduction of information to writing or some other form of graphical representation and the arranging of this information into groups of related items.

b. Evaluation. The determination of the pertinence, reliability, and accuracy of the information.

c. Interpretation. The determination of the significance of the information in relationship to information and intelligence already known and the drawing of conclusions as to the probable meaning of the evaluated information.

103. Processing Procedure

a. Information is processed as received without waiting to collect additional information. The intelligence derived from incomplete information may be essential, particularly for nuclear targets or fast moving internal defense operations. There is always a time lag between the buildup of a target and the time that the information becomes available; in fact, complete information on the target may not become available until after the target has begun to dissipate. If time permits, a search is directed for additional information to complete, confirm, or refute the intelligence developed from incomplete information.

b. The sequence in processing depends upon the nature and urgency of the information. Usually, recording is the first step; however, on urgent items, recording may occur simultaneously with evaluation and interpretation, or

even later. Irrelevant information is not processed. Information needed immediately by higher, lower, or adjacent units is disseminated before it is completely processed. Information not of immediate concern, but of possible present or future value, is normally completely processed before being disseminated.

c. Evaluation and interpretation may be instantaneous and may be followed by immediate dissemination. For example, information from a reliable source and believed to be true may state that the enemy is about to launch a major attack. In this case, recording is of secondary importance and the intelligence report that an attack is imminent is disseminated as soon after receipt as possible.

d. Information is sometimes relayed to a higher echelon before any processing takes place. For example, to decrease the production time of intelligence related to nuclear targets, a commander may order that all information concerning specified enemy units, areas, or activities is to be reported without processing at any lower headquarters.

e. Figure 9 illustrates the flow of processing at a division, corps, or field army headquarters having a tactical operations center (TOC). The upper portion reflects processing which occurs when the message is first received at the TOC. The lower portion reflects the processing which takes place when the message is first received at the G2 section. The latter portion may also apply equally as well to processing at the brigade levels except that those references to the G2 and TOC are not appropriate at these levels.




Figure 9. Flow of processing.

104. Processing of Information at Corps and Field Army

As the scope of intelligence activities and the volume of information increase, a more elaborate and intricate system of processing is required.

a. Recording. Above division, the wealth of information requires thorough and painstaking recording to prevent loss of items or obscuration by irrelevant details.

b. Evaluation. Evaluation of information is more complex at higher echelons because of the amount and variety of information received. This is partly compensated for by the greater number of sources and agencies that permit more specific determination of the accuracy of a given item, the reliability of the source, and the reliability of the agency obtaining the item.

- (1) *Pertinence.* The pertinence of information is more than just a matter of determining who needs it and when. There must be a sifting of the valuable information from that of little importance of relevance.
- (2) *Reliability.* Determination of the reliability of the source and agency is relatively easy, because of the more frequent exploitation of a given source or use of a particular agency. Over a period much data accumulates on the accuracy and reliability of sources and on the ability, training, and experience of the collecting agency.
- (3) *Accuracy.* The accuracy of information is also more readily determined because of the comparative wealth of corroborating evidence. An additional check on accuracy is available to the larger unit G2. Frequently, however, a lower headquarters may use information to produce intelligence that agrees with the intelligence separately produced by the larger unit from the same information. This additional check on accuracy may become dangerous if the larger unit allows itself to become unduly reliant on intelligence produced by its subordinate

units. Each echelon must have some independent capability for producing intelligence.

c. Interpretation. Interpretation of information at higher headquarters is a progressively more complex task. The same abundance of information and intelligence that makes determination of the significance of an item relatively simple makes the task of selecting the appropriate information and intelligence for comparison more difficult. Moreover, the higher the headquarters, the less comparative significance an individual item has; and the linking of the item with those which in the aggregate have a major significance is more difficult. When there are large volumes of both new information and accumulated information and intelligence, efficient interpretation depends on systematic recording and precise analysis.

- (1) The evaluated information and previously produced intelligence used in determining the significance of new information are carefully recorded so that items required for reference are available to the intelligence officer when he interprets a new item of information.
- (2) Analysis of each new item of information is made to relate it to information already available. Every component part is judged in relation to known facts; and the significance of the parts, as well as the whole, is determined. Once this has been accomplished, the effect of the information on the current intelligence picture is established. The information has been converted into intelligence.

d. Advent of Automatic Data Processing. Although the fundamentals and basic procedures for processing information into intelligence will not change, the advent and application of automatic data processing systems will aid greatly in sorting, recording, transmitting, and presenting information on demand. Evaluation and interpretation of such information will continue to be a function of the trained intelligence officer.

Section II. RECORDING

105. General

a. Recording makes subsequent interpretation easier and more accurate, and facilitates preparation of intelligence reports by conveniently drawing together all available information on a specific subject. The recording means used must be adequate to handle the volume of information and intelligence received and to serve the needs of those who must have access to it. Means and techniques of recording must permit timely dissemination of information and intelligence.

b. At headquarters above division, recording is of increased importance and complexity. Maximum use should be made of mechanical equipment and, when available, automatic data processing systems.

c. Common aids currently used in recording are the—

- (1) Journal.
- (2) Situation maps.
- (3) Intelligence workbook.
- (4) Intelligence files.

106. Journal

a. The journal is a chronological log of significant intelligence activities covering a stated period, usually 24 hours. It is an index of reports and messages that have been received and transmitted and of important events that have occurred. The journal is a permanent and official record. (For details and an example of a staff journal, see FM 101-5.) The journal is of great significance at echelons below division level.

b. The commander of a brigade may prescribe the maintenance of one journal for the unit or require the maintenance of separate journals by each staff section. It is felt desirable, in view of the trend toward a dual function capability on the part of the S2-S3, to maintain a combined journal for the S2-S3 sections. In this event, separate workbooks and message files should be maintained. Unless specifically prohibited by the commander, the S2 section should maintain a separate intelligence journal file to provide a working file for the S2 section.

c. Journal entries should reflect—

- (1) An accurate statement of the message itself.
- (2) A notation as to the sender of the message.
- (3) The time of receipt and method of transmission of the message.
- (4) Action actually taken (not intended) as a result of the message.

107. Situation Maps

a. The enemy situation map is a temporary graphic record of the current dispositions and major activities of the enemy. Information of friendly forces on this map is usually limited to boundaries; locations of command posts of higher, lower, and adjacent units; reconnaissance units; and the forward edge of the battle area. Separate overlays are often used to display separate categories of information. A typical overlay shows fortifications; another shows potential nuclear targets; and still another presents details of order of battle. The latest time at which the activity was observed or the disposition was confirmed should be indicated when plotting enemy activities and dispositions.

b. Other information and intelligence aspects of the situation may be recorded on situation maps. Chemical officers at respective headquarters, for example, record reported nuclear bursts and CBR data on situation maps; and engineer officers similarly record mine and obstacle data.

c. Permanent recordings of the information on situation maps is achieved by overlay tracing or periodically photographing the map.

d. Maintenance of the situation map at brigade and battalion level is usually a joint S2/S3 action while at higher levels a separate situation map is maintained by each section. The friendly situation is basically the responsibility of the S3 while the enemy situation is basically the responsibility of the S2. In combined operations, personnel from either section may plot friendly or enemy entries on the situation map and perform other processing functions.

e. The situation map provides a basis for comparison of the enemy situation against the friendly situation. From the intelligence offi-

cer's standpoint, pertinent information of the enemy is recorded graphically on the situation map for reference and study. Whenever possible, both the situation map and the S2 workbook will be maintained. However, in a fast moving situation when the volume of messages is such that both cannot be maintained effectively, priority should be given to keeping the situation map current. The following types of entries pertaining to the enemy should be posted on the situation map:

- (1) Unit identification (down to the lowest level practicable).
- (2) Unit dispositions (down to the lowest determinable level).
- (3) Boundaries (down to the lowest determinable echelon).
- (4) The location of weapons, to include—
 - (a) Machinegun positions.
 - (b) Supporting mortars (all calibers).
 - (c) Antitank gun positions.
 - (d) Artillery positions.
 - (e) Armored vehicles.
- (5) Minefields.
- (6) Roadblocks.
- (7) Entrenchments.
- (8) Other obstacles or defensive installations.
- (9) Logistics and command facilities.
- (10) Activities.
- (11) Terrain data.

f. The primary intelligence uses of the situation map are—

- (1) To show the enemy disposition and situation.
- (2) To provide a basis for comparison in order to determine the significance of newly received data pertaining to the enemy forces.
- (3) To provide a background and basis for briefings and other required intelligence reports.
- (4) To provide the basis for overlays which graphically show the enemy situation.
- (5) To assist in the determination of patterns of movement of guerrilla or insurgent forces.

g. The secondary intelligence uses of the sit-

uation map are to post—directly on it or in its margins—the following information:

- (1) Computations of enemy personnel and weapons strengths.
- (2) Organization charts of appropriate enemy units.
- (3) Summarizations of weather and terrain data.
- (4) A listing of priority intelligence requirements.
- (5) Notations pertaining to current patrol plans.
- (6) Closing time computations.
- (7) A listing of friendly attachments.

h. The intelligence officer may consider the use of the following means of maintaining the situation map:

- (1) Rather than attempting to plot all entries on a map by means of conventional or improvised military symbols, a number or letter may be plotted in the area where the activity was observed. A corresponding letter or number can then be entered into a space alongside the map and a notation entered as to the activity observed.
- (2) A variation of the above would be to draw a line from the descriptive passage or statement to the exact location on the map where the activity was observed.
- (3) Care must be taken to prevent overcrowding of the map. One method of doing this is to group entries by categories on a series of acetate overlays.
- (4) An enlarged sketch map can be also prepared to cover overcrowded areas. This will allow the posting of additional details.

108. The Intelligence Workbook

a. The workbook aids in the sorting, evaluating, and interpreting of information and in the preparation of intelligence reports. It is not a permanent record and it is not distributed to an outside agency. The workbook is kept current and obsolete entries are deleted. Specialized workbooks are usually maintained by each branch of the intelligence section at field army and higher headquarters.

(Classification)

Infantry

Armor

Artillery

G2 WORKBOOK

Headquarters, _____ Div

Air
Other forces
Potential nuclear targets
Nuclear activity
CBR Activity
Other activity
Personnel losses
Equipment losses
Obstacles and barriers
Administrative activities
New identifications
Enemy movements (units)
Vehicular movements
Weather and terrain conditions
Counterintelligence
Morale and combat efficiency
Tech Intel
ASA Data

(Classification)

Figure 10. Type intelligence workbook.

b. There is no prescribed form for the workbook. At division and lower headquarters, index tabs are labeled to assist in the preparation of paragraphs of the intelligence summary (INTSUM). At corps and higher levels, index tabs are utilized to assist in the preparation of the periodic intelligence report (PERINTREP). Figure 10 shows a type workbook generally used at division and lower levels.

c. Information from incoming messages and reports is entered in the workbook under appropriate headings. For example, information on a newly identified infantry unit would be recorded under "New Identifications" as well as "Infantry." A message that furnishes information on different subjects results in several entries, none of which usually quotes the entire message. For example, a message containing information on the locations of a reserve armor unit and an artillery unit results in extracts under "Armor" and under "Artillery." Each entry in the workbook based on an incoming message includes a reference to the journal serial number of that message. For example: "J2, 091200 April, from 20th Engr Cbt Bn: Bridge at LINDEN (91246) destroyed by bombing. Estimated out of action for 30 hours." "J2" refers to the journal serial number and the date-time group entered refers to the time of occurrence of the event.

109. Intelligence Files

Files are necessary to permit ready access to all available information. The files most commonly maintained are the—

a. *Journal File.* This file contains a copy of record of each message or document noted in the journal. It supports the journal and is also a permanent and official record.

b. *Information or Reference File.* All information of possible future value is cross-indexed in this file. Much information is collected which has no immediate interest but which may be of future value. Because of the large volume of information filed at field army and higher headquarters, devices such as punch cards and electronic sorting machines are used where possible.

c. *Order of Battle Files.* These files are discussed in detail in chapter 7.

110. Coordinates Register

The coordinates register is a recording device designed to provide the brigade and lower echelon intelligence officer with a workable counterpart to the extensive intelligence files and workbooks maintained at higher echelons. Intelligence data should be organized by some means into related groupings or into systematized forms, in order that interpretation of them can be accomplished readily and without time loss. The coordinates register affords such a means, and it is also compact enough to facilitate carrying of the document on the person with the advantage of ready access.

a. *Form of Coordinates Register.*

- (1) The register should consist of a loose-leaf notebook. Each page of the notebook pertains to a single grid square on the operational map, covering the geographical area of operation or of interest. This geographical area should include the enemy area, friendly area, and areas of concern on both flanks.
- (2) The pages of the coordinates register are of two types. One type of page is designed for written entries which describe enemy activities, locations, weapons, and similar items. These entries are preceded by a date-time group and map coordinates. The S2 may, if desired, add his personal comments or notations to any entry. Figure 11 illustrates the composition of this type of page for the coordinates register.
- (3) The second type of page is designed to represent a single grid square schematically. Entries are plotted on the square in a manner comparable to that used in plotting the operational situation map. This page of the register shows graphically any data applicable to a single grid square. An enlarged grid square is drawn on the page and entries are made as shown in figure 12.

b. *Uses of Coordinates Register.* Some of the most important uses of the coordinates register are as follows:

ITEM	TIME	COORD	STATEMENT	NOTES
1.	092235	25381539	MG Fired on Recon Ptl from A Co	Have next Ptl check this area
2.	092318	?	Veh noise - Tk? -Heard direct N. of A Co OP #2 28321507	Ask Air OP's to look
3.	100600	28021523 to 28141527	Special OB report on Wpns & Fortifications	Div OB wants more dope on wpns strength
		28141527 to 28221529	Trenches & Bunkers	
		28611545 to 28781551	Wire	
		28811551 to 29001559	Platoon on line - has 2 MG's	Same MG's as Yesterday? Check this!
			Extensive trenches and firing Pns	
4.	102335	28391530 to 28691541	B Co Ptl Rpts wire and AP Mines <u>Very Heavy</u>	New since 081800
5.	110600	28431588	Res Unit (Co?) In Gen'l Area	(From Div PIR)
6.	110630	28381557	Med Tank spotted by L Plane	How many more???
7.	111320	28731584 and 28151564	Active mortars	
8.	120010	28611564	Flash from small Cal. Arty not over 75	At? AA? Gun? RR or Bazooka? Ask higher H.Q.

Figure 11. First type of page for the coordinates register.

- (1) *Interpretation.* To develop patterns of enemy activity and to follow the progress of construction, laying of minefields, and other activities.
- (2) *Planning.*
 - (a) *Operational.* To determine routes of movement, areas of main and secondary attacks.
 - (b) *Patrol.* To provide guidance in selecting missions which should be assigned to patrols and to brief patrol personnel.
 - (c) *Fire.* To assist in formulating the friendly fire plan in either defensive or offensive situations.
- (3) *Reference.* Answers the questions of

the S2 and his immediate commander and the questions of higher headquarters.

c. Maintenance of Coordinates Register.

- (1) The coordinates register should be re-organized when necessitated by movement to a new area or by the need to remove entries that are no longer valid. It is recommended that blank sheets be prepared for grid squares in which future operations of the friendly unit are anticipated.
- (2) The register should be maintained, whenever possible, on bond paper. The transparency of such paper is sufficient to allow the use of a grid




Figure 12. Second type of page for the coordinates register.

scale underneath the schematic page, thereby allowing a more accurate and rapid plotting of or reference to the entries.

- (3) The scale of the schematic page may be made a matter of SOP. Such standardization would assist in the dissemination of intelligence down to

lower echelons; for example, order of battle special reports based on imagery interpretation studies could be sent in the map scale used in the reports.

- (4) For security reasons the friendly situation normally should not be plotted in the coordinates register.

Section III. EVALUATION

111. General

Evaluation includes determining the pertinence of the information, the reliability of the source and agency through which the information was derived, and its accuracy. Evaluation of information at the lower echelon is a simple step compared to the procedures employed at higher echelons. From the viewpoint of the brigade or battalion S2, information which relates to the unit's area of interest is pertinent;

information relating to areas outside the area of interest may or may not be pertinent. The brigade or battalion S2 may not be able to judge the reliability of a source because he may not have repetitive contact with a given source. This difference between higher and lower echelons is largely due to the fact that information received from higher headquarters has been processed, evaluated and interpreted, and the information collected by organic agencies at

lower echelons is generally acquired by direct observation or actual contact with the enemy.

112. Pertinence

The examination of information for pertinence specifically determines whether or not the information is—

- a. Pertinent with regard to the enemy or to the characteristics of the area of operations.
- b. Needed immediately, and if so, by whom.
- c. Of possible present or future value, and if so, to whom.

113. Reliability

a. The source of information and the agency by which it was collected are both evaluated for reliability. The principal basis for judging the reliability of a source and an agency is previous experience. Other criteria include a knowledge of the training, experience, and past performance of troop units. A pertinent question to ask is, "Under the conditions existing at the time, could this information have been obtained?"

b. The headquarters closest to the source and agency is ordinarily the best judge of the reliability of the source and agency. Consequently, a higher headquarters normally accepts the reliability evaluation of the lower headquarters and will consider only the reliability of the reporting headquarters.

114. Accuracy

a. Accuracy means the probable truth of the information. Judgment of accuracy is based on the answers to the following questions:

- (1) Is it possible for the reported fact or event to have taken place?
- (2) Is the report consistent within itself?
- (3) Is the report confirmed or corroborated by information from different sources or agencies?
- (4) Does the report agree or disagree in any way with other available information? Which one is more likely to be true?
- (5) If the report does not agree with information from other sources or agencies, which one is more likely to be true?

b. The most reliable method of judging accuracy is by comparing it with other information. The intelligence officer, where possible, obtains the same information through different agencies and from many sources.

c. Marked differences in the evaluation of the accuracy of information may occur between higher and lower echelons. The reason for this difference is the fact that higher echelons, which have more sources of information and intelligence than lower echelons, have a correspondingly greater opportunity to confirm, corroborate, or refute the accuracy of reported data. Regardless of the source, the accuracy of incoming information and intelligence is reevaluated at each echelon.

115. Evaluation Rating

a. The evaluation of each item of information is indicated by a standard system (STANAG No. 2022, Ed. 2, app R). The evaluation of reliability is shown by a letter and the evaluation of accuracy by a numeral as depicted in the paragraphs to follow. Evaluation ratings are made at the lowest headquarters possible.

b. Evaluations of the reliability of source and agency are as follows:

- A—Completely reliable.
- B—Usually reliable.
- C—Fairly reliable.
- D—Not usually reliable.
- E—Unreliable.
- F—Reliability cannot be judged.

- (1) An "A" evaluation of source is assigned under only the most unusual circumstances. For example, when the source has long experience and extensive background with the type of information reported. A rating of "B" indicates a source of known integrity. An "F" rating is assigned when there is no adequate basis for estimating the reliability of the source.
- (2) Agencies are ordinarily rated A, B, or C. However, when the source of an item and the collecting-reporting agency are evaluated differently, only the lower degree of reliability is indicated.

c. Evaluation of the accuracy of an item of information is indicated as follows:

- 1—Confirmed by other sources.
- 2—Probably true.
- 3—Possibly true.
- 4—Doubtfully true.
- 5—Improbable.
- 6—Truth cannot be judged.

- (1) If it can be stated with certainty that the reported information originates from a source other than that for already existing information on the same subject, it will be classified as "confirmed by other sources" and will be rated "1."
- (2) If no proof in the above sense can be established, and if no reason exists to suspect that the reported information comes from the same source as the information already available on this subject, it will be classified as "probably true" and will be rated "2."
- (3) If the contents of the report are confirmed in essential parts by information already available, the above procedure, (2), will also apply to unconfirmed information contained in the report.
- (4) If the investigation reveals that the reported facts—on which no further information is yet available—are compatible with the previously observed behavior of the target, or if the known background of a person leads to the conclusion that he might have acted as reported, the information received will be classified as "possibly true" and will be rated "3."
- (5) Reported but unconfirmed information, the contents of which contradict the estimate of the development or the hitherto known behavior of the target, will be classified as "doubtful" and will be rated "4" as long as this information cannot be disproved by available facts.
- (6) Reported information which is not confirmed by available data and which contradicts the experience hitherto assumed to be reliable with regard to the development of a target or issue is

classified as "improbable" and will be rated in category "5." The same classification is given to reported information that contradicts existing data on a subject originally rated "1" or "2."

- (7) If the investigation of a report reveals that a basis for allocating ratings "1" to "5" is not given, the reported information will be classified as "Truth cannot be judged" and will be rated "6."
- (8) The statement that a report cannot be judged as to accuracy must always be preferred to an inaccurate use of the ratings "1" to "5." However, a rating "1" or "2" should be considered. If there is no sound basis for a rating of "1" to "5," because of the complete absence of other information on the same target, the rating "6" has to be given.
- (9) It must be recognized that the scale "1" to "6" does not represent progressive degrees of accuracy. The stress must be given to the literal rating represented by the numeric symbol.

d. Although both letters and numerals are used to indicate the evaluation of an item of information, they are independent of each other. A completely reliable agency may report information obtained from a completely reliable source which, on the basis of other information, is judged to be improbable. In such a case, the evaluation of the information is A-5. A source known to be unreliable may provide information that is confirmed by other sources and is of undoubted accuracy. In such a case, a report is evaluated E-1. A report evaluated F-6 may be accurate and should not be arbitrarily discarded.

e. A report disseminated to higher, lower, and adjacent units contains the evaluation for each item of information. For example, "The division artillery of the Aggressor 42d Tk Div can fire nuclear rounds of 0.5 KT yield (C-3) ***."

f. The evaluation and interpretation of in-

formation at the brigade and battalion level is a simplified mental process involving only the intelligence officer; thus, the standard evaluation rating has a limited application. However, the S2 must understand this system to assist

him in processing information received from other headquarters and, when appropriate, to evaluate information he disseminates to other headquarters.

Section IV. INTERPRETATION

116. General

The processing of information is concluded with interpretation, which consists of three steps—analysis, integration, and deduction.

117. Analysis

a. Analysis is the sifting and sorting of evaluated information to isolate significant elements with respect to the mission and operations of the command. Analysis requires good judgment and a thorough knowledge of the principles of military operations, the characteristics of the area of operations, and the enemy situation, to include enemy doctrine and past practices.

b. Analysis at headquarters above division level often involves detailed research with greater difficulty caused by the increased volume of information. The many individuals who will be involved in performing analyses must relate their efforts to the mission of the command in order to avoid the needless expenditure of time and effort.

118. Integration

a. Integration is the combination of the elements isolated in analysis with other known information to form a logical picture or hypothesis of enemy activities or the influence of operational area characteristics on the mission of the command. In the process, more than one hypothesis may be formulated, based upon existing intelligence.

b. Integration, particularly the development of hypotheses, requires the same good judgment and thorough background knowledge essential to making a good analysis. In formulating hypotheses, the intelligence officer must avoid preconceived opinions and hypotheses based on what he would do if he were the enemy commander.

c. After they are formulated, all hypotheses are analyzed and tested. Analysis of an hypothesis includes determining the indications that should exist if the hypothesis is a valid one. Testing includes verifying the existence or non-existence of these indications within the limitations of available time and means.

d. Integration may be a mental process completed in a few moments, or it may be a lengthy process involving the collection of a large volume of additional information.

119. Deduction

The last step in the processing of information is deduction. Here meaning is deduced from the hypothesis developed; it is then tested and considered valid as a result of integration. Deduction is designed to answer the question, "What does this information mean in relation to the enemy situation, the weather, and the area of operations?" The resulting answer provides a useful conclusion which can serve as a basis for determining future enemy courses of action and for keeping the intelligence estimate current.

CHAPTER 6

DISSEMINATION AND USE OF INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION

Section I. INTRODUCTION

120. General

Dissemination can be defined as the timely transmission of information and intelligence in an appropriate form to the units or agencies which can make a timely and effective use of the data. The primary purpose of dissemination is to enable the commander to make decisions with confidence; a secondary purpose is to provide knowledge, in the light of which new information may be processed. Intelligence is used in much the same manner at all echelons. The means of dissemination are likewise the same at all levels, with variations occurring in the volume, coverage, and frequency.

121. Dissemination Criteria

a. One objective in disseminating intelligence is to insure that the intelligence staffs at various echelons of command have the same information with regard to the enemy and the area of operations. This insures that commanders at various echelons of command have the same general picture and use the same frame of reference in planning their operations.

b. Intelligence is disseminated within the producing headquarters and to higher, lower, and adjacent units. Dissemination to lower and adjacent units is the more difficult and yet important because—

- (1) The intelligence picture at lower echelons changes more rapidly.

- (2) The requirement for a greater amount of detail may result in delay.
- (3) The intelligence produced at levels above division by specialized means must all be disseminated to lower echelons.

c. The adequacy of intelligence dissemination is judged, in order of priority, by the following criteria:

- (1) Information and intelligence are placed in the hands of the ultimate user in time to permit his evaluation and interpretation, formulation of plans, and initiation of action under the existing situation before the intelligence picture has changed. If the information is disseminated without processing, it is stated that such information is unevaluated. The source is given if security permits.
- (2) Only intelligence which can be used by the unit concerned is disseminated.
- (3) The importance and priority of the intelligence furnished are carefully considered. The dissemination means selected should be one that least interferes with other operational messages.
- (4) The disseminated matter is in such form that the recipients may readily locate details of interest.

Section II. DISSEMINATION MEANS

122. General

a. Dissemination within a headquarters is usually made by personal contacts, oral reports, briefings, and by distribution of intelligence estimates, analyses of the area of operations, and written reports.

b. Dissemination to higher, lower, and adjacent units is by means of reports, summaries and studies, intelligence estimates and analyses of the area of operation, operational plans and orders, and maps.

123. Hot Reports

Hot reports are one-time reports containing information or intelligence for which speed of transmission is a prime essential. A hot report need not follow a prescribed form. It should, as far as practical, answer the questions: Who? What? When? Where? and How?

124. Flash Reports

Flash reports are used to transmit information or intelligence data of high priority which must reach the user without delay. They are usually concerned with an enemy activity—air, armor, CBR, or nuclear attack—which poses an immediate threat to the command. Flash reports receive the highest transmission priority, because of their urgent nature and usually will be disseminated, without evaluation or interpretation, as unconfirmed information, subject to later confirmation.

125. Intelligence Report (INTREP)

a. The INTREP is a NATO-standardized intelligence report (see STANG No. 2022, app R) used to report information concerning enemy capabilities.

b. An INTREP will be sent without regard to a specific time schedule in all cases where facts influencing enemy capabilities have been newly observed or have undergone changes, as compared with previous reports, and where the information might be of importance for the recipient's appreciation of enemy capabilities.

c. As far as practicable, the INTREP should include the intelligence staff's deduction, which, in principle, should be approved by the commander.

d. The report will be disseminated to higher, lower, and adjacent headquarters at the discretion of the commander. It will be disseminated by the quickest means appropriate.

e. An INTREP has no prescribed content or format except that the word "INTREP" will be the heading of the report.

126. Supplementary Intelligence Report (SUPINTREP)

a. The SUPINTREP is a NATO-standardized intelligence report (see STANAG No. 2022, app R) used for more comprehensive re-

views produced on special request or in preparation of a particular operation.

b. The SUPINTREP may concern one or several intelligence targets; or it may contain all intelligence data collected over an extended period of time, including items contained in a previous INTREP or INTSUM.

c. The nature of any SUPINTREP will dictate the specific dissemination required; it will be disseminated by the most suitable means.

d. No format is prescribed, except that the word "SUPINTREP" will appear at the beginning of the report.

127. Intelligence Summary (INTSUM)

a. The INTSUM is a NATO-standardized intelligence report (see STANAG No. 2022, app R) which contains a brief summary of information of intelligence interest, covering a period designated by the next higher commander. Although the length of the period will vary with the situation and the desires of the commander directing the submission of the report, it is normally prepared every 6 hours (0600, 1200, 1800, and 2400 hours). The INTSUM provides a summary of the enemy situation in forward and rear areas, enemy operations and capabilities, and weather and terrain characteristics, and is an aid in assessing the current situation. Negative information may be included but nonoperational intelligence should be excluded. The INTSUM reflects the intelligence staff's deductions which, in principle, should be approved by the commander.

b. The INTSUM normally is prepared at division and higher headquarters, for dissemination to the unit commander and staff and to higher, lower, and adjacent commands by the quickest appropriate means.

c. An INTSUM has no prescribed format, except that the word "INTSUM" will be the first item of the report. A type format and an example are provided in appendix F.

128. Periodic Intelligence Report

a. The periodic intelligence report (PER-INTREP) is a summary of the intelligence situation covering a longer period than the INTSUM (see FM 101-5). It is a means of

disseminating detailed information and intelligence. It covers the enemy situation, operations, capabilities and vulnerabilities; characteristics of the area of operations; and counterintelligence. No details of friendly forces which may be of value to the enemy are included. Other intelligence documents such as technical intelligence summaries, prisoner of war interrogation reports, translations of captured documents, and weather and climate summaries may be disseminated as appendixes to the PERINTREP. The PERINTREP is concise but complete and makes maximum use of sketches, overlays, annotated maps, and annexes. The use of abbreviations and unnecessary references to map coordinates are avoided.

b. The PERINTREP is normally prepared at corps and higher echelons. Corps may dispense with the PERINTREP if the situation does not permit timely dissemination. At field army, a PERINTREP is always issued. Dissemination is made by the most suitable means—usually by liaison officers or messengers—to the staff, adjacent units, and to the subordinate and higher headquarters at the next two higher and lower echelons. The period covered by the document is prescribed by the next higher headquarters, and varies with the tempo of intelligence activities. Normally a 24-hour period is covered during combat. The PERINTREP should be disseminated in time for use in daily planning.

129. Weekly Intelligence Summary

This report generally follows the format of a PERINTREP. It serves to highlight trends that are useful in planning future operations and in processing current information. These reports may be issued at field army and higher headquarters.

130. Imagery Interpretation Reports

a. *General.* Information or intelligence obtained by imagery interpretation is disseminated by imagery interpretation reports. The basic types of interpretation reports are hot reports, immediate reports, mission review reports, summary reports, detailed reports, and special reports. A detailed discussion and examples of these reports are contained in FM 30-20 and TM 30-245.

b. *Hot Report.* The hot report is rendered at the earliest possible time after the imagery is interpreted. It provides information in response to the specific purpose for which the mission was flown, or reports any new developments vital to current operations. The report is disseminated to the operational units concerned by the next most rapid communication means available.

c. *Immediate Report.* The immediate report is a short written report produced in addition to, or in lieu of, a hot report when—

- (1) A wide distribution is required, or
- (2) The exact operational activity concerned was unknown at the time of the hot report, or
- (3) A permanent record of the report is desirable, or
- (4) Additional data on information transmitted in a hot report are requested.

d. *Mission Review Report.* The content of this report is a resume of the intelligence items uncovered by an imagery mission or sortie. Mission review reports are prepared and disseminated by all imagery interpretation elements within the field army, usually within 48 hours, in accordance with procedures established by the field army G2. Mission review reports provide a basis for ordering prints or requests for the detailed reports described below.

e. *Summary Report.* Information from earlier imagery reports (by category and time periods) are consolidated, trends and patterns pertaining to targets covered are developed, and the current status of the targets is described in the report. It is a means of describing targets deep in enemy-held areas. A summary report is normally prepared by the imagery interpretation elements.

f. *Detailed Report.* This type of report gives complete information on individual targets or areas for use in strategic and tactical planning. It contains detailed and precise information gained from thorough studies of imagery and other intelligence sources. The report is prepared as required at corps and higher echelons.

g. *Special Report.* Whenever information needs to be presented to the commander, but

it has not been included in one of the reports discussed in the preceding paragraphs, a special report is prepared. Consequently, these reports usually give a thorough treatment of one subject or a group of subjects and normally require considerable time for completion and publication.

131. Prisoner of War Interrogation and Translation Reports

These reports summarize, or report in full, the results of interrogations of one or more prisoners of war and translations of extracts or summaries of enemy documents. Information of immediate value is disseminated as a spot report (to interrogator personnel and counterintelligence personnel, the spot report is equivalent to the hot report discussed in paragraphs 123 and 130). Other information is disseminated in the most convenient form, considering the needs of the users. At corps and higher echelons, detailed reports of these types usually are distributed as annexes to the PERINTREP.

132. Bombing, Shelling, and Mortaring Reports

Information of enemy bombing, shelling, or mortaring activity is initially disseminated by means of a BOMREP, SHELLREP, or MORTREP, as appropriate. Submission is a responsibility of the affected unit. Reports are rendered as normal messages and are transmitted by the fastest means available to the next higher headquarters. Further dissemination of the information is accomplished by the higher headquarters as required. The initial report format is standardized by STANAG No 2008 (see app G).

133. Nuclear Burst and Biological or Chemical Attack Reports

a. Initial reports and data of enemy or unidentified nuclear bursts, or of enemy biological or chemical attack, are disseminated from the source level through designated headquarters to the highest headquarters in the area of interest, by the most expeditious means available, with a *flash* precedence. Reports of subsequent attacks and followup data are transmitted with a lesser precedence. The reporting format is

standardized by Standardization Agreement STANAG No. 2103 (app H).

b. Initial and followup reports are evaluated at each headquarters and the results are appropriately disseminated. The report format for dissemination of evaluated data is standardized (see STANAG No. 2103, app H).

c. Warning of expected contamination from a nuclear burst or biological or chemical attack is disseminated by the first headquarters capable of determining such information. A standardized report following STANAG 2103 (app H) is used.

134. Radiological Contamination Estimates and Reports

a. Radiological contamination information is disseminated by means of NBC5 (nuclear) reports (see STANAG No. 2103, app H) and by means of current or future radiological contamination overlays. The current radiological contamination overlay is a plot of dose rate contours of operational interest extracted from the radiation situation map maintained by the Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Element (CBRE). In *future radiological contamination reports*, decay factors are applied to estimate the radiation situation at future times. Current and future contamination reports and overlays are disseminated to interested staff sections, agencies, and other headquarters. Contamination overlays or reports are prepared and disseminated by the chemical element (CBRE) of the command (see FM 3-12 for details).

b. *Fallout predictions* from enemy or friendly use of nuclear weapons are prepared in the CBRE of the TOC or similar agency, before and after the burst. Fallout predictions are reports which indicate the possible danger areas from fallouts; dose rates are not predicted. The reports contain information for estimating times of arrival in a certain area. Fallout predictions are based on current or forecast meteorological data and actual or assumed ground zero, yield, height of burst, and cloud data. Fallout predictions provide information which is used as a basis for planning and estimating. Fallout predictions are distributed to interested staff offices; agencies; and higher, adjacent, and subordinate units (FM 3-12). For details concerning radio-

	3 to 5 day forecast ¹	48-hour forecast	24-hour forecast	12-hour forecast ²	12-hour flight forecast for aviation	Route and terminal forecasts for individual army aviation flights ³	Forecasts for use of nuclear weapons	Radiological defense forecasts	CBR forecast
Altitude of tropopause in feet -----							X	X	See FM 3-10
Atmospheric pressure -----		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Cloud coverage—height and amount in general terms -----	X	X							
Cloud coverage—height in feet above ground and amount in eights of sky -----			X	X	X	X	X		
Cloud decks thickness in feet -----					X	X	X		
Density altitude—information required established in local SOP -----					X	X			
Frontal conditions -----						X	X		
General wind pattern -----		X							
Precipitation, type, character, intensity, time of beginning, and duration -----	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		
Relative humidity—stated as low, medium, high -----		X					X		
Relative humidity—stated in percentages -----			X	X					
Temperatures in degrees centigrade, wind direction to nearest 10 degrees, and windspeed to nearest 5 knots at 2,000-foot intervals from surface to 30,000 feet -----					X	X			
Temperature in degrees centigrade, wind direction in tens of miles, and windspeed to nearest knot, in 2,000-meter zones to 32,000 meters ⁵ -----							X	X	
Temperature ranges including freeze and thaw -----	X	X	X	X					
Terminal conditions at specified terminals to include ceiling in feet above ground, airstrip visibility, precipitation, surface winds, temperature, and dew point: -----					X	X			
Surface winds—general direction and speed -----		X	X	X					
Visibility—in units of distance with restrictive elements -----	X	X	X	X	X ⁴	X ⁴	X		
Weather phenomena to include items such as tornadoes, thunderstorms, squalls, blowing dust, blowing sand, and fog -----		X	X	X	X	X			

¹ Time of significant changes in weather elements should be given, when possible.

² This forecast gives weather conditions along the forward edge of the battle area. It should be subdivided, as appropriate, for the brigades, regiments, and battalions concerned.

³ Information is for a specified route for a specific period. Additional information required are altimeter settings at destination and alternate strip.

⁴ At flight altitudes.

⁵ Surface to 18,000 meters each 2 hours and surface to 32,000 meters each 6 hours.

Figure 13. Contents of weather forecasts.

logical survey data, sign-posting of radiologically contaminated areas, see FM 3-12; for information on friendly nuclear strike warning, see FM 5-26 and FM 101-31-1.

135. Weather Forecasts

a. A *weather forecast* is a prediction of the weather conditions expected at a place, within an area, along a route at a specified future time, or during a specified period. The accuracy and reliability of weather forecasts depend upon

such factors as characteristics of the area, available weather data, reliability of weather communication facilities, forecast period length, and the experience of the forecaster. Reliability of forecasts generally decreases as the forecast period increases. Weather forecasts are in coded (numerical), graphical (pictorial), or written (plain language) format. Weather forecasts for use by troop units are usually in plain language form. The contents of weather forecasts are as shown in figure 13.

b. Forecasts are classified as short period, extended period, and long period. A short period forecast covers up to 48 hours in advance of the time of issue. Short period forecasts are also referred to by the length of the period covered, such as 12-, 24- or 48-hour forecasts. An extended period forecast covers a period of from 3 to 5 days and a long period forecast covers a period of more than 5 days in advance of the time of issue.

c. Because of the changing nature of weather forecasts, especially short period forecasts, timeliness is a critical factor in their dissemination. Weather forecasts normally are transmitted by electrical means.

d. The intelligence officer makes provisions for the dissemination of severe weather warnings. These special forecasts of hazardous weather are issued to enable units to take necessary action to prevent injury to personnel and damage to materiel. The type of weather for which severe warnings are issued depends upon the needs of the unit. Severe weather warnings usually cover tornadoes, thunderstorms, dust or sand storms, extremely heavy precipitation, freezing temperatures, winds above specified speeds, and freezing precipitation. Warnings are issued by the supporting air weather service detachment, as requested. Flood warnings are the responsibility of the unit engineer. Severe weather warnings are normally disseminated as hot reports.

136. Current Weather Reports

These reports contain information on existing weather conditions or specific weather elements. They may be oral, written, or graphic representations prepared by Army aviators, field artillery target acquisition units, artillery meteorological sections, and air weather service detachments. Other units furnish current weather reports as directed. Reports of current weather are used in connection with the operations of aircraft or use of artillery, nuclear weapons, CR agents, and other activities. Normally these reports are disseminated directly to the user by the collecting agency.

137. Summaries of Weather and Climate

a. These are information summaries used as a basis for other estimates and plans. Usually they are prepared by the supporting air

weather service detachments, as requested by the intelligence officer. The summaries are disseminated through the medium of intelligence documents such as written analyses of the area of operations, intelligence estimates, and PERINTREPS.

b. A *weather summary* is a description of the weather at a point, along a route, or within an area during a specified recent period. Weather summaries are used in analyzing the effects of weather on recent operations and in estimating the effects of weather on future operations. They are required for engineer forecasts of streamflow, condition of ground, and trafficability. Weather summaries have no prescribed form or content. The contents of a weather summary are determined by the requester based on intended use.

c. A *climatic summary* gives statistical data in terms of averages, extremes, and frequencies of occurrence for a specified period of time such as year, season, month, at a given point, along a route, or within an area. Climatic summaries are compiled from historical records of weather observations over long periods. Format or content are not prescribed. Appendix I contains an example of a climatic summary.

138. Climatic Studies

A climatic study is the analysis and interpretation of climatic information (climatic summary) in the light of probable effects on operations. Climatic studies usually are prepared at corps and higher headquarters. Detailed climatic studies for strategic areas of the world are included in the National Intelligence Survey. The supporting air weather service element, at the request of the intelligence officer, prepares climatic studies for specific purposes to meet the particular requirements of the command. Climatic studies are disseminated on the same basis as weather and climatic summaries.

139. Technical Intelligence Bulletins and Summaries

Technical intelligence bulletins and summaries are prepared at corps and higher headquarters. These reports are used to disseminate the results obtained from an examination of enemy materiel. Bulletins usually deal with individual items, while summaries are broader in scope. They are disseminated through com-

mand, technical intelligence, or combat service support channels depending upon the scope and nature of the contents.

140. Signal Intelligence Reports

ASA units provide signal intelligence reports, both spot and periodic reports, in accordance with the desires of the G2 of the appropriate command.

141. Order of Battle Books and Handbooks

a. Order of battle books contain lists, histories, code names, and other data on foreign

units, and biographical data on foreign military personalities.

b. Order of battle handbooks contain data concerning the political structure, military system and organization, and tactical doctrine of foreign nations.

c. Order of battle books and handbooks are usually prepared by the Department of the Army and theater headquarters. Field army may issue supplements to keep these documents current.

Section III. THE ANALYSIS OF THE AREA OF OPERATIONS

142. General

The analysis of the area of operations shows the effects of the characteristics of the area on the general courses of action which the enemy and friendly forces may adopt. Its preparation is the responsibility of the intelligence officer, although other staff officers assist in preparation. The analysis includes use of intelligence to serve as a basis for development of specific friendly courses of action and enemy capabilities (courses of action) in the commander's estimate, the operations estimate, the intelligence estimate, and other staff estimates. The analysis is oriented on the mission of the command with limiting considerations such as operational environment, time, and boundaries. Appendix B provides additional guidance on the preparation of the analysis of the area of operations.

143. Frequency of Preparation

a. An analysis of the area of operations is required for each mission. It may involve the preparation of an entirely new analysis or the updating of an existing but appropriate analysis.

b. An analysis of the area of operations is prepared before the mission is received, if a logical mission can be assumed based upon the known situation. Analyses based on assumed missions are reevaluated upon receipt of the actual mission.

c. Analyses usually require revisions in light of the commander's decision, the uncovering of new areas, and the receipt of additional or more accurate information.

144. Form of Presentation

a. At corps and higher headquarters, the planning of projected operations requires the preparation of a written analysis.

b. At division level and below, an abbreviated form of the analysis is included in the intelligence estimate. As with the other contents of the intelligence estimate, this abbreviated analysis normally is given orally. A written analysis at division level usually is prepared only for operations to be carried out at a great distance—amphibious or long-range airborne or airmobile operations are examples of such operations.

Section IV. THE INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

145. General

An intelligence estimate is a logical and orderly examination of the intelligence factors (weather, terrain, and enemy) affecting the accomplishment of a tactical mission. It includes the use of intelligence to determine the influence on the friendly situation of the area

of operations and the enemy's vulnerabilities, situation, and courses of action which are most likely to be adopted. Appendix J furnishes additional guidance on the use of the information contained in the intelligence estimate. FM 101-5 contains the prescribed form which can be used, with minor modifications, for either oral or written estimates, at all echelons.

146. Frequency of Preparation

The intelligence estimate is continually revised and kept current in the light of new intelligence. As each new item of information is processed, it affects in some way the current intelligence estimate of the situation. Therefore, the conclusions already drawn in the current estimate are altered or confirmed. New capabilities are determined and obsolete ones are discarded; and, as a result, the relative probability of adoption by the enemy of a particular course of action becomes clearer.

147. Forms of Presentation

a. The intelligence estimate may be presented orally or in writing. A written intelligence

estimate is prepared for projected operations, when time is available, when dissemination is required and oral presentation is not possible, and when a historical record is desired. Oral and written presentations are brief, consistent with adequacy of detail.

b. In oral presentations, maximum use is made of graphic aids such as terrain models, colored maps and overlays, charts, and graphs. Information and intelligence that are common knowledge or readily apparent from the graphic aids are not repeated. At appropriate points in the presentation, previously furnished intelligence or information which have not changed may be identified.

Section V. OPERATION PLAN OR ORDER AND REPORTS

148. Operations Plan or Order

Intelligence is disseminated in paragraph 1a of the operation plan or order. The paragraph may either make reference to an intelligence document such as a summary or annex or it may include specific intelligence information, sometimes both. Paragraph 3, "Coordinating Instructions," may be used to disseminate orders to obtain or report specific items of information and to disseminate counterintelligence measures applicable to two or more units.

149. Intelligence Annex

The intelligence annex is a NATO-standardized formal intelligence order that may accom-

pany an operation plan or order. The first paragraph of an intelligence annex gives a summary of the enemy situation required to understand the plan or order. The paragraph may refer to annotated maps, enemy situation overlays, or current intelligence reports. Appendix O is an example of a division intelligence annex to an operation order.

150. Operational Situation Report

The Operational Situation Report (SITREP) is based on NATO STANAG Number 2020. Although its preparation and dissemination is a staff responsibility of the operations officer, the intelligence officer prepares paragraph 1 (Enemy) of the SITREP.

Section VI. MAPS

151. Responsibility

a. The intelligence officer prepares plans and policies and exercises staff supervision over all activities concerning military maps.

b. At division, the division support command is charged with the procurement, storage, and distribution of military maps under the general staff supervision of the division G2. At corps and field army, the engineer staff officer is charged with the procurement, storage, reproduction, and distribution of maps and map substitutes under the general staff supervision of the respective G2.

c. The intelligence officers of units below

division are responsible for determining the map requirements for the command; however, the logistical staff officer is responsible for procurement, storage, and distribution of military maps.

152. Military Maps

The term "military maps" refers to all maps (other than aeronautical and hydrographic charts) used for military purposes. Military maps are classified generally according to the military use for which the map is best suited. This classification depends largely on the scale, which is indicative of the accuracy of the map

and is a criterion of the amount of detail shown on the map. Certain general classifications are also commonly used to indicate the extent of geographic information given, as well as the manner in which it is portrayed.

a. Military Classification.

(1) *By scale.*

- (a) Small scale: 1:600,000 and smaller.
- (b) Medium scale: larger than 1:600,000, but smaller than 1:75,000.
- (c) Large scale: 1:75,000 and larger.

(2) *By use or description.*

- (a) General maps smaller than 1:1,000,000—used for general planning purposes.
- (b) Strategic: 1:1,000,000—used for strategic planning purposes.
- (c) Strategic-tactical: 1:250,000 (1:500,000 alternate)—for use when other scales are unsuitable or unavailable.
- (d) Road: 1:250,000—for tactical and administrative troop movements.
- (e) Tactical: 1:50,000 (1:100,000 alternate)—for tactical and administrative purposes.
- (f) Artillery: 1:50,000—for artillery fire control.
- (g) Photomap 1:5,000–1:60,000 (1:25,000, preferred)—for tactical and administrative purposes.
- (h) Town plan: 1:12,500.
- (i) A situation map shows the tactical or combat service support situation of a unit at a specified time and is of a scale appropriate to the amount of detail required.

b. General Classification.

- (1) *Planimetric map.* A map showing only the horizontal (flat) position of features.
- (2) *Topographic map.* A map that presents the horizontal and vertical positions of the features represented.
- (3) *Plastic relief map.* A topographic map printed on plastic and molded into a three-dimensional form.
- (4) *Photomaps.* A reproduction of a photograph or photomosaic on which grid lines, marginal data, place names, and

boundaries are added, and which, in some instances, depicts relief graphically.

- (5) *Plastic relief photomap.* A photomap printed on plastic and molded into a three dimensional form.
- (6) *Photomosaic.* An assembly of air-photographs to form a composite picture.
- (7) *Military city map.* A large-scale topographic map (usually 1:12,500) of a town or city.
- (8) *Special maps.* Maps for special purposes, such as trafficability maps, transportation maps, and boundary maps.
- (9) *Terrain Model.* A three-dimensional representation of an area, modeled in plaster, rubber, or other materials. It is distinguished from other map types by showing some cultural and terrain features realistically instead of symbolically.

153. Requirements

a. General. Timely planning is necessary to insure that sufficient quantities of suitable maps are available to units at the time and place needed. The basic factors that govern this planning are—

- (1) The area of map coverage.
- (2) The map scales required.
- (3) Initial allowances.
- (4) Replenishment issues.
- (5) Replacement issues.
- (6) Emergency issues.

b. Initial Allowances.

- (1) Initial allowances prescribe the number of copies of map sheets, by type or scale, that can be requisitioned by each organization without further approval. Initial allowances furnish units and individuals with a sufficient number of copies of map sheets to provide adequate coverage of each scale required. Difficulties of production and distribution, as well as the weights involved, necessitate economy in map issue. Various factors, such as the strength, composition, and functions of a unit, are combined with

experience data to determine the quantities of maps to be allowed the unit in tables of initial allowances. The allowances prescribed in FM 101-10 are based on experiences of World War II and are a guide only. The wide dispersion required by the nuclear battlefield may require increased allowances.

(2) Tables for determining map requirements and discussions of the subject frequently employ the terms "sheet" and "copy." The term "sheet" is used to describe a map of given scale that covers a given area of ground. It is a single piece of paper. The term "copy" designates any exact counterpart or facsimile of a sheet. Physically, as an imprinted piece of paper, a sheet and a copy are identical. The difference is a matter of semantics. As used in connection with map requirements, the term "sheet" conveys the idea of an area of terrain cartographically depicted on a piece of paper. The term "copy" connotes quantity.

(3) The determination of initial map requirements can be illustrated by the procedure employed by a division in calculating the needs of its subordinate units. The job is done by the G2, G3, and support command commander. The G3 outlines the operational plan. The G2 and G3 together decide on the types and scales of the maps to be used. The support command commander advises on the availability of maps, including types and scales. In accordance with the plan for future tactical operations, the G2 marks the projected boundaries of the division and its subordinate units and the overall area for which coverage is desired. This area extends forward of the present lines to include objectives of the contemplated operation. Allowance is made for the time necessary for procurement and distribution. The G2 also informs the support command commander of other factors involved in the scheme of maneuver which are pertinent to map requirements.

(4) With the information obtained from the G2 and the data contained in experience tables, the support command commander is now ready to calculate map requirements for all units of the division and division headquarters. The procedure is essentially as follows:

- (a) Lay out the projected division area for which coverage is desired on the map index of the scale being considered.
 - (b) Show the tentative battalion and brigade boundaries in the division area outlined on the map index. Project these boundaries sufficiently forward to cover the entire area for which map coverage is desired at each scale.
 - (c) List the identifications of the sheets required to cover the area included within the boundaries of each echelon of command, from battalion to division inclusive.
 - (d) Determine the number of copies of each sheet required at each echelon from the experience table.
 - (e) List the total number of copies of each map sheet required. These are planning figures for initial issue.
- (5) The support command commander requisitions, stores, and issues maps in addition to advising on availability and ascertaining specific requirements. The division engineer provides technical information on methods, facilities, and quality of reproduction.
- (6) In the above illustration, it is assumed that the division is calculating its own initial allowances. Initial allowances for a division are determined at field army in most situations.

c. Replenishment Issues. A replenishment issue is based on replenishment allowances that include authorized supplemental issues to cover normal losses and authorized quantities to cover areas of new interests. Replenishment requirements are calculated by applying a percentage factor to the number of copies required for initial issue. The sum of the initial require-

ment, plus the replenishment requirement for each sheet, represents the total number of copies of each sheet that the field army is prepared to distribute.

d. Replacement Issues. A replacement issue refers to the recall or voiding of old map issues and the issuing of new editions. Replacement issues are made on the basis of initial allowances.

e. Emergency Issues. An emergency issue has no particular basis except the emergency of combat. Emergency issues are kept to a minimum.

154. Distribution

a. General.

- (1) The distribution of maps is keyed to the operational plan. Only the particular map sheets which cover the area of interest are of any immediate use to troops. Changes in tactical plans may not affect other supplies, but they do have an immediate effect on map requirements. The distribution system must respond instantaneously to such changes if the required maps are to be provided in time. This sensitivity to the tactical situation demands close staff supervision over map supply.
- (2) Premature issue of maps not of immediate interest is also inadvisable. The issue may be a needless one due to a change in the operational plan and,

once issued, the maps can seldom be withdrawn for reissue to another unit.

- (3) In a mobile situation, detailed issues to individuals and small units are difficult to make. The bulk of maps needed to cover any substantial area makes it impractical to supply a unit with maps for any prolonged period of mobile operations.
- (4) Logistical limitations prevent maintaining excessive reserves of maps; hence, map distribution is carefully controlled to prevent waste.

b. Maps as Intelligence Documents. Maps are valuable sources of information concerning the area of operations. They are intelligence documents. From the distribution standpoint, because they are considered as intelligence documents rather than as items of supply, they are handled separately by an independent system set up exclusively for this purpose. Corps, primarily a tactical headquarters, is an integral part of the system. Divisions requisition and draw their maps from corps and not directly from the field army as in the case of other supply items.

c. Map Designations. The intelligence annex to the operation order designates the maps to be used during an operation. In paragraph 5 of the annex, the intelligence officer lists the maps that will be supplied to each unit, in the number of copies of each classification or scale, and includes instructions concerning special requisitions and distribution.

Section VII. AIRPHOTOS

155. Types of Airphotos

a. Vertical photo. An airphoto made with a camera the optical axis of which is approximately vertical to the earth's surface, or the film of which is as near horizontal as is practicable. It has inherent but relatively small errors of scale and azimuth resulting from tip and tilt, variations in relief, and optical distortions.

b. Composite. An airphoto made with a camera having one principal lens and two or more surrounding and oblique lenses. The several resulting photos are corrected or rectified

in printing so as to permit assembly as verticals with the same scale.

c. Oblique Photo. An airphoto taken with the camera axis intentionally directed at an angle between the horizontal and the vertical.

- (1) A high oblique includes the horizon.
- (2) A low oblique does not include the horizon.

d. Stereopair. Two airphotos to which a portion of the total area projected thereon is common. Examination of such pairs with a stereoscope gives an exaggerated third-dimen-

sional view of the terrain that is included in the area of overlap of both photos.

e. Wide-Angle Photo. An airphoto taken with a camera that has a wide-angle lens that will photograph a cone of approximately 90°.

f. Vectographs. Two specially printed overlapping airphotos which give the illusion of the third dimension when viewed with polaroid spectacles.

156. Airphoto Coverage

a. The term "airphoto coverage" denotes ground area represented on airphotos, photomaps, and mosaics. Airphoto coverage falls into the two general classes of intelligence imagery and mapping photography, and is specifically designated as follows:

(1) *Permanent record imagery.* The three categories of permanent record imagery commonly used by the imagery interpreter are initial record, general intelligence record, and detailed intelligence record.

(a) *Initial record.* This is complete permanent imagery coverage, flown seasonally, of a projected area of operations usually extending from the line of contact with enemy ground forces to deep within the enemy territory. Photographic coverage is of medium scale (1:8,000 to 1:20,000) and suitable for stereoscopic study. The initial record imagery provides basic information about enemy installations and defenses, cultural features, trafficability, and soil and vegetation. Its principal value is to provide a basis for evaluating changes in enemy-occupied territory. Areas subject to seasonal changes are recorded under conditions characteristic of each season to eliminate the observed differences caused by these changes. Vertical initial record serves as a map substitute or supplement. The field army normally supervises the automatic initial distribution to subordinate units according to areas of interest, and supplementary issues are made as necessary. Typical allow-

ances are shown in FM 101-10.

(b) *General intelligence record.* This is vertical, medium scale (1:8,000 to 1:20,000) imagery coverage within the field army's area of interest. It provides current intelligence and is compared with prior imagery (initial record) to determine current location and disposition of enemy installations, troop concentrations, troop movements, equipment, and supplies. This type of imagery is normally requested by divisions and higher headquarters.

(c) *Detailed intelligence record.* Detailed intelligence record is obtained to supplement the general intelligence record by providing large-scale imagery of areas of specific interest in the battle area. It provides the imagery for detailed analysis of selected terrain features, installations, and equipment. It is frequently necessary to use more than one sensing or recording system over the target. Types of detailed analysis are—

1. *Vertical analysis.* The study of large scale (1:1,000 to 1:8,000) photographs reveals the plan and heights of installations not shown in general intelligence record.
2. *Oblique analysis.* The study of air photographs taken at an angle from the vertical reveals installations from the elevation viewpoint. This type of imagery is particularly important in the analysis of features not suitable for vertical analysis, such as concealed or well-camouflaged installations.
3. *Concealment analysis.* Installations and equipment hidden from observation are detected and subjected to study by special recording techniques; for example, a camouflage net located through general intelligence record photography may be identified as a covering for mechanical equip-

ment when the area is subjected to infrared search.

4. *Deception analysis.* Enemy measures designed to develop and confuse friendly intelligence collection agencies are detected through analysis and comparison of photographic and electronic presentations such as radar, infrared, and electronic intelligence.

(2) *Mapping photography.* Mapping or charting photography is taken for the purpose of preparing or revising maps and charts. It is generally taken at much smaller scales (1:35,000 to 1:60,000) than intelligence photography and is used for intelligence purposes only when no other intelligence photography is available. This photography is taken with specially stabilized cameras and other equipment. The flight pattern and elevation are carefully controlled.

b. Imagery obtained by the use of Army aircraft is a type of detailed intelligence record. Air observers or photographers equipped with suitable cameras can, in many cases, provide commanders with low-altitude (orientation)

obliques and limited vertical photography under conditions and at times when high-performance aircraft are unable to meet Army requirements. Commanders should fully exploit the employment of Army aviation in a supplemental photo-reconnaissance role.

157. Mosaics

A mosaic is an assembly of two or more overlapping airphotos. A picture of a larger area than can be recorded on one photo is thus presented. There are three types of mosaics: controlled, uncontrolled, and strip.

a. A controlled mosaic is laid on ground control to provide an accurate representation of distances and directions. It can be made quite accurate if sufficient control data exist, but its preparation is slow and tedious.

b. An uncontrolled mosaic is made without the check of scale or position that would be given by a framework of control points. In comparison with a controlled mosaic, its preparation is quite rapid, but it is much less accurate.

c. A strip mosaic consists of one strip of airphotos taken on a single flight. Depending on the time and the amount of control available, it may be controlled or uncontrolled.

CHAPTER 7

ORDER OF BATTLE

Section I. INTRODUCTION

158. General

a. Order of battle is defined as the identification, strength, command structure, and disposition of the personnel, units, and equipment of any military force. It consists of evaluated information regarding the following elements:

- (1) Composition.
- (2) Disposition.
- (3) Strength.
- (4) Training.
- (5) Tactics.
- (6) Logistics.
- (7) Combat effectiveness.
- (8) Miscellaneous data.

b. Order of battle intelligence is an integral part of combat and strategic intelligence. In determining enemy capabilities and probable courses of action, commanders must consider order of battle intelligence together with other intelligence pertaining to the enemy, terrain, and weather.

c. In general, order of battle personnel are responsible for all information concerning foreign military forces. In order to accomplish his mission, the order of battle analyst has to consider and develop intelligence concerning the order of battle elements as they pertain to foreign military forces. Order of battle techniques employed in support of internal defense operations parallel those used during conven-

tional warfare; however, the nature of internal defense operations, and particularly of the enemy forces, may require modification of techniques and expansion of the scope of order of battle to include nonmilitary personnel of significant interest. A major problem is the difficulty in locating and identifying the enemy and the resultant lack of useful information. This problem is compounded by the elusive nature of the guerrillas and their tendency to make frequent changes in unit identification and location.

159. Relationship to Other Intelligence

Military intelligence is developed in many fields outside the scope of order of battle, but all intelligence is ultimately related to it. For example, technical intelligence produces intelligence on the capabilities and characteristics of a weapon, but order of battle intelligence determines the effect of the weapon's capabilities and characteristics on enemy tactics, combat effectiveness, and organization. Enemy military intelligence organizations are of primary interest to counterintelligence, but as part of a military organization, they are also of interest to order of battle because they concern enemy composition, strength, and personalities. The relationship between order of battle intelligence and other military intelligence cannot be overemphasized.

Section II. ELEMENTS OF ORDER OF BATTLE INTELLIGENCE

160. Composition

Composition is the identification and organization of units. It applies to specific units or commands as opposed to type units.

a. Unit identification is often called the key to order of battle intelligence because it leads to the answers to many questions concerning the enemy. Unit identification in order of bat-

the intelligence consists of the complete designation of a specific unit. It identifies the unit, indicates what type unit it is, and gives its relative size or strength. Through identification, the order of battle analyst is able to develop a basic picture of the enemy. Combined with organization, the identification of a specific unit alerts the analyst to the possible presence of other unidentified units of the same organization.

b. Organization is the structure of a unit and the relationship of the various echelons within the structure. A knowledge of the organization of a military force is necessary to develop accurate intelligence concerning strength, tactics, training, logistics, and combat efficiency. The capabilities of an enemy cannot be assessed accurately without a knowledge of organization. The organization of all types of armies is constantly changing. Thus, organization is an element of order of battle to which continuing attention is devoted.

c. The basic, self-sufficient, tactical unit must be considered when developing intelligence concerning composition. A tactical unit is defined as the highest tactical echelon(s) having a fixed TOE. In the U. S. Army, this term would apply to the division, while in some countries the field army is the basic, self-sufficient, tactical unit. The importance of this concept lies in the term self-sufficient. Organic units, although capable of independent action, cannot sustain themselves over a prolonged period of time. They are dependent upon higher headquarters or upon that unit which by design is self-sufficient. For this reason, subordinate units are seldom employed independently or separately from the basic, self-sufficient, tactical unit. The following example will show clearly the importance of this concept. An order of battle analyst receives confirmed reports of a new Aggressor mechanized rifle regiment in his section. Knowing that the mechanized rifle division is the basic, self-sufficient, tactical unit and therefore that its three mechanized rifle regiments are seldom employed independently, he tentatively accepts the presence, not of one new mechanized rifle regiment, but of an entirely new mechanized rifle division. When one of these regiments is located, it may be reasonably assumed that the remaining elements of that division are

also somewhere close by. This principle may not apply in an insurgency environment where subordinate units may be employed independently or attached to local areas for limited periods of time.

161. Disposition

Disposition in order of battle terminology consists of the location of enemy units and the manner in which these units are tactically (or administratively, in time of peace) deployed. In addition, disposition includes the recent, current, and proposed (or probable) movements of enemy units.

a. Location refers to a geographical location or position occupied by any unit or units. It is important primarily because it answers the commander's question, "Where is the enemy?" Without this information, the commander and his staff are incapable of performing effective operational planning and are unable to make acceptable estimates of the situation or arrive at sound decisions for the employment of friendly troops. Knowledge of the strength and the location of an enemy force assists the commander in determining the capabilities of this force and its effect upon the accomplishment of his mission. In time of peace, intelligence collection guidance is seriously hampered when knowledge of location of foreign military forces is lacking.

b. Tactical deployment is the relative position of units with respect to one another or to the terrain. Tactical formations are designed for executing the various tactical maneuvers. If this deployment can be predetermined, it may lead to an accurate appraisal of probable enemy courses of action. The knowledge of how enemy units are echeloned may indicate (if the enemy assumes the offensive) which units will be used in the initial attack and which units will be employed in supporting and reserve roles. Tactical deployment with respect to terrain is also important. A study of dispositions, coupled with an analysis of the area of operations, leads to logical conclusions concerning enemy capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable courses of action.

c. Movement of enemy units is another subelement of disposition. Movement is the physical relocation of a unit from one geographical

point to another. Movement is significant because it automatically changes the tactical deployment of the opposing forces and, quite properly, is referred to as enemy redeployment activities. Movement or redeployment is also important for other reasons. When an enemy unit has moved, is moving, or will possibly move in the near future, it becomes capable of a number of actions which affect the order of battle situation. Such a unit can be moving to attack, to reinforce, or to replace another unit, or to perform other missions unknown to friendly forces. In view of these possibilities, a unit movement becomes highly important and must be tracked as closely as possible.

162. Strength

The term "strength" covers the description of a unit or force in terms of men, weapons, and equipment. Information concerning strength gives the commander a strong indication of enemy capabilities and assists him in determining the capabilities and probable courses of action of the enemy force. A lack of strength or a preponderance of strength has the effect of lowering or raising the estimate of the capabilities of an enemy force. Likewise, a marked concentration or buildup of units in an area gives the commander certain indications of enemy objectives and probable courses of action. In time of peace, changes in the strength of a potential enemy are important factors indicating his intention to wage war. The manpower potential of a nation affects the current armed strength, conscription quotas, and mobilization capacity. Strength computation techniques are described in appendix K.

163. Tactics

Tactics in order of battle intelligence include tactical doctrine as well as tactics employed by specific units. Tactical doctrine refers to the enemy's accepted principles of organization for, and conduct of, operations. Tactics, on the other hand, describe the manner in which the enemy conducts an operation in accordance with tactical doctrine. From a knowledge of tactical doctrine, the order of battle analyst knows how the enemy may employ his forces under various conditions or in certain types of situations or special operations. Various types of enemy units can logically be expected to per-

form according to certain patterns within the framework of tactical doctrine. There are established principles and patterns for the employment of infantry, armor, and artillery in both offense and defense. Any predetermination of the probable patterns of employment and enemy action or reaction is extremely important in the planning phase of an operation as well as in its execution phase.

164. Training

Training is closely related to combat effectiveness in both peace and war. Each type or phase of training analyzed (individual or unit) contributes to the overall picture of potential or actual enemy capabilities. Units usually are engaged in field exercises and in maneuvers during the latter part of the training cycle. Thus, the combat efficiency and capabilities of units at the peak of proficiency can be appraised. The thoroughness, degree, and quality of specialist, NCO, and officer training determine to a large extent the overall efficiency of the armed force.

165. Logistics

Logistics also is closely related to combat effectiveness. The adoption of a course of action is influenced by the ability of the logistical system to support that action. Knowledge of the enemy's logistics facilitates a more accurate evaluation of enemy capabilities as well as strength, combat efficiency, and disposition. Types of logistical information of interest to the order of battle analyst include—

- a. All classes and types of supply.
- b. Requirements.
- c. Procurement.
- d. Distribution.
- e. Transportation.
- f. Installations.
- g. Terminals.
- h. Evacuation and salvage.
- i. Maintenance.

166. Combat Effectiveness

Combat effectiveness is a term used to describe the abilities and fighting quality of an enemy unit or entire national army. Combat effectiveness affects the capabilities of a unit or army. How well a unit will perform in combat is predicted by analyzing—

- a. Personnel strength.
- b. Amount and condition of weapons and equipment.
- c. Status of training.
- d. Efficiency of the officer and noncommissioned officer corps.
- e. Length of time a unit has been committed in combat.
- f. Traditions and past performance.
- g. Personality traits of the unit commander.
- h. Geographical area in which committed.
- i. Morale, health, discipline, and political reliability (or belief in the cause for which they fight).
- j. Status of technical and logistical support of the unit.
- k. Adequacy of military schooling at all levels.
- l. National characteristics of the people.

167. Miscellaneous Data

Miscellaneous data include various types of supporting information needed by an analyst to contribute to the development of the other order of battle elements. Miscellaneous data include basic intelligence that can be described as "know your enemy."

a. Personality files contain information on certain characteristics and attributes which describe individual members of an enemy military force. A knowledge of personalities is important as an aid in identifying units. In many foreign armies, the average soldier may not know the identity of his unit, but usually he knows the name of his commander. Personality data is valuable because the tactics and combat efficiency of particular units are often closely related to key individuals.

b. Unit history is defined as the record of

past performance or activities of a specific unit. It includes information/intelligence on component elements; on present and past parent units; outstanding personalities who have commanded the unit; and other details which describe, limit, or clarify the capabilities of the unit concerned. The development of unit history is important because it aids in determining the capabilities and limitations of a unit. Military units, like individuals, develop certain outstanding characteristics which distinguish them from other units. Just as they consider the various qualifications and traits of enemy military personalities, order of battle personnel must also consider an enemy unit as a "personality" in analyzing its capabilities and limitations.

c. Information on uniforms and insignia is an important part of know-your-enemy intelligence. This information assists in establishing unit identification and organization and in determining morale and esprit de corps.

d. Some foreign armies use systems of code numbers (and names) to conceal true designations (or affiliation) of units, field post numbers, and vehicles. These code number systems, when properly analyzed, are valuable sources of information related to composition and disposition.

e. The order of battle analyst must be able to recognize and appreciate the capabilities and limitations of foreign weapons and equipment. Although technical intelligence agencies are primarily concerned with the determination of weapons and equipment characteristics and capabilities, the analyst uses this intelligence to analyze the effects of these items on the organization, disposition, tactics, and combat effectiveness of the military force.

Section III. PLANNING THE COLLECTION EFFORT

168. Responsibility

Order of battle personnel assist the G2 in continuously planning the collection effort. At times, they may be required to draft collection memorandums for the guidance of collection agencies. As intelligence is developed, the need for new information arises, and every effort is made to maintain a continuous flow of order of

battle information by timely requests to the collection agencies.

169. Collection

Order of battle personnel do not have a collection capability; therefore, most of the information is received from agencies and sources outlined in paragraphs 52 through 75. The G2

section sends information it receives to the order of battle section for detailed processing. From the standpoint of report and source eval-

uation, order of battle personnel must know which agencies are available and their capabilities to supply accurate information.

Section IV. PROCESSING ORDER OF BATTLE INFORMATION/INTELLIGENCE

170. Introduction

Order of battle personnel are responsible to the intelligence officer for the processing of order of battle information. The intelligence and information received and processed by an order of battle section normally becomes voluminous in a short period of time. In organizing this information, order of battle personnel maintain extensive and systematic filing and compilation systems. Specific items of intelligence and information must be located on short notice and incorporated into comprehensive reports or analyses. These requirements necessitate a high degree of efficiency in the organization and processing of data received.

171. Order of Battle References

Typical order of battle references currently published are—

a. Order of Battle Handbooks. Order of battle handbooks (often known as "Handbook of Military Forces") contain background data including descriptions of a foreign nation's political structure, typical organization of that nation's military establishment, tactical doctrine applicable to various types of military units, and other more technical data, such as the logistical system used and the characteristics of weapons and equipment.

b. Order of Battle Books. Order of battle books are compilations of current intelligence which shows the composition and disposition of the military establishment of foreign nations. They are normally published by headquarters of higher commands or at the departmental level. Unlike the order of battle handbooks they contain established intelligence data on major identified units and their subordinate elements. They may also contain personality data, lists of logistical installations, unit history data, and other order of battle data. Changes or updated versions are normally disseminated on a regular basis by the publishing headquarters.

c. Installation Handbooks. Ideally, these

books contain complete information concerning every military installation in every city in the country or area of interest. They are useful, particularly during peacetime, for establishing disposition of forces.

d. Miscellaneous References. Other publications and periodicals prepared at departmental and area command levels are of value to the order of battle specialist. These may deal specifically with order of battle or with any and all phases of combat and strategic intelligence. Civilian organizations under contract to the Department of Defense make special studies on various subjects concerning foreign and enemy military forces. These studies are usually detailed and technical in nature, but provide a wealth of special information not otherwise available.

172. Recording Order of Battle Data

a. The recording aids outlined in paragraphs 105 through 110, may be adapted to order of battle use (for example, the index tabs on the workbook corresponding with the order of battle factors). Order of battle records and files are consulted continually for the purpose of producing new intelligence. Files are established for cataloging incoming information for easy reference and for use as a basis for comparison and contrast in the production of new intelligence. Because of this, order of battle files must be simple, yet complete. One or more of the typical aids discussed below may be used; the type used depends upon the existing situation and the echelon maintaining the files:

- (1) Unit workbook.
- (2) Order of battle workbook.
- (3) Order of battle situation map.
- (4) Order of battle card file (STANAG 2078).
- (5) Personality file.
- (6) Military installation file.
- (7) Organizational file.
- (8) Strength file,
- (9) Topical file.

b. Other file systems or forms are developed locally to cope with special situations; however, the primary purpose of these is the production of intelligence. The establishment of elaborate file systems is not permitted to hinder accomplishment of this purpose.

173. Unit Workbook

The format of the unit workbook depends entirely on the structure of the foreign army being monitored. Typically, the unit workbook consists of a collection of unit worksheets arranged by type of unit or in numerical sequence




Figure 14. Example of a unit workbook.

(see fig. 14). Analysts, with order of battle books at their disposal, may use them as unit workbooks by inserting additional pages as new information is received (see fig. 15). Generally, the parent unit listed on the unit worksheet is of division size or larger. Personalities are listed on the worksheet as a ready reference to the personalities of the unit. Unit, postal, and vehicle numbers are noted on the worksheet and are used in determining order of battle changes or as confirmation of current data.

Details which may reveal any facet of the unit's order of battle are noted in the remarks column. Such items as reports of branch insignia, number and type of weapons, and statements of local residents are entered in this column in abbreviated form. The date and the source of information are entered for each entry. The installation column of the worksheet shows the numerical designation assigned a particular enemy installation when plotted on a sketch, map sheet, or town plan attached to the workbook.

SUBORDINATE UNITS	CITY	COORDINATES	INSTL	PERSONALITIES	ID OR CODE NR	REMARKS
Div Hq	Stein	PV818147	1 & 3	CG G/D Murdock Edward R		PW No 26, captured 2 Feb 63
219 Mtz Rifle Regt	Delitsch	PU781934	4	CO - Col Oldham Ernest B	16181	Document captured 19 Mar 63
220 Mtz Rifle Regt	Eilenburg	PU852961	2		16182	Deserted 21 Mar 63
3d Bn	Gladbach	PV891024	1			Gladbach residents report bn subordinate to Hq in Eilenburg. 3 Feb 63
61 Mdm Tank Regt	Linburg	PV863106	3	CO - Col Bhartrhari, Kerala N		Agent report 26 May 63
352 Trans Bn	Lehrt	PV825158	1		16195	OB book

Figure 15. Example of a unit worksheet of a unit workbook.

174. Order of Battle Workbook

a. The order of battle workbook aids in the sorting, evaluation, and interpretation of information and in the preparation of intelligence reports. Its purpose and use are identical to those of the G2 worksheet.

b. There is no prescribed form for the order of battle workbook. At corps level and higher, the order of battle workbook is tabbed to conform with paragraphs of the order of battle annex of the periodic intelligence report (PERINTREP). Figure 16 shows the method of tabbing the workbook.

c. Information is entered under the appropriate heading or headings as either a complete report or a digest of the original report. All entries contain a journal date and number in addition to identification of the source. Comments, when appropriate, are added after each entry to show the significance of the report when compared with the overall tactical situation.

175. Order of Battle Situation Map

This is a graphic portrayal of current enemy order of battle, either confirmed or unconfirmed. It shows identification and dispositions of the enemy units and any other information which will assist in developing the enemy order of battle (see fig. 17).

a. As a general rule, enemy units down to and including two echelons below the analyst's own level of command are plotted by using the appropriate symbols in FM 21-30. For example, at division, enemy regiments and battalions are plotted; at corps, enemy divisions and regiments. Higher units are plotted to the extent practicable. The foregoing information is only a guide. For example, analysts at theater level who are responsible for publication of order of battle books may plot separate battalions. Peculiarities of enemy organization, the tactical situation, and time and personnel available determine more precisely what will be plotted and what will be omitted on




Figure 16. Example of an order of battle workbook.


order of battle maps. The time and date of the information are entered below each symbol or plotting. This rule does not apply to the internal defense situation where the enemy unit may be no larger than a squad.

b. A caption box on the order of battle situation map is an annotation containing information which helps to explain the order of battle situation. Although any number of caption boxes may be used, normally three types are necessary—strength, unlocated units, and legend caption boxes.

- (1) The entries in a strength caption box usually consist of a digest of strength computations in numbers of personnel, type(s) of units, and weapons and equipment categorized as committed forces, their fire support units, and reinforcements (see fig. 17).

- (2) It is important that the order of battle analyst be aware of that which is not known about the enemy. He is assisted in this by the use of the unlocated units caption box which calls attention to existing units which remain unlocated. It is a reminder that maximum effort must be directed toward establishing the disposition of units listed therein and that they remain a threat to accomplishment of the friendly mission.

- (3) A legend caption box is included on the order of battle situation map when it becomes necessary to improvise symbols for enemy units. Within this caption box, the exact meaning of each improvised symbol is explained.



STRENGTH				UNLOCATED UNITS	LEGEND
<u>COMMITTED FORCES</u>				Recon Co, 23 Regt Recon Co, 24 Regt Unident Recon Bn, 22 Div 160mm Mort Bn, 22 Div	I Irregular
	<u>NR</u>	<u>PERS</u>	<u>WPNS</u>		
Mtz Rifle Bn	5	2675	30xHMG		
Mdm Tk Bn	2	420	64xMdm Tk		
Recon Co	2	120	6xMdm Tk 6xAmph Tk		
<u>FIRE SUPPORT</u>					
Mort Bn	1		18x160 Mort		
Gun Bn	1		18x100 Gun		
How Bn	1		18x122 How		
RL Bn	1		18x140 Rkt		
AAA Regt	1		24x57 Gun 18x57 SP Gun		
<u>REINFORCEMENTS</u>					
Mtz Rifle Bn	1	535			
Mdm Tk Bn	1	210	32xMdm Tk		
Mdm Tk Regt	1	1200	101xMdm Tk 3xAmph Tk 10x122/152 AG		
Mtz Rifle Regt	1	2555	35xMdm Tk 3xAmph Tk		
Recon Bn	1	230	10xMdm Tk 10xAmph Tk		
Irregular Co	1	95			

Figure 17. Order of battle situation map.

ORDER OF BATTLE CARD (STANAG 2078)					
1. TITLE-NATIONALITY:		2. CODE NAME:		3. NICK NAME:	
4. PARENT FORMATION:		6. FIELD POST NO.		8. COMMANDER:	
5. SUBORDINATE FORMATIONS/UNITS: (List only major subordinate elements)		FPN	COMMANDER		7. INSIGNIA: a. Personnel: (Attach patch) b. Equipment: (Sketch)
9. UNIT HISTORY:			10. MISCELLANEOUS: a. Logistics: b. Training: c. Tactics: d. Other:		
NOTE: This card is a summary of OB information pertaining to the division. Other card files containing information pertaining to the subordinate elements are necessary.					

Figure 18. Format for Order of Battle Card (STANAG 2078).

176. Order of Battle Card (STANAG 2078)

Order of battle card files are used to maintain accurate and complete data on any unit (see fig. 18). Order of battle cards will be maintained at all echelons down to and including division or such lower levels as may be necessary. (To meet the requirement for more detailed recording and filing of order of battle intelligence, particularly at higher levels, a supplementary filing system may be maintained. This system generally will be based on the component parts of the order of battle card.) Normally, one card will be maintained on each enemy division or any other unit in a position to affect current operations. The order of battle card contains the following minimum information, numbered as follows:

1. TITLE (number and designation of unit/formation)—NATIONALITY
2. CODE NAME (official name assigned by the enemy for convenience)
3. NICK NAME (unofficial popular name)
4. PARENT FORMATION
5. SUBORDINATE FORMATIONS/UNITS
6. FIELD POST NUMBER
7. INSIGNIA
 - (a) Personnel
 - (b) Equipment
8. COMMANDER
9. UNIT HISTORY
10. MISCELLANEOUS
11. LOCATION
12. TABLE OF PERSONNEL AND MAJOR ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT (to include initial and effective strengths and casualties (STANAG 2076))
13. COMBAT EFFICIENCY

Note. Data contained in Items 11, 12, and 13 are subject to frequent change and are listed on the back of the card.

177. Personality File

Personality data on designated categories of individuals are recorded in a personality file. The purpose of this file is to provide reference material used in the development of other order of battle intelligence. Information on key

military figures can be of significant value in the establishment of unit identifications, tactics, and combat effectiveness. The file is kept in alphabetical order. The card (or sheet) contains information concerning the individual's name, rank, current assignment, date and place of birth, civilian education, political affiliation, nicknames, and physical peculiarities. Reference also is made to the individual's schooling, qualifications, awards, decorations, chronology of assignments, campaigns, engagements, demonstrated performance in leadership assignments, and important activities participated in, as well as character traits such as morals, reputation, appearance, and mannerisms. Source and date of information are recorded with each entry.

178. Military Installation File

These files are normally maintained during peacetime by higher echelons to facilitate publication of installation handbooks. A collation or explanatory sheet contains all information that has been collected on each installation to include the number and types of buildings and their capacities, personnel uniforms and insignia, and major items of unit equipment (see fig. 19). Maps, town plans, or sketches showing the location of each installation within the city supplement this file.

179. Organizational File

This file is an efficient and convenient method of showing types of units within an armed force. Organizational files depict the complete breakdown of all units, from the highest type headquarters to the lowest unit, including personnel and major weapons strengths. Since this is rarely possible on a single sheet of paper, a chart showing the general organization of the major unit and individual charts for each of its subordinate units are prepared. Principal weapons and equipment charts may be prepared to supplement organizational charts (see fig. 20).

180. Strength Worksheet

This worksheet (see fig. 21) is used to maintain a running numerical tabulation of the enemy's personnel and equipment strengths. This information is recorded on committed units, fire support units, and reinforcements.

TOWN HELMERZHEIM

COORD 33ULB 5220

INSTL	LOCATION	DESCRIPTION	USE	CAPACITY	STRENGTH	UNIT	TIME LAST		REMARKS
							INFO	EVAL	
1	523208 (201-4th St)	5 story, red brick bldg, Flagpole extends from 5th story window	Unident Hq	400	Unk	Unk	0758	B-2	Many high ranking officers and official sedans observed.
2	522211 (Hwy 2 be- tween K & L Sts)	4x 2-story, wood barracks surrounded by 8' board fence	Trps	500	350?	Engr?	0758	C-2	Sentry observed wearing engineer insignia.
3	531215	6x 4-story, red brick bar- racks with 2-story bldg	Trps	1,000	850	Unident- ified Army	0458	B-2	Sentry observed wearing art insignia. Known to local residents as "Kaiser Eks"
4	533218 (N of Instl 3)	8x 1-story garage-type bldg	gun park	---	---	---	0458	B-2	Probably belongs to unit in Instl 3. 9x100mm guns observed
5	514231	2x 3-story, stucco bldg	Trps	Bn	Bn	1st Bn 19th Mtz R Regt	1257	A-1	
6	535211	Local tng area, obstacle course in NW corner	---	---	---	---	0458	B-2	Believe used by trps from both Instl 2 and 3
7	554205	Several underground bunkers inclosed by 8' barbed wire fence. Guard towers located on each corner.	Ammo dump	10 Tons (est)	---	---	1257	F-6	

Figure 19. Example of an installation handbook explanatory sheet.

MOTORIZED RIFLE BATTALION, MOTORIZED RIFLE REGIMENT

UNIT	Personnel ¹		Small arms		Mortars	AAA	Antitank artillery			Vehicles			Electronic	
	Officers	Enlisted men	Light machinegun	Heavy machinegun	82-mm mortar	14.5-mm antiaircraft machinegun (dual)	57-mm antitank gun	82-mm sqd antitank launcher	82-mm rcl rifle	AC	Trucks	Motorcycles	MANKO	Radios
Mtz rifle co (3)	18	339	45	6				27		12	3	3		15
Mortar battery	4	43			6					1	2	1		3
Arty battery	6	44				2	3		3	1	2	1		3
Hq and svc co	17	64								24	5	1	1	13
TOTALS	45	490	45	6	6	2	3	27	3	38	12	6	1	34

¹Individual weapons: officers--pistol: enlisted men--5 percent pistol, 35 percent submachinegun, 60 percent rifle.

Figure 20. Example of a principal weapons and equipment chart.

Figure 21. Strength worksheet.

181. Topical File

This file is maintained when detailed information is desired on new items of enemy equipment, changes or clarification of tactical doctrine, or on any additional data which will clarify enemy order of battle. Cards or sheets are filed alphabetically by subject.

182. Evaluation and Interpretation

The same methods of evaluation and interpretation discussed in chapter 5 are used. An

analysis of the order of battle elements is required in the interpretation of order of battle information. The interrelationship of these elements is such that it is difficult to place a greater importance on one than another. Similar difficulty is encountered in analyzing one element without reference or dependence upon another. Therefore, a combination of all data pertaining to all elements is required to accomplish complete interpretation.

Section V. DISSEMINATION OF ORDER OF BATTLE INTELLIGENCE

183. General

The methods of dissemination are discussed in detail in chapter 6. The order of battle section is usually responsible for most of the enemy situation of the intelligence estimate (sec III, app J). Paragraphs 6 through 11, section III, appendix J, are primarily its concern. Although paragraphs 12 and 13 usually involve the order of battle analyst, other intelligence personnel may also contribute to these paragraphs.

184. Order of Battle Annex

An order of battle annex is a document containing order of battle information/intelligence which normally is disseminated with the PERINTREP. Since it is a means of disseminating newly developed intelligence, only the intelligence produced during the reported period is presented. Appendix L provides additional guidance and a sample annex.

CHAPTER 8

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

Section I. INTRODUCTION

185. General

Counterintelligence is essential to the success of any military operation. The element of surprise in military operation depends not only upon reliable intelligence and rapidity of movement, but also upon effective counterintelligence. By denying information to the enemy and thereby decreasing his ability to use his combat power effectively, counterintelligence aids in reducing the risks of a command.

186. Counterintelligence Measures

a. Passive. Passive counterintelligence measures are designed to conceal information from the enemy. They include measures such as secrecy discipline, security of classified documents and materiel, signal security, movement control, censorship, camouflage, use of concealment and electronic countermeasures. Passive counterintelligence measures are readily standardized in the unit SOP regardless of the specific nature of the unit's mission.

b. Active. Active counterintelligence measures actively block the enemy's attempts to gain information or to engage in sabotage or subversion. They include counterreconnaissance, counterespionage, countersabotage, counter-subversion, deception programs, camouflage, and the use of smoke to deny enemy observation. Active counterintelligence measures vary with the mission of the unit.

187. Counterintelligence Agencies

a. The individual soldier is the ultimate counterintelligence agency. Passive counterintelligence operations depend upon his ability

to carry out proper security, camouflage, and observation and reporting procedures in his daily activities; to evade the enemy if isolated; and, if captured, to resist enemy interrogation, adhere to the code of conduct, and escape if possible. Also, evaders and recovered U.S. prisoners of war are valuable counterintelligence sources for information concerning enemy intelligence activities, including subversion.

b. Counterintelligence specialists are assigned to security units of military intelligence detachments, battalions, and groups (see FM 30-9), to provide the intelligence officer with an operating element in the field of counterintelligence.

c. All units are, in effect, counterintelligence agencies since they must implement appropriate counterintelligence measures to keep information on their activities, locations, and dispositions from the enemy. Some units, such as U.S. Army Security Agency units and censorship units, have specialized counterintelligence functions arising from the nature of their missions. Every staff officer and subordinate commander must be cognizant of the counterintelligence aspects of his particular activity.

d. Other agencies, including the Office of Naval Intelligence (Navy), the Office of Special Investigations (USAF), the Coast Guard's Intelligence Division, the State Department, the Treasury Department, and the Justice Department perform certain functions that assist Army counterintelligence operations.

Section II. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

188. General

Counterintelligence operations are classified generally as those pertaining to military security; civil security; port, frontier, and travel security; censorship; and special operations. These operations are conducted by the counterintelligence specialist of the military intelligence units. (See FM 30-9 and FM 30-17 for detailed discussion of these operations.)

a. Military Security. Counterintelligence operations taken to increase military security include both passive and active counterintelligence measures taken by a command to protect itself from espionage, enemy observation, subversion, sabotage, or surprise. Typical measures encompass security discipline, safeguarding of classified information and equipment, security of troop movements, neutralization of counterintelligence targets in tactical operations, use of passwords, and special handling of escapees and evadees.

b. Civil Security. All counterintelligence activities affecting the civil population of the area are a part of the civil security counterintelligence operations. These operations are extensive in commands with large territorial responsibilities, in heavily populated areas, and in cold war situations. Typical civil security counterintelligence measures are control of circulation of personnel, civil censorship, security screening of civilian labor, monitoring of suspect political groups, and industrial plant protection. Because many of the civil security counterintelligence measures are within civil affairs areas of interest, close coordination should be maintained with civil affairs staffs (G5s and S5s) and civil affairs units operating in the area.

c. Port, Frontier, and Travel Security. These types of counterintelligence operations consist of the special application of military and civil security measures to the control of airports, seaports, land and sea frontiers, international air boundaries, and all nonmilitary travel into and out of a theater of operations. Typical of such operations are military travel permit systems, sea and land frontier patrols, and security screening and control of "frontaliers" (legal, daily, frontier crossers).

d. Censorship. Censorship is the examination and control of all types of communications other than certain exempted official communications for the purpose of preventing information of value from reaching the enemy, as well as for collecting information of value to the United States or its Allies. Following are definitions of the four basic types of censorship with a notation of the G2 responsibility for each:

- (1) *Armed Forces Censorship.* The examination and control of personal communications to or from persons in the Armed Forces of the United States and persons accompanying and serving with the Armed Forces. The G2 has staff responsibility for this type of censorship. (See AR 380-200 and FM 30-28.)
- (2) *Civil Censorship.* The censorship of civil communications, such as messages, postal matter, and films, entering or leaving or circulating within areas or territories controlled by the Armed Forces of the United States. This type of censorship falls within the scope of civil security. The G2 has staff supervision and control over this form of censorship. Principal civil affairs staff officers coordinate with the G2 in the planning and implementation of this type of censorship. (See AR 380-83 and FM 45-20.)
- (3) *Enemy Prisoner-of-War and Civilian Internee Censorship.* The censorship of communications to and from prisoners of war and civilian internees held by the Armed Forces of the United States. The G2 has staff responsibility for this type of censorship. (See AR 380-235.)
- (4) *Field Press Censorship.* The security review of news material subject to the jurisdiction of the Armed Forces of the United States, including all information or material intended for dissemination to the public. The G2 has no responsibility for this type of

censorship (normally responsibility of the command public information officer) except as such matters may be coordinated with him by the command chief field press censor. (See AR 3600-65 and FM 45-25.)

e. Special Operations. These operations conducted by counterintelligence specialists, include the employment of specialized active and passive counterintelligence measures in the conduct of secret operations against hostile and unfriendly intelligence organizations and activities.

189. Brigade and Battalion

a. A basic counterintelligence function of the S2 consists of implementing and supervising counterintelligence measures directed by higher headquarters. At lower echelons the emphasis is on denial (passive) measures—measures which are applied to prevent the enemy from obtaining information—rather than detection (active) measures used to expose and neutralize the enemy effort, or deception (active) measures employed to mislead the enemy as the true status or purpose of friendly activity, personnel and weapons, strength, disposition, and logistical buildup. These denial measures are directed and controlled by higher headquarters through the use of standing operating procedures (SOP), standing signal instructions (SSI), signal operating instructions (SOI), administrative orders (ADMIN O), and operation orders (OPORD). The application of the measures should be closely coordinated with other command staff personnel, particularly with the S3 and the communications officer.

b. The S2 functions as a staff advisor for the application of counterintelligence measures in an operational situation. Operational activities, such as the establishment of outposts, listening posts, and ambushes, which are mainly S3 functions, also have counterintelligence implications, since they are designed not only to protect the unit, but also to counter the enemy's collection effort. Therefore, the location of such positions or activities should be selected based on their counterintelligence and operational values. To arrive at such a determination, close coordination and joint plan-

ning by the S2 and S3 are required.

c. The counterintelligence section of the military intelligence detachment attached to the division provides direct counterintelligence support to the division. Counterintelligence personnel may be deployed as needed to brigades and/or battalions. Operational control of these personnel is a responsibility of the counterintelligence section chief, but those personnel are responsive to the requirements of the brigade or battalion S2.

d. The S2 assists in planning and supervising counterintelligence training conducted for personnel of lower echelons. The training of these troops should include both unit and individual security measures, to include the counterintelligence aspects of evasion and escape, and conduct in the event of capture.

190. Division

a. Counterintelligence at division level is primarily concerned with denying target information to the enemy. Of particular concern are military security measures for the neutralization of enemy target acquisition efforts directed toward locating nuclear weapons systems. To the extent possible, division counterintelligence measures are reduced to SOP.

b. A counterintelligence section composed of specialists is organic to the military intelligence detachment normally attached to a division. The senior officer of the security section is usually designated chief of the counterintelligence branch of the G2 section and, as such, is responsible to the division G2 for the implementation and execution of the division's counterintelligence effort.

c. Counterintelligence operations at division level may include internal security measures and counterintelligence coverage of the area for which the division is responsible. Activities appropriate for supervision by the division counterintelligence branch and performance by security personnel may include—

- (1) Military security measures which encompass personnel, document, and physical security to provide internal security to the division headquarters, communications centers, and

other division installations and areas, by conducting counterintelligence surveys, inspections, checks, and personnel security investigations.

- (2) Screening of refugees, linecrossers, and PW of counterintelligence interest.
- (3) Control, exploitation, and neutralization to the extent possible, of counterintelligence targets assigned to the division and targets of opportunity. Typical targets include enemy intelligence agents; installations utilized by enemy intelligence, counterintelligence, or paramilitary organizations; enemy communications media; selected enemy personnel in the political and scientific fields; records and files of intelligence and counterintelligence interest; and black- and white-list personalities.

d. Frequently situations may arise that are beyond the capability of the counterintelligence section. An example is the security screening of an abnormally large influx of refugees into the division area or the necessity of reducing an unusually large number of high-priority counterintelligence targets. In such cases, counterintelligence augmentation personnel may be requested by the division G2 from the commander of the military intelligence unit at field or theater army level.

191. Corps

a. Counterintelligence operations at corps generally are similar to those at division except for the greater number of units and the larger areas involved. In addition, corps counterintelligence operations are concerned with long range as well as current operations. The field army will normally delineate the scope of the long range counterintelligence operations for subsequent implementation by the counterintelligence branch of corps. Activities appropriate for supervision by a corps counterintelligence branch may include military security, civil security, frontier and travel security, and censorship operations.

b. Normally, corps has no area responsibility; therefore, the counterintelligence section of the military intelligence unit attached to corps

confines its activities to internal security functions of the corps headquarters and to any other security functions which are related to the mission of the corps and fall within the mission and functions of the security section. However, there may be instances when, because of nuclear battlefield conditions, independent actions, or an increase in the workload and responsibilities of the field army military intelligence security company, the security section of corps may be called upon to assist in area coverage or to engage in counterintelligence operations that are normally the responsibility of security personnel of field army and division. This is especially apt to occur in internal defense operations.

c. When, because of conditions mentioned earlier, the operations of the security section of corps are expanded, assistance by field army counterintelligence specialists may be requested by the Corps G2 from the Army G2.

192. Field Army

a. Field army, like division, has area responsibility. Operations, however, are broader in scope because of the greater number of units, the larger area involved, and the requirement for longer-range planning. The territorial responsibilities of the field army result in more extensive counterintelligence operations pertaining to civil security and special operations than is true at lower echelons. Field army counterintelligence operations pertaining to civil security are based upon support of tactical operations as well as later transfer of territorial responsibility to TASCORP.

b. The field army continually conducts counterintelligence operations within the field army and corps areas. Such activities are coordinated with the corps intelligence officer to avoid conflict and duplication of effort.

c. Normally, a team of the field army military intelligence security element will provide area counterintelligence coverage for each corps area. Other teams will be so located as to maintain effective counterintelligence coverage in the remaining field army area. The military intelligence security element may be strengthened as necessary by augmentation personnel from theater counterintelligence resources.

193. Army Group

Army group has no territorial responsibilities and conducts only such counterintelligence operations as are necessary to maintain the security of the army group headquarters. Counterintelligence plans of army group are usually general in nature and take the form of policy guidance to coordinate counterintelligence operations of subordinate units. Major emphasis is placed upon security of military operations. This involves considering enemy activities which threaten military security and the necessary civil and military security countermeasures. Counterintelligence operations in support of the army group cover those of subordinate units. Deception plans usually are assigned to subordinate units for execution.

194. Theater Army Support Command (TASCOM)

a. The TASCOM commander has the responsibility for rear area security throughout the communications zone down to the field army rear boundary. The TASCOM commander normally delegates this responsibility to the commander of the Area Support Command (ASCOM). To assist in the performance of this mission, a military intelligence group, security is assigned to ASCOM. This group provides counterintelligence and security support for all installations and activities in the communications zone, to include the headquarters of theater army and TASCOM.

b. Denying the enemy information of the supplies, service installations, nuclear weapons systems, and transportation and communication means, and their protection against sabotage, are vital to the accomplishment of the TASCOM mission. Thus, TASCOM requires extensive counterintelligence operations of all types. Although the scope and emphasis may vary, counterintelligence procedures and techniques are similar to those at field army level.

c. The subordinate military intelligence detachments of the military intelligence group, security, are normally attached to the area support groups in order to provide area coverage throughout the communications zone. Strengths may be shifted to cope with varying workloads and levels of activity. Detachments are responsive to the staff intelligence or

security officers of the area support groups although operations are centrally coordinated at the groups headquarters under the staff supervision of the staff intelligence and security officer of the Area Support Command. The following functions constitute most of the workload of the military intelligence group, security:

- (1) Personnel security investigations and complaint type investigations.
- (2) Counterintelligence surveys and inspections.
- (3) Security support for Army nuclear weapons systems and facilities.
- (4) Counterespionage, countersabotage, and countersubversion operations.
- (5) Interrogation of suspected guerrillas and prisoners of war captured in the TASCOM area who are of counterintelligence interest.
- (6) Operation of a centralized record facility on personnel of intelligence interest for TASCOM and other elements of the Theater Army.
- (7) Assistance in the security education program for TASCOM personnel.

195. Theater Army

a. Except for missions not suitable for assignment to subordinate commands, theater army counterintelligence activities are usually confined to the coordination of operations of subordinate commands and the administrative control of counterintelligence specialist personnel assigned to the theater. Essentially, theater army coordinates and supervises counterintelligence operations by—

- (1) Publishing policy statements and directives.
- (2) Planning and supervising the assumption of counterintelligence control of army rear areas by TASCOM when the field army moves forward. Coordination usually takes place be-

tween the armies and TASCOM or the Area Support Command of TASCOM.

- (3) Supervising the activities of subordinate commands to insure complete counterintelligence coverage.
- (4) Planning the procurement of counterintelligence specialists.

b. The theater army commander exercises operational control over a military intelligence group assigned to his command. This group provides specialized support, such as theater-wide special operations and technical intelligence analysis, which requires centralized control and direction. In the event of hostilities, this military intelligence group may be transferred to a combined or joint command if theater army headquarters is removed from the chain of operational control and becomes a planning-type headquarters.

196. Theater Army Civil Affairs Command

Theater army civil affairs command head-

quarters, when established, is concerned with internal security of the command headquarters and with providing policies, guidance, coordination of civil affairs command counterintelligence operations pertaining primarily to civil security and civil aspects of censorship and port, frontier, and travel security. These operations usually are carried out by subordinate civil affairs units, field armies, and logistical commands (FM 41-10).

197. Theater Army Air Defense Command

Theater army air defense command headquarters is concerned with internal security of the command headquarters and with providing policies, guidance, and supervision. Counterintelligence operations within the theater army air defense command are concerned primarily with military security, with emphasis upon protection of weapons and target acquisition means.

Section III. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PLANNING AND ORDERS

198. General

a. Counterintelligence planning is based on enemy capabilities to obtain information of friendly activities. Counterintelligence planning develops appropriate countermeasures to prevent the enemy from learning of those friendly dispositions and activities which disclose the intentions of the command or which, if disrupted, would imperil the accomplishment of the mission.

b. Planning the counterintelligence measures for, and in support of, any operation is concurrent with the planning and conduct of the operation. It begins with the inception of the operation plan and continues until the operation is completed. The procedures used in counterintelligence planning generally are similar to the planning of the collection effort described in earlier chapter.

199. Counterintelligence Estimate

a. The counterintelligence estimate is an evaluation of the enemy's intelligence capabilities to determine the relative probability of enemy adoption of these capabilities; it includes

the effects of these capabilities on friendly courses of action. How effectively existing counterintelligence measures can counter enemy capabilities is considered, and the need for additional measures or increased emphasis on certain measures is determined.

b. The estimate is based on knowledge of the order of battle of the enemy units and agencies which collect intelligence information and conduct sabotage and subversive activities—of special interest are organization, training, equipment, doctrine, techniques, and deployment.

c. Written counterintelligence estimates are rarely used at corps and division; they are common at field army and logistical commands in the communications zone. With minor modifications, the intelligence estimate form is suitable for counterintelligence estimates. Usually, the counterintelligence estimate is prepared for the intelligence officer by the chief of the counterintelligence section. The format of a counterintelligence estimate may be found in appendix M.

Based upon the conclusions reached in the counterintelligence estimate, the counterintelligence measures worksheet is prepared or revised. This worksheet (see fig. 22), which is similar to the intelligence collection plan, is

UNIT:

Period covered: From _____ To: _____

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)										(5)																																																																																																																																			
<i>Phases or periods of operation</i>	<i>Categories of counterintelligence operations involved</i>	<i>Counterintelligence measures to be adopted</i>	<i>Agencies responsible for execution of counterintelligence measures</i>										<i>Instructions regarding entries in columns (3) and (4), notes for future action, and staff coordination measures.</i>																																																																																																																																			

Figure 22. Counterintelligence measures worksheet form.

The counterintelligence plan is a systematic listing of all the counterintelligence measures to be carried out by a command, indicating the agencies responsible for the execution of each

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CHAPTER 9

COMPANY INTELLIGENCE

Section I. GENERAL

202. Purpose

This chapter provides the company commander with additional guidance in determining his intelligence requirements and in formulating means and methods for the collection of information and the dissemination of information and intelligence.

203. General

a. The scope of intelligence activities at the company level is much reduced from that at higher echelons. An urgent need does exist for the collection of information and the application of intelligence to the tactical plan or mission of the company.

b. The company commander must make the greatest possible use of the time and means available to him in order that collection of

information and use of resulting intelligence will fulfill the maximum number of his requirements. The company commander has a realistic and urgent responsibility to supply the information needed by the S2 of the next higher echelon. It is largely through the efforts of the individual companies that the battalion S2 is able to produce the intelligence necessary for the commander and the subordinate elements of the command.

c. The company commander, like the S2, is often unable to satisfy all of his requirements for information. This means that he must establish a working priority for his requirements after considering the mission of the company and the enemy situation as known at the time.

Section II. COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS

204. General

The type and amount of intelligence required will vary with each situation, the knowledge previously acquired, and the terrain in the area of operation. It is a maxim that the company commander will never have all of the information of the enemy that he desires. It is also true that requirements as to type and detail of intelligence will vary with different missions. In every case, however, the company commander will rely upon the S2 at the next higher echelon to furnish him with much of the intelligence necessary for planning his assigned missions.

205. Requirements for the Attack

a. In order to execute his attack order suc-

cessfully, the company commander requires timely and accurate intelligence concerning the enemy's defense capability. In general, the commander will always require information on the enemy, weather, and terrain which will enable him to influence the outcome of the action through proper decisions relative to—

- (1) Positioning of the reserve.
- (2) Employment of weapons.
 - (a) Location.
 - (b) Type of fire.
 - (c) Weighting of fire support.
- (3) Location of the company commander.
- (4) Commitment of the reserve.
- (5) Requests for support from higher headquarters.
 - (a) Fire support.

(b) Troop support.

b. Intelligence is important to the company commander in the attack because knowledge of the manner in which the enemy is conducting his defense allows the commander to take a positive approach in influencing the action, enables him to maintain the initiative and exploit his own successes as well as enemy weaknesses, and it permits him to apply the force available at the most advantageous moment.

206. Requirements for the Defense

a. As in the attack, intelligence requirements for the conduct of a successful defense will vary. Generally, the following requirements will be given priority during the period prior to the enemy attack which can be anticipated in a defense situation:

- (1) Locations of avenues of approach into the friendly position.
- (2) Locations of obstacles.
- (3) Locations and strengths of opposing enemy forces, including his reserves.
- (4) Locations of enemy automatic weapons.
- (5) Locations of likely enemy assembly areas.
- (6) Weather forecasts and information.

b. As in the attack information/intelligence on these items will enable the company commander to take a positive approach to influence the action and enables him to exploit fully his own capabilities and the enemy weaknesses. (See chap 4 for additional guidance.)

207. Intelligence Requirements for Other Actions

a. *Withdrawal.* A withdrawal, whether by daylight or at night, poses definite intelligence requirements. One of the most important means of fulfilling these requirements is reconnaissance. The company commander must select routes to assigned or designated assembly areas; these routes should provide security from enemy observation and fire. Terrain and weather will play an important part in selection of routes. Security for a withdrawal begins with the inception of planning and continues until the movement is completed. Security must include both security for the force and security measures designed to deny

the enemy knowledge of the withdrawal before, during, and frequently after the action is completed.

b. *Company as a Security Force.* Frequently the company will be designated as a security force for the next higher echelon or as a part of a larger security force for the division. Security forces are used to provide security, deception, and flexibility, and to add depth to the defense of a larger unit. Security forces should have greater mobility than the enemy, but a similar result may be achieved by use of deception, movement in darkness, and retention of the initiative in movement. The company commander continues to have the responsibility for rapidly passing back to the echelon controlling the security force all items of information/intelligence. Requirements will be focussed on terrain, reconnaissance, and the effects of the weather as forecast.

c. *Company as a Reserve Force.*

(1) When a company is designated as the reserve or as part of a larger reserve unit, planning for employment in at least one, but usually several roles is necessitated. The company commander must use reconnaissance to ascertain the best utilization of terrain for each role in which his unit may be employed. Weather information and its effect on terrain must be weighed and studied. Enemy capabilities as they affect each role must be determined. Since the company is in reserve, the opportunity for using organic means to acquire information is limited or nonexistent. Requests must be made of the S2 at the next echelon for the intelligence necessary to plan for the various missions anticipated.

(2) In reserve, the company commander will frequently be charged with an area security responsibility by the next higher echelon. As a general rule when increased dispersion is necessitated by the enemy's capability to employ nuclear weapons, the area security mission will require utilization of most, if not all, of the com-

pany's personnel. The security mission will necessitate the employment of some of the counterintelligence measures mentioned in chapter 8.

d. Other Actions. Regardless of mission or role, the company commander is responsible

for the security of his unit. Insuring the security of a company while it is in movement presents many problems. All security measures which do not interfere with the accomplishment of the mission should be implemented. Security measures must be developed for each situation on an individual basis.

Section III. INTELLIGENCE MEANS AVAILABLE

208. General

The company commander must accomplish the S2 functions since he has no personnel whose primary duty is intelligence. With the urgent need for intelligence at this level, the company commander must organize his unit to provide for the handling of collected information and the dissemination of intelligence.

209. Organic Collecting Agencies

All subordinate elements of the company must be trained and prepared to function as collecting agencies. Available to the commander are his tactical elements (platoons), his organic supporting weapons observers, reconnaissance elements, personnel manning the company observation post, and finally, every individual of the company who can observe enemy activity or its effect. The main problem in transmitting the information available to the company commander, and through him to the battalion S2, is one of training of personnel to insure that items of significant information are recognized and reported expeditiously to the commander.

210. Attached or Supporting Collection Agencies

The company commander should insure that personnel of attached or supporting units, such as forward observers of supporting artillery and personnel manning outposts in the company area of responsibility, report information of possible interest or significance to him for his consideration. Also included are personnel of supporting arms and reconnaissance elements from the next higher echelon which are attached or operating in the company area.

211. The Company Commander's Intelligence Role

a. It is often incorrectly stated that the

company does not produce intelligence. This statement is usually based on the function of the higher echelon S2 and his role in the production of intelligence for his commander, the staff, and subordinate elements. The company commander can and does analyze, evaluate, and produce intelligence on a limited scale for the use of his company and its subordinate elements. This process is largely mental and instinctive, but it does encompass the elements associated with the production of intelligence. A requirement exists for designation of personnel and means of communication for receiving the information from the collection agencies. There must also be some means of recording information in the absence of the company commander. Once the company commander has established his "intelligence section" and insured the receipt of information from his collection agencies, his role then parallels that of the S2, i.e., analyzing items in the light of his mission and the known enemy capabilities. The company commander has one additional responsibility, namely, that of insuring the uninterrupted flow of these items of information to the next higher echelon S2. The commander makes no attempt to evaluate this information, but provides all details to facilitate evaluation at the S2 level.

b. The company has no organic personnel designated for intelligence duties. It is necessary, therefore, that the commander utilize personnel with other primary duties for intelligence purposes. An inspection of personnel assigned to company headquarters will result in the selection of several who will be available to function in an intelligence capacity on a part-time basis. Among such personnel are the executive officer, the first sergeant, communications sergeant, messenger, or radio-tele-type operator. The main point is to insure that

capable personnel are available to perform intelligence functions on an around-the-clock basis.

212. Dissemination

Equally as important as the receipt of information and intelligence is its timely dissemination to personnel and units concerned

with the use of these items. This requirement alone justifies the procedure of insuring that certain personnel are assigned intelligence duties. In addition to reporting (disseminating) information to the battalion S2, the company commander must keep his organic, subordinate, attached, and supporting elements informed.

Section IV. INTELLIGENCE AT LOWER LEVELS

213. General

At the level of units below company, intelligence is again reduced in scope, but it is equally important and will pose many of the same requirements that are present at the company level. A large portion of the intelligence used here must be produced at company and higher levels and then disseminated to the platoon and squad. This results from the relatively small area of operations and the limited number of personnel involved. In the strictest sense of the word, at lower levels "information" is the collected product while "intelligence" emanates from higher levels.

214. Platoon Intelligence Requirements

As a major subordinate element of the company, the platoon comprises the main tactical echelon of the company. Needs will vary with the different types of platoons within the company, based on the mission, assignment, and capabilities of each. Platoon leaders will develop some intelligence information at their level for use of the platoon and squad. Care must be taken, however, that the company provides the broadest coverage and that information developed at platoon and squad level is viewed in its proper perspective. Platoon leaders must transmit expeditiously to company that information developed. It must be recognized that the effective production of intelligence requires the participation of all elements of the command.

215. Squad Intelligence

As the smallest tactical entity of the company, the squad intelligence needs are commensurate with the mission assigned to the

squad. Because of the limited size of the unit and the limitation of the area of knowledge, most of the squad's information requirements must be met by the higher level. Items produced at squad level are limited and also subject to distortion unless correlated with intelligence developed at company and higher level. It is the squad leader's responsibility to insure the receipt of intelligence from above and to disseminate it to each of the members of his squad. Equally important is the squad leader's responsibility for training the members of his squad in intelligence matters, particularly in the need for immediate and accurate reporting of all items of information. (See FM 21-75.)

216. Company Patrols

In addition to patrols directed by the S2 at battalion level, the company commander will dispatch patrols to obtain needed information, to provide contact with adjacent units, and to serve as a screening or counterreconnaissance force. These patrols will be reported to the S2 for coordination purposes. The S2 will include in his daily patrol plan those patrols which must be coordinated with higher and adjacent units. Company-directed patrols for the most part will consist of those patrols that the commander feels necessary to maintain contact between elements of the company, and between the company and adjacent units; those patrols necessary to provide warning and security to the company from enemy activity; and those patrols utilized for reconnaissance of important to elements of the company, rather than to the company itself. Constant, aggressive, and thorough patrolling is a strong deterrent to enemy intelligence efforts.

CHAPTER 10

INTELLIGENCE ASPECTS OF SPECIAL ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS, SPECIAL OPERATIONAL METHODS, OR SPECIAL PURPOSE OPERATIONS

Section I. GENERAL

217. Introduction

a. The intelligence operations described in the previous chapters are generally applicable to any military operation. However, certain aspects of intelligence operations receive increased emphasis depending upon the limitations and requirements of unusual characteristics in the operational environment.

b. Unusual characteristics in the operational environment are of two general types. One is concerned with special environmental conditions such as extremes of weather or terrain. The other is the result of special operational methods such as airborne, amphibious, and air-mobile operations; or operations for special-

ized purposes such as cover and deception, psychophysical operations, and internal defense operations.*

c. This chapter discusses intelligence aspects of these unusual characteristics and provides references for more detailed coverage.

218. Use of Strategic Intelligence in Special Operations

Strategic intelligence is used extensively in planning for special operations, particularly those to be conducted in a distant area. Strategic intelligence used for this purpose is confirmed and supplemented by combat intelligence as soon as practicable.

Section II. EXTREMES OF WEATHER AND TERRAIN

219. General

a. Operations in extremes of weather and terrain depend upon a detailed knowledge of the terrain and climatology of the area of operations. The collection of information of the extreme characteristics of weather and terrain together with the determination of the effects of these extremes on both friendly and enemy courses of action, is a prerequisite to the initiation of an operation.

b. Operations in extremes of weather and terrain affect intelligence operations by creating special intelligence requirements and by generally impeding collection and dissemination

of information and intelligence. Specific intelligence requirements and problems posed by extremes of weather and terrain are discussed in certain field manuals of the 31-series. Paragraphs 220 and 221 emphasize significant intelligence considerations.

220. Extremes in Weather

a. Provisions must be made for frequent weather forecasting and for rapid dissemination of forecasts to the lowest echelons. Forecasts must include special items of particular significance to the military operation. Wind velocity in northern operations is extremely

*Internal defense operations are a normal mission of the U.S. Army, rather than "operations for specialized purposes." They are discussed briefly in this chapter, however, to point out unique intelligence requirements which are characteristic of such operations. FM 30-31, Internal Defense/Development Intelligence (to be published) will provide more detailed doctrine in this area.

important because of its use in determining the windchill factor. In mountain operations, storms of all types are critical factors in the conduct of operations. Weather forecasts and forecasting capabilities must be responsive to these special conditions. Additional equipment or units may be required to meet the need.

b. Extremes in weather affect intelligence requirements concerning enemy capabilities. Specific information of the enemy's capabilities for moving cross-country and for living and fighting for prolonged periods in extreme weather is an essential intelligence requirement.

c. Preplanning is necessary to minimize the effects of weather extremes on intelligence collection efforts. Extremes of cold or heat affect the operation of surveillance devices; prolonged periods of reduced visibility limit the effectiveness of reconnaissance/surveillance and the effectiveness of visual and photographic capabilities; and sudden storms place limitations on all combat surveillance operations.

221. Extremes in Terrain

a. Extreme terrain increases the magnitude of the effort required to collect needed information. This is caused as much by terrain obstacles to collection as by the more detailed information required because of the extreme terrain variations. Jungle areas require close examination in order to penetrate the jungle cover; mountainous regions limit observation, especially when the high ground cannot be occupied; and northern regions or deserts are conspicuous by their lack of easily identified and located terrain objects.

b. Generally, areas of extreme terrain lack geodetic and map coverage. This creates a requirement for greater detail in the collection of terrain information.

c. Early examination and evaluation of the collection efforts required and prior planning and preparation will minimize collection problems during the conduct of the military operation.

Section III. SPECIAL OPERATIONAL METHODS

222. Joint Airborne Operations

a. The production and dissemination of intelligence are influenced by the following characteristic of joint airborne operations:

- (1) Planning is concurrent.
- (2) Higher headquarters provide most of the information and intelligence for airborne units during the planning phase.
- (3) Terrain analyses are more detailed. Special emphasis is placed upon the location of suitable drop zones and assault aircraft landing zones. These locations are developed by means of a point landing area study.
- (4) Weather information must be broader in scope and more detailed; weather forecasts must be more frequent than for ground-based operations.
- (5) Secrecy measures are stringent and rigidly enforced. However, intelligence disseminated to subordinate units is as extensive and detailed as time permits.

b. Certain enemy capabilities receive special emphasis. Examples are his capability to employ nuclear weapons, chemical and biological agents, and airstrikes against the airborne force in the departure area, en route, and in the objective area; his armor capability; and his air defense capability (FM 57-10).

223. Airmobile Operations

a. Intelligence requirements characteristic of airmobile operations or requiring emphasis include terrain analyses of landing areas, detailed and frequent weather forecasts, and accurate locations of enemy air defense installations.

b. The determinations of air avenues of approach and landing zones are major requirements. Normally, these requirements cannot be fully accomplished by ground reconnaissance. For areas immediately in front of the FEBA, information can be obtained from the units in contact. Visual, SLAR, and photo aerial reconnaissance is employed in the ob-

jective area and in other areas beyond the capabilities of the units in contact (FM 57-35).

224. Amphibious Operations

a. Special considerations that affect intelligence requirements for amphibious operations include the following:

- (1) Length of time elapsing between the initiation of planning and the execution of the operation.
- (2) Dependence upon higher echelons for information and intelligence.
- (3) Lack of opportunity for supplemental

ground reconnaissance prior to initiation of landing.

- (4) Difficulty in dissemination of intelligence during the initial stages of the landing.

b. Intelligence requirements that receive special emphasis include information about beaches and the terrain inland to the beachhead line, including obstacles and demolitions on beaches and under water; weather conditions; and current information of the enemy situation just prior to and during the assault landing (FM 31-12).

Section IV. SPECIAL WARFARE

225. General

Special warfare embraces all the military and paramilitary measures and activities related to unconventional warfare, internal defense, and psychological operations.

226. Unconventional Warfare

Intelligence requirements at all command levels concerned with the conduct of unconventional warfare operation encompass the entire spectrum of intelligence. Unconventional warfare includes the three related fields of guerrilla warfare, evasion and escape and subversion, conducted within hostile areas by predominately indigenous personnel, usually supported and directed in varying degrees by an external source. The planning and conduct of unconventional warfare encompasses the entire spectrum of intelligence and counterintelligence activities at all command levels concerned with this type of warfare.

a. Guerrilla Warfare.

- (1) Planning and conduct of intelligence and counterintelligence activities in support of guerrilla forces are normally centralized in the J2 and J3 staff sections of the Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force (JUWTF) of the unified or specified command. Once Guerrilla Warfare Operational Areas (GWOAs) have been designated by the theater commander where guerrilla assets are known to be available, Army special forces operational detachments are infiltrated into

these areas. To provide a focal point for planning and conducting unconventional warfare operations in these areas, a priority task of special forces is the organization of an area command headquarters for integrating special forces operational detachments and the indigenous resistance forces. (See FM 31-21 for details.)

- (2) Guerrilla forces conducting overt offensive operations in GWOAs will be primarily interested in acquiring combat intelligence for use in their own operations. To this end, guerrillas will normally employ conventional information gathering techniques such as patrols, observation posts, and area and target site reconnaissance, supported in varying degrees by information from their auxiliary and underground forces. Correspondingly, the guerrilla forces must have a well-developed counterintelligence capability to prevent enemy security forces from penetrating the main guerrilla force organization by infiltrating informants or agents.
- (3) Intelligence requirements in support of military objectives are dictated by the nature and scope of unconventional warfare operations to be conducted in the designated operational areas. They are primarily directed toward information which—
 - (a) Provides a thorough background

knowledge of the operational area to include an intimate understanding of the indigenous population within the operational area and an evaluation of their resistance potential.

- (b) Aids in determining political trends.
- (c) Aids in determining enemy activities and capabilities.
- (d) Supports guerrilla psychological operations.
- (e) Supports the expansion of guerrilla operations.
- (f) Provides weather data.
- (4) The employment of guerrilla forces as intelligence collection agencies for commanders of theater and component forces is restricted by communication limitations and the nature of their collection effort to support their own operations. The security of guerrilla forces dictates restrictions on radio traffic and, consequently, the amount of intelligence that can be provided. This limitation notwithstanding, guerrilla forces are ideally suited to contribute to the theater intelligence effort—chiefly target acquisition, damage assessment, and enemy order of battle (FM 31-21 and FM 31-21A).

b. Evasion and Escape.

- (1) Information and intelligence of the area of operations and enemy procedures and techniques are required for an effective evasion and escape program.
- (2) Information on the area of operations is collected using normal collection methods. Specific requirements include information on usable routes for escapees and evadees, cover and concealment, sources of water and subsistence, areas to be avoided, areas safe for use as removal areas, borders, and the attitude of the local population according to social, ethnic, religious, and economic groups, if possible.
- (3) Requirements concerning enemy procedures and techniques in countering the evasion and escape operation are

collected primarily by interrogation of knowledgeable prisoners of war, refugees, escapees, and evadees.

- (4) The intelligence officer, in consultation with the operations officer, analyzes information and intelligence and assists the operations officer in devising escape and evasion plans. He coordinates counterintelligence measures to support the plans, and assists in the intelligence aspects of evasion and escape training.
- (5) Details on evasion and escape are discussed in FM 21-77.

c. Subversion.

- (1) Subversion comprises the clandestine or covert actions by indigenous underground resistance groups for the purpose of reducing the military, economic, psychological, morale or political strength of an enemy. It includes such activities as propaganda, agitation, espionage, penetration, sabotage and other actions which may be violent or nonviolent in character. By a systematic application of such means in close coordination with its guerrilla forces, the underground organization attempts to undermine or overthrow a government or an occupying power.
- (2) The success or failure of the underground resistance movement to operate effectively in a hostile environment hinges largely on the effectiveness of its intelligence networks to provide overt, covert, and clandestine intelligence needed for planning and conducting subversion against the enemy government or occupying power. These intelligence networks must be sufficiently broad in scope to cover every facet of the society and government, including enemy military forces. Correspondingly, it must have a well-developed counterintelligence capability to prevent opposition security forces from penetrating vital operational elements of the underground, and to provide suitable cover and security for its agent personnel en-

gaged in the covert collection of information.

- (3) In view of the sensitive nature of such operations, military intelligence requirements levied on the resistance underground organization may be greatly circumscribed, in view of the need to communicate with underground leaders in utmost secrecy. Normally, this will be accomplished through the area command headquarters in the unconventional warfare operational area. However, other channels of communication may be used. Notwithstanding these inherent limitations, an effective underground organization may be in a position to materially contribute to the theater intelligence effort by providing both strategic and tactical intelligence to further military objectives. (See FM 31-21A.)

227. Internal Defense Operations

a. General. The successful prosecution of internal defense operations is only possible through the use of timely and accurate intelligence. Intelligence must be timely so that friendly forces can react before the information loses its value, and it must be accurate so that forces are not wasted in the attempted exploitation of erroneous information or misled by false information originated by the insurgents. The job of obtaining timely and accurate intelligence is made difficult by the nature of insurgent operations. The elusive nature of the insurgents; their ever-changing organization, strength, and location; their compartmentation; and their ability to blend in with the local population demand more thoroughly coordinated and controlled nationwide intelligence and more counterintelligence personnel than are needed for normal operations. Although conventional intelligence principles remain valid, techniques must be tailored to exploit the characteristics of the insurgents, their capabilities and limitations, the locale in which they operate, and the degree of control or influence they enjoy in that locale. Since internal defense operations are not solely military operations, military intelligence units must establish

liaison and coordinate their activities with all other agencies in the national intelligence community, including those in the police and paramilitary forces.

b. Intelligence Activities. Intelligence activities are characterized by extensive coordination with, and participation in police, detection-, and penetration-type operations such as—

- (1) Search and seizure.
- (2) Establishment and operation of checkpoints and roadblocks.
- (3) Documentation of civilians.
- (4) Censorship.
- (5) Physical and electronic surveillance of suspects and meeting places.
- (6) Maintenance of extensive dossiers.
- (7) Intensive interrogation.

c. Irregular Force Intelligence System. Intensive effort is required to expose, thwart, destroy, or neutralize the irregular force intelligence system. Counterintelligence operations are complicated by the degree of reliance that must be placed on local organizations and individuals, the difficulty in distinguishing between friendly and hostile members of the population, and political considerations which will frequently hinder proper counterintelligence operations. Often a larger number of intelligence and counterintelligence personnel is needed than would be required for normal combat operations (FM 31-15).

d. Combat Intelligence.

- (1) The individual soldier must be impressed with the importance of intelligence and the need for reporting all information of intelligence value. Collection plans must be prepared at all echelons and personnel provided with clear, concise, and simple orders and requests for information. Dissemination of orders and requests for information should be as widespread as security requirements will allow.
- (2) In addition to normal military intelligence requirements, particular attention must be paid to the attitude of the local population and to the collection of information on hostile or abnormally friendly persons, new faces appearing in a locality, and persons who are reported to have disappeared.

- (3) Precautions must be taken to avoid premature alerting of insurgent units to the presence of friendly forces. Personnel, including women and children, who appear to be friendly civilians, may, in fact, be used as outposts to warn units and bases of the approach of friendly forces.
- (4) Prisoners should be taken whenever possible, and every opportunity should be given the insurgent to surrender. Themes to encourage surrender should be included in psychological warfare operations. The success of such a plan depends on the treatment given to those who do leave the insurgents and join the government side. Reasonable treatment will bring benefits in increased numbers of returnees and resulting decrease in insurgent strength. On the other hand, even a few cases of mistreatment may stop the flow of returnees and cause the failure of the program.
- (5) Interrogation of returnees, prisoners of war and all other detained personnel can produce valuable intelligence information. The basic principles of prisoner of war handling and interrogation apply. However, since internal defense involves many factors, political considerations may require that prisoners and returnees be handled in a different manner than in normal operations. When this does occur, as much military information as possible should be obtained from the person while he is available, and arrangements should be made to obtain information gained from later detailed interrogations. Both prisoners and returnees should be treated in a firm but fair manner and impressed with the fact that they are now in custody of their own government.
- (6) Travelers from remote areas, or those coming from areas where guerrillas are known or suspected to be operating or hiding, should be carefully and thoroughly interrogated. Such individuals may be in the possession of valuable OB, terrain, or other intelligence information.
- (7) Funds should be made available to reward informants and other persons providing valuable intelligence information. The use of such funds, however, must be wisely controlled because, although it encourages reporting, it may also encourage the reporting of false or fabricated information by persons motivated solely by the prospect of either material gain or to misinform. One method of preventing this is to provide additional rewards to persons providing information which results in tactical successes, and to withhold payment or to punish persons proved to have reported fabricated or deliberately falsified information.
- (8) Information on known insurgents should be distributed as widely as possible consistent with security requirements. Suitable rewards can also be established for information leading to their capture or death.
- (9) Maximum use should be made of the aerial photographic capability to produce photographs for use by patrol and tactical unit commanders. Visual reconnaissance can often locate guerrillas and direct forces or fire to destroy them. It can also often achieve confirmation of certain terrain information and reported guerrilla activity, such as construction of shelters, fortifications, weapons emplacements, and the clearing and cultivation of fields. In all cases, areas where suspected activity has been detected should be covered regularly by observation flights and aerial photography. The effectiveness of visual observation and aerial photography generally increases as the observer or interpreter becomes more familiar with his assigned area. Observers and interpreters should be used in an area as long as possible to take advantage of this increased effectiveness. When changes are necessary, there should be an over-

lap so that the new observer or interpreter can become familiar with the area before the old one is reassigned.

e. Covert Intelligence Collection.

- (1) The highly specialized and sensitive nature of covert intelligence collection demands specially selected and highly trained personnel.
- (2) Information obtained from covert sources is often highly sensitive and must be tightly controlled in order to protect the source. However, information of a tactical nature upon which combat response can be taken should be passed to the appropriate tactical units (see FM 30-18 for details).

f. Counterintelligence and Security.

- (1) Since internal defense operations are basically the restoration of internal security in the area of operations, they demand a vigorous and coordinated counterintelligence effort. As in both covert collection operations and in the collection of combat intelligence, this effort is complicated by the very nature of internal defense operations. It is further complicated by the effectiveness of the insurgent intelligence and counterintelligence effort. Liaison and an exchange of information between both military and civilian counterintelligence agencies and related agencies such as police are essential to the success of the counterintelligence effort.
- (2) The comments pertaining to covert collection operations will also apply to covert counterintelligence operations which in many cases are conducted in the same manner, although aimed at information of counterintelligence interest rather than of tactical intelligence interest. During the course of counterintelligence operations, however, information of intelligence interest may also be obtained and should be passed to interested agencies.
- (3) Most of the counterintelligence measures employed will be overt in nature and will be aimed at the protection of installations and units, and information and detection of espionage, sab-

otage, and subversion. Examples of counterintelligence measures which should be employed are the following:

- (a) Background investigations and records check on persons in sensitive positions and those whose loyalty may be questionable.
- (b) Maintenance of files on organizations, locations, and individuals of counterintelligence interest.
- (c) Indoctrination of personnel in all fields of security.
- (d) Inspections of the internal security of installations and units.
- (e) Control of the movement of civilians within friendly controlled areas.
- (f) Identification systems to minimize the possibility of guerrillas gaining access to installations or moving freely.
- (g) Unannounced searches and raids on suspected guerrilla meeting places.
- (h) Censorship.

228. Psychological Operations

a. Psychological operations are conducted against enemy troops and hostile civilians in order to cause disaffection. They are directed toward friendly or neutral civilians in order to win their support or, as a minimum, to influence their behavior so as to preclude interference with U.S. tactical operations. In internal defense/development operations the bulk of the psychological operations effort is directed toward winning the support of the civilian populace.

b. Intelligence is required concerning the enemy and hostile civilians to identify susceptible groups and their potential psychological vulnerabilities toward which psychological operations can be directed in order to cause surrender or disaffection.

c. Intelligence is required concerning friendly and those whose loyalties are unknown to help identify key individuals or groups and those social, ethnic, religious, political, or economic attitudes towards which we can direct our psychological operations in order to win their support.

d. For detailed psychological operations intelligence requirements see FM 33-1 and FM 33-5.

Section V. SPECIAL PURPOSE OPERATIONS

229. Tactical Cover and Deception

a. Tactical cover and deception plans are based on knowledge of the enemy's psychology and intelligence capabilities. To prepare a deception story, information and intelligence on the following are necessary: enemy means of collecting information and the capabilities of these means; how the enemy processes information to include what he considers to be indications; at what enemy command level action is taken on the deception story; and the personalities of the enemy intelligence officers and commanders who can be expected to act on the deception story. This information and intelligence is derived in part from studies of enemy procedures and order of battle on enemy units that collect and process information.

b. To execute tactical cover and deception operations, it is essential to have intelligence on the progress of the operations and early warning of enemy suspicions that a deception operation is being used against him also is required. Such intelligence is produced by the use of normal collection means and special use of communications intelligence and covert agencies.

c. Part of any tactical cover and deception plan is the denial of certain information to the enemy. Security of cover and deception plans and operations are supported by counter-intelligence measures. Information on every phase of tactical cover and deception plans and operations is disseminated on a need-to-know basis. To safeguard this information, special procedures such as restricted areas, security checks, special passes, and special handling of documents and equipment are established.

d. Communications cover and deception is of paramount importance to the success of tactical cover and deception operations (see FM 32-20). The advice and assistance of the ASA staff officer should be obtained during the planning and execution phases of all cover and deception operations.

e. Continued success of tactical cover and deception operations depends in part upon convincing the enemy that his failure was due to faulty evaluation of information. To accomplish this, the normal pattern of intelligence

activities is continued during and after tactical cover and deception operations. See FM 31-40 for further details.

230. Electronic Warfare (EW)

a. All aspects of electronic warfare must be planned and conducted in coordination with the ASA staff officer of the command. Intelligence is required on enemy offensive and defensive electronic means, including types of equipment, locations, place and purpose in the enemy order of battle, and operating frequencies. All available collection agencies are used to secure this intelligence. Such agencies include technical intelligence detachments and those intelligence agencies supporting the field army which are capable of gathering the necessary technical data. These data, once gathered and interpreted, are used to plan electronic countermeasures (ECM) using existing equipment or for developing new ECM equipment to fill the particular requirement.

b. The overall implications of active countermeasures must be carefully considered in planning EW operations. COMINT can be a lucrative source of intelligence. The undesirable effects of jamming on communications intelligence sources are weighed against possible diversion of enemy resources to evade the jamming. The immediate tactical advantages to be gained by interference in the enemy's command and control system are also considered. (FM 32-20 contains details on electronic warfare.)

231. Chemical and Biological Operations

a. The enemy's chemical and biological capabilities and the effects of chemical or biological agents on the area of operations are considered in analyses of the area of operations, intelligence estimates, and collection plans. The surprise with which chemical and biological agents can be used and the difficulties involved in the immediate detection of their use—but particularly verification of a biological attack—make indications of the use of these agents an important element in intelligence collection planning.

b. The unit counterintelligence plan includes measures to prevent the enemy from learning

of our intentions regarding the use of chemical or biological agents.

c. Effective use of chemical and biological munitions or agents requires information and intelligence on targets and target areas for attack by our forces. Predictions are required as to the effects of the characteristics of the area of operations on the use of chemical and

biological munitions or agents. Specifically, information is required on the surface wind speed and direction, temperature, temperature gradient, relative humidity, and precipitation and, in the case of biological agents, sunlight. In addition, data on the type of soil, surface contour, and vegetation are needed. (See FM 3-10-series and TM 3-240.)

CHAPTER 11

INTELLIGENCE TRAINING AND INTELLIGENCE STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURES

Section I. INTELLIGENCE TRAINING

232. General

Intelligence training, including counter-intelligence training, is given to all personnel. Personnel whose primary duties are concerned with intelligence are given additional training appropriate to their assignments.

233. Conduct of Intelligence Training

a. Intelligence training is integrated with other training (see app L) except for specialized subjects and orientation. It is not conducted as a separate activity distinct from all other training.

b. Intelligence training emphasizes speed of collection and processing of information and the extension of collection activities to the depth of the unit's area of influence. It should constantly stress proper security practices. When appropriate, this training should be supplemented by additional hours of specialized instruction in internal defense operations.

c. In training exercises, units should be provided with the intelligence means normally required during combat operations. Realistic training situations requiring the use of these means should be provided.

234. Responsibilities

a. All commanders are responsible for the intelligence training of their units. The operations officer has primary responsibility for matters pertaining to overall training of the command. All staff officers are responsible for the intelligence training of their staff sections.

b. The intelligence officer, in coordination with the operations officer, exercises staff supervision over intelligence training within the

command. He prepares the intelligence training program, conducts intelligence schools, supervises intelligence training, conducts tests, and assists lower units in obtaining training aids and qualified instructors. He informs the operations officer of the time needed for intelligence training and requirements for facilities, training aids, and instructors. Close coordination between the intelligence officer and other members of the staff helps insure the integration of intelligence training with other training.

c. Unit training in reconnaissance and the collection of information is planned and supervised by the intelligence officer in coordination with the operation officer. Orders directing unit intelligence training are issued by the operations officer in the name of the commander.

235. Specialized Intelligence Instructional Methods

a. The methods of instruction prescribed by FM 21-6 are applicable to specialized intelligence training. In most cases, specialized intelligence training is best accomplished by centralizing instruction.

b. A system of intelligence schools within the command helps establish standard practices throughout the command.

- (1) A theater-level intelligence school should be established for instruction of all officers and selected noncommissioned officers assigned to intelligence duties. Instruction should be area oriented and should interpret the effects of conditions peculiar to the

command and the area of operations on intelligence functions and procedures.

- (2) Division-level schools should be established for instruction of all officers and selected noncommissioned officers assigned to intelligence duties. Subordinate units conduct intelligence schools to train their regularly assigned intelligence personnel and those of their subordinate units. These schools are conducted by unit intelligence officers, with the assistance and under the supervision of the intelligence officer of the division or comparable unit. Instructors should preferably have attended the school established at the next higher level.

c. Training is not concluded with the completion of the division-level and subordinate intelligence schools; rather it is conducted on a continuous basis and is perfected by the integration with on-the-job and other training.

236. Intelligence Training and Maneuvers

a. Intelligence play in maneuvers should be

designed to furnish realistic training in every aspect of combat intelligence. The use of Aggressor as a maneuver enemy improves realism and helps make commanders, staffs, and troops conscious of the enemy as a real opposing force.

b. Intelligence measures used in maneuvers include aerial surveillance, ground reconnaissance, use of surveillance devices, safeguarding military information, use of camouflage and camouflage discipline, restrictions on the use of communications, identification of aircraft, radiological monitoring, reporting of nuclear bursts, detecting and reporting chemical and biological attacks, preparation and distribution of photos as supplements to maps, and the requisition and distribution of maps.

c. Intelligence training should include training individuals to understand weather elements and to effectively use weather information. The effects of weather upon tactical operations, personnel, weapons, equipment, terrain, and movement should be emphasized. Particular emphasis should be given to training the individual soldier in the timely, accurate, and factual reporting of information.

Section II. INTELLIGENCE STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURES

237. Section SOP

The intelligence officer prepares the SOP for the routine activities of the intelligence section. The format and content of the SOP will depend upon the level of command, the nature of the operations, and the desires of the intelligence officer (FM 101-5).

238. Command SOP

The intelligence officer usually prepares that portion of the command SOP that pertains to intelligence activities. A form for a command SOP is contained in FM 101-5. An example of a division SOP is contained in FM 61-100. Intelligence entries therein can be used as a guide in the preparation of the intelligence portion of a command SOP.

APPENDIX A

REFERENCES

FM 1-15	Divisional Aviation Battalion and Group.
FM 1-100	Army Aviation Utilization.
FM 3-10	Employment of Chemical and Biological Agents.
(S) FM 3-10A	Employment of Biological Agents (U).
(C) FM 3-10B	Employment of Chemical Agents (U).
FM 3-12	Operational Aspects of Radiological Defense.
FM 5-20	Camouflage, Basic Principles and Field Camouflage.
FM 5-30	Engineer Intelligence.
FM 6-15	Artillery Meteorology.
FM 6-20-1	Field Artillery Tactics.
FM 6-121	Field Artillery Target Acquisition.
FM 8-10	Medical Service, Theater of Operations.
FM 11-40	Signal Corps Pictorial Operations.
FM 17-36	Divisional Armored and Air Cavalry Units.
FM 19-1	Military Police Support, Army Divisions and Separate Brigades.
FM 19-2	Military Police Support in the Field Army.
FM 19-3	Military Police Support in the Communications Zone.
FM 19-30	Physical Security.
FM 19-40	Enemy Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees.
FM 20-60	Battlefield Illumination.
FM 21-5	Military Training Management.
FM 21-6	Techniques of Military Instruction.
FM 21-26	Map Reading.
FM 21-30	Military Symbols.
FM 21-31	Topographic Symbols.
FM 21-40	Chemical, Biological, and Nuclear Defense.
FM 21-75	Combat Training of the Individual Soldier and Patrolling.
FM 21-77	Evasion and Escape.
(C) FM 21-77A	Evasion and Escape (U).
FM 30-9	Military Intelligence Battalion, Field Army.
(S) FM 30-9A	Military Intelligence Battalion, Field Army (U).
FM 30-10	Terrain Intelligence.
(C) FM 30-10A	Special Applications of Terrain Intelligence (U).
(C) FM 30-15	Intelligence Interrogation (U).
FM 30-16	Technical Intelligence.
(C) FM 30-17	Counterintelligence Operations Intelligence Corps, U.S. Army (U).
(S) FM 30-18	Intelligence Collections Operations, Intelligence Corps, USA (U).
FM 30-20	Aerial Surveillance-Reconnaissance, Field Army.
FM 30-20-1	Aerial Surveillance-Reconnaissance, Field Army (Aerial Surveillance Com-
(TEST)	pany).
FM 30-28	Armed Forces Censorship.

FM 30-31	Internal Defense/Development Intelligence (to be published).
FM 30-102	Handbook on Aggressor Military Forces.
FM 30-103	Aggressor Order of Battle Book.
FM 31-10	Barriers and Denial Operations.
FM 31-12	Army Forces in Amphibious Operations.
FM 31-15	Operations Against Irregular Forces.
FM 31-16	Counter guerrilla Operations.
FM 31-18	Infantry Long Range Patrol Company.
(C) FM 31-20A	Special Forces Techniques (U).
FM 31-21	Special Forces Operations.
(S) FM 31-21A	Special Forces Operations (U).
FM 31-30	Jungle Training and Operations.
(C) FM 31-40	Tactical Cover and Deception (U).
FM 31-71	Northern Operations.
FM 31-72	Mountain Operations.
(CM) FM 32-5	Communications Security (U).
(S) FM 32-10	United States Army Security Agency in Support of a Field Army (U).
(S) FM 32-20A	Electronic Warfare (Ground Based) (U).
FM 33-1	Psychological Operations—U. S. Army Doctrine.
FM 33-5	Psychological Operations—Techniques and Procedures.
FM 41-10	Civil Affairs Operations.
FM 44-1	U. S. Army Air Defense Employment.
FM 45-20	Civil Censorship.
FM 45-25	Field Press Censorship.
FM 55-8	Transportation Intelligence.
FM 57-10	Army Forces in Joint Airborne Operations.
FM 57-35	Airmobile Operations.
FM 61-100	The Division.
(S) FM 100-1	Doctrinal Guidance (U).
FM 100-5	Field Service Regulations, Operations.
FM 100-10	Field Service Regulations, Administration.
FM 100-15	Field Service Regulations, Larger Units.
FM 101-5	SOFM, Staff Organization and Procedures.
FM 101-10-series	SOFM, Organization, Technical and Logistical Data.
FM 101-31-series	Nuclear Weapons Employment.
FM 105-5	Maneuver Control.
TC 5-9	Near Infrared Night Vision and Detection Equipment and Its Application.
TM 3-210	Fallout Prediction.
TM 3-215	Military Chemistry and Chemical Agents.
TM 3-216	Military Biology and Biological Agents.
TM 3-220	Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Decontamination.
TM 3-240	Field Behavior of Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Agents.
TM 5-248	Foreign Maps.
TM 5-545	Geology and Its Military Applications.
TM 30-245	Photographic Interpretation Handbook.
TM 30-246	Tactical Interpretation of Air Photos.
(C) AR 10-122	United States Army Security Agency (U).
AR 95-51	Aerial Observer Training.
AR 320-5	Dictionary of United States Army Terms (Short Title AD).
AR 320-50	Authorized Abbreviations and Brevity Codes.
AR 350-30	Code of Conduct.

AR 350-225	Survival, Evasion, and Escape Training.
(C) AR 360-65	Establishment and Conduct of Field Press Censorship in Combat Areas.
AR 380-5	Safeguarding Defense Information.
AR 380-83	Civil Censorship.
AR 380-200	Armed Forces Censorship.
AR 380-235	Enemy PW and Civilian Internee Communications Censorship.
(C) AR 381-101	Employment, Utilization, and Special Administration of Counterintelligence, and Area Intelligence, Personnel (U).
AR 381-115	Counterintelligence Investigative Agencies.
AR 604-5	Clearance of Personnel for Access to Classified Defense Information and Material.
AR 604-10	Military Personnel Security Clearance.
DA Pam 108-1	Index of Army Films, Transparencies, GTA Charts, and Recordings.
DA Pam 310-series	Military Publications Indexes.
JCS Pub 1	Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint Usage.
JCS Pub 2	Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).
ASubjSed 30-9	Combat Intelligence.
ASubjSed 30-40	Order of Battle Personnel.

APPENDIX B

THE ANALYSIS OF THE AREA OF OPERATIONS

1. General

An analysis of the area of operations is a study to determine the effects of the area of operations on the general courses of action that the enemy and friendly forces may adopt. It includes consideration of climatic or weather conditions, relief and drainage systems vegetation, surface materials, manmade features, military aspects of the area, observation and fire, concealment and cover, obstacles, key terrain features, avenues of approach, air avenues of approach, and effects of the area on combat service support.

2. Sources of Information

a. Analyses of the area of operations and studies prepared by higher headquarters are valuable source materials in the preparation of an analysis of the area of operations. The conclusion of analyses prepared by higher headquarters are usually not directly applicable to a subordinate unit. Considerations that are important to the higher commander's mission are not necessarily applicable at the subordinate headquarters.

b. Technical reports, maps and photos, and reports of ground and air reconnaissance are valuable as sources of information in the preparation of an analysis of the area of operations.

c. Other staff officers assist in the preparation of the analysis by furnishing specialized information (para 73).

- (1) At all echelons of command, the engineer produces and distributes terrain studies, including soil analyses and technical interpretation of terrain characteristics of military significance; included are obstacles, routes, avenues of approach, cover and concealment, and trafficability.

- (2) At field army and at comparable and higher headquarters, the preparation of intelligence studies of manmade features of the area of operations is the responsibility of the technical service staff officer concerned with such features.

- (3) Weather information of both a general and a special nature is provided by the staff weather officer.

- (4) Information and analyses of political, economic, sociological, and psychological aspects of the civil community are obtained from the civil affairs officer.

3. Contents of the Analysis

a. An annotated example of a written analysis of the area of operations is contained in FM 101-5.

b. Additional guidance is provided in subsequent paragraphs, the titles of which correspond to select paragraphs and subparagraphs of the example.

4. Climatic or Weather Conditions

a. This paragraph of the analysis lists the items of weather information that have military significance. Throughout the remainder of the analysis, the weather information is interpreted as to its operational effects. For example, winds at low temperatures are interpreted in terms of the windchill factor and the resulting effects on operations, such as an attack or defense which must face the prevailing winds, or the use of open or closed storage facilities.

b. Light data always are given as they are necessary for the selection of courses of action and the conduct of military activities.

- (1) The beginning of morning nautical twilight (BMNT) and the end of

evening nautical twilight (EENT) are the beginning and end, respectively, of enough light for limited visibility. The beginning of morning civil twilight (BMCT) and the end of evening civil twilight (EECT) are the beginning and end, respectively, of adequate light for large-scale operations.

- (2) Moon phases and other phenomena such as atmospheric conditions and star brilliance, influence night operations. During full moonlight, conditions of visibility sometimes approach those of daylight. Such conditions are anticipated as they influence friendly and enemy courses of action such as attacks, patrolling, and changes in dispositions at night.

5. Relief and Drainage System

Drainage and ridge lines are the basic elements in studying terrain as they clearly indicate the general shape of the ground. A complete study of the relief and drainage includes detailed information about slope, configuration, elevation of ground forms, and depth, width, and conditions of banks and bottoms of streams and rivers. These items can be portrayed graphically on maps by various methods.

6. Vegetation

Vegetation studies are best presented in the form of colored, or otherwise marked, overlays.

7. Surface Materials

These data, if extensive, are best presented in colored or marked overlays. In preparing these data, soil maps made by the agricultural services of various countries are particularly valuable. The information contained in soil maps can frequently be translated into a trafficability map and a map of areas susceptible to high radiation intensities of induced radioactivity. A trafficability map, based on weather forecasts, and colored or marked to indicate degrees of trafficability, effectively shows areas suitable for cross-country movement.

8. Manmade Features

These data provide detailed information of

militarily significant manmade features. These features, if extensive, are best presented on a map or marked overlays.

9. Additional Characteristics

Only those characteristics which influence the choice of a course of action by either force are included. Only the pertinent data of applicable characteristics which influence the choice of a course of action by either opposing force are listed. Lengthy data are presented in annexes, preferably in tabular form.

10. Military Aspects of the Area

This paragraph analyzes the facts listed in the "General Description of the Area" paragraph and determines their influence on the tactical and combat service support factors that are considered in the selection of a course of action by either force. In the analysis of these factors, the effects of and on nuclear fires, chemical and biological agents, and important devices and equipment used in implementing courses of action are integrated as appropriate. The tactical aspects of observation and fire, cover and concealment, obstacles, key terrain features, avenues of approach, and the combat service aspects are discussed in the following paragraphs.

11. Observation and Fire

a. Observation depends on conditions of weather and terrain which permit a force to see the enemy either visually or through the use of surveillance devices. The highest terrain in an area usually provides the best observation. The increased use of equipment with line-of-sight characteristics requires the availability of suitable terrain features for sighting purposes. The capability of employing organic aerial platforms reduces the requirement to use such terrain. Smoke clouds from materials (vegetation and buildings) set on fire by thermal effects of nuclear weapons obstruct visual and some types of electronic observation. Dust clouds caused by nuclear blast reduce both visual and electronic observation. Other factors that limit or deny observation include smoke, fog, precipitation, darkness, woods, and tall vegetation.

b. Fire, as used in the analysis of the area of operations, includes the field of fire of the weapon and characteristics of weapons de-

livery systems affected by weather and terrain. For example, gusty surface winds affect the use of free rockets. High, irregular terrain features may limit the field of fire of weapons. A field of fire is an area that weapons can cover effectively with fire from given positions. Although observation is essential to effective control of fire, the best observation does not always guarantee the best field of fire. An ideal field of fire for flat-trajectory weapons is an open area in which the enemy can be seen and on which he has no protection from the fire of such weapons.

12. Concealment and Cover

a. Concealment is protection from enemy observation and may be provided by woods, underbrush, snowdrifts, tall grass, cultivated vegetation, darkness, smoke, dust, fog, ground haze, rain, or falling snow.

b. Cover is protection from the effects of enemy fires and is provided by ditches, quarries, caves, riverbanks, folds in the ground, shell craters, buildings, walls, railroad embankments and cuts, sunken roads, and highway fills. Defiladed areas which provide protection against nonnuclear weapons do not necessarily protect against effects of nuclear fires. Unless the forward slopes of a terrain mass are very steep, blast will affect personnel and materiel on the reverse slope because the blast wave follows the configuration of all but the most rugged terrain. When a nuclear weapon is fired over a deep valley, or the valley axis points toward ground zero, the blast effects may be channelized and increase damage. Irregular terrain provides some cover from thermal radiation of nuclear fires. Few buildings are sufficiently strong to withstand all effects of blast and, if not damaged or destroyed by blast, may be damaged by thermal radiation. Foxholes, bunkers, and tunnel type shelters offer the simplest forms of effective cover.

c. Concealment and cover are desirable for both the attack and the defense. If troops can move forward under the concealment of woods, fog, or a moonless night, the chances of achieving surprise are greater. If troops can move protected from enemy's fire by ditches, embankments, or walls, the attack will be more effective. A defender seeks to defend behind an area which has cover for the defending

troops and concealment for their organization of the ground, but does not offer the enemy covered approaches.

d. The mobility of the command is considered in determining available cover and concealment. Cover and concealment are desirable during troop movements by any means. Routes which afford good cover and concealment reduce the vulnerability of a moving force to detection and to destruction by fire.

13. Obstacles

a. An obstacle is any natural or artificial terrain feature which stops, impedes, or diverts military movement. Natural obstacles include rivers, streams, canals, lakes, swamps, cliffs, steep slopes, dense woods, jungles, deserts, mountains, cities, and certain types of unstable soil. Artificial obstacles are works of construction and destruction executed to stop or impede military movement. They include minefields, craters, antitank ditches, trenches, abatis, roadblocks, deliberately flooded areas, areas contaminated with chemical and biological agents, extensive rubble, forest fires, tree blowdown caused by nuclear fires, and areas contaminated with residual nuclear radiation. There is little, if any, practical reason for the brigade or battalion S2 to distinguish between natural and artificial obstacles and he usually does not do so.

b. Obstacles to be fully effective must be covered by observation and fire. However, even undefended obstacles may channelize an attacker into concentrations which are easier to detect and are suitable for nuclear attack. Obstacles perpendicular to a direction of attack favor the defender by slowing the enemy, forcing him into concentrations that tend to occur while crossing obstacles, and holding the attacker for a longer time under the effective fires of the defense. Obstacles parallel to an axis of advance may give the attacker flank protection. However, parallel obstacles may interfere with lateral movement and coordination.

c. Consideration of obstacles is influenced by the mission of the command. In the defense the intelligence officer identifies as obstacles those features of the terrain which stop, impede, or divert military movement within the area encompassed by the FEBA, lateral boundaries and the rear boundary (prescribed or as-

sumed). In the attack he considers the obstacles from the line of departure to the objective (both inclusive), bounded laterally by the assigned or assumed operational zone.

14. Key Terrain Features

a. A key terrain feature is any locality or area whose seizure or control affords a marked advantage to either opposing force. Key terrain features are selected to indicate areas and localities whose seizure or control must be considered in formulating and selecting courses of action. The selection is based on the mission of the command. Those terrain features are selected which in our control give us a marked advantage in the accomplishment of our mission, or which if seized or controlled by the enemy hinder materially the accomplishment of the mission. For example, a bridge over an unfordable river may give access to the opposite shore without requiring an assault crossing. Control of a road or rail center may reduce the enemy's ability to resist our advance. A level clearing in rough terrain may be the only accessible landing field for airmobile operations. Key terrain varies with the level of command. For example, to an army commander, a large city may afford marked advantages as a communications center, but to a division commander, the high ground which dominates the city may be more important, and the city itself may be an obstacle. Obstacles are rarely key terrain features. The high ground dominating a river, rather than the river itself, is usually the key terrain feature for the lower unit commander. An exception is an obstacle, such as a built-up area, which is assigned as an objective to a force; the obstacle then becomes key terrain to the force ordered to capture it.

b. Key terrain, in addition to influencing the mission accomplishment, is also highly significant in applying combat power. Control is not insured only by seizure and occupation. Seizure and physical occupancy of key terrain features by relatively large forces may not be feasible. Destructive fires delivered by long-range means can destroy forces physically occupying key terrain. The commander controls key terrain and avoids destruction of his forces while keeping the enemy from gaining control. Control includes maneuver, surveillance, security, and use of fires. Terrain which permits or denies

maneuver may be key terrain. Tactical use of terrain often is directed at increasing the capability for applying combat power and at the same time forcing the enemy into areas which result in reduction of his ability to apply his combat power. Terrain which permits this also may be key terrain. The effect of terrain on maneuver, application of combat power, and preservation of force integrity are considerations in selecting key terrain, its control, and tactical use.

c. In the offense, key terrain features are usually forward of the friendly dispositions and are often assigned as objectives. However, terrain features in adjacent sectors may be key terrain features if their control is necessary for the continuation of the attack or the accomplishment of the mission. If the mission is to destroy enemy forces, terrain may be selected whose seizure helps insure the required destruction. If the mission is to seize or secure an area, terrain is selected which insures control of the area. Terrain which gives the enemy effective observation along an axis of advance to be used by the friendly forces may be key terrain if the enemy must be denied its possession or control. Key terrain may be within friendly territory when its control is essential to the success of an offensive operation. For example, if the enemy can attack before our attack and seize or control a terrain feature which prevents or hinders the launching of our attack and seize or control a terrain feature affords us a marked advantage and it is a key terrain feature.

d. In the defense, key terrain features are usually within the assigned sector and within or behind the selected defensive area. These features are normally—

- (1) Terrain which gives good observation over avenues of approach to and into the defensive position.
- (2) Terrain which permits the defender to cover an obstacle by fire.
- (3) Important communication centers which affect command communications, and the use of reserves.

e. Key terrain features also may be forward of the defensive area or in adjacent sectors. For example, a terrain feature forward of the edge of the battle area or in an adjacent sector

which gives the enemy good observation over defended localities, communication routes, or enemy avenues of approach, is a key terrain feature when active measures must be taken to reduce the enemy advantage. The defender may move his position forward to include the feature or take action to minimize the enemy advantage by the use of fire, chemicals, smoke, concealment, and cover.

15. Avenues of Approach

a. An avenue of approach is a route for a force of a particular size to reach an objective or key terrain. To be considered an avenue of approach, a route must provide some ease of movement and enough width for dispersion of a force of a sufficient size to affect significantly the outcome of the operation. The division G2 usually considers avenues of approach adequate for at least the type brigade of the particular division. The corps and higher G2 usually consider avenues of approach adequate for at least a division. In determining the width of dispersion, consideration is given to the deployment patterns, mobility means, and the area required for maneuver to prevent presenting lucrative targets for nuclear fires.

b. A valley approach gives the advancing force some cover from enemy direct fire and some concealment from enemy observation. A valley approach includes the floor of the valley, the slopes of the ridges, and the military crests. Control of the military crests on each side of the valley is essential. In a valley approach, the best avenue of approach is that which offers the best observation, cross-country trafficability, road net, fields of fire, concealment and cover, and dispersion. In evaluating the use of a deep valley approach, the possible intensification of nuclear effects and resulting greater casualties on the valley floor are considered. At times, the best avenue may be along the slopes of a ridge below the military crests, rather than along the valley floor.

c. The use of a ridge approach depends upon the width and shape of the ridge, the size and deployment of the units involved, and the distance to the elevation of adjacent ridges. A ridge approach usually has the advantage of good observation. However, there may be little protection from enemy fire on the ridge. The

best avenue of approach in a ridge approach is often slightly below the topographical crest, with sufficient force on the crest to control it.

16. Air Avenues of Approach

a. An air avenue of approach is a route which provides a suitable flight path for a particular number of aircraft to reach a drop or landing zone. In selecting air avenues of approach the major considerations are adequate airspace for rapid movement of the aircraft to landing or drop zones, ground observation, easily recognized terrain features, terrain corridors, and length of the flight path.

b. In selecting avenues of approach for tactical helicopter operations, the major concern is concealment. Routes selected should defile and be easy to follow which will assist in navigation at low altitudes. Ridge lines are crossed as infrequently as possible to reduce exposure time to radar detection. Steep defiles or canyons are avoided, especially when there is an appreciable amount of surface wind because momentary loss of aircraft control can occur from downdrafts. Heavily forested and swampy areas provide good routes as ground troops have little opportunity to see, or to take under fire, the helicopters passing overhead at tree-top level. Low altitude operations over heavy foliage distort the acoustic wave from aircraft and decrease the distance at which the sound can be detected. It also hampers determination of the direction of the noise source by ground observers. Aviation officers assist in evaluating the effect of air density, altitude, and visibility on selected avenues of approach.

17. Combat Service Support Aspects

a. The analyses of the facts and subconclusions developed in the preceding parts of the analysis are further studied for their effects on both friendly and enemy combat service support activities. In this paragraph the effects of the characteristics of the area on combat service support that influence the selection of a course of action by either force are determined.

b. In studying the influence of the area, consideration is given to effects on matters such as availability of adequate routes for lines of communication, facilities for maintenance and storage, construction resources, public health

situation, required shelter for administrative facilities, availability of labor, maintenance of discipline, law and order, and control of refugees.

18. Effects of Characteristics of the Area

This paragraph contains the conclusions reached on the basis of the facts and subconclusions previously developed. The effects of the characteristics of the area of operations on each significant course of action of which the enemy is physically capable and which, if adopted, affect the accomplishment of our mis-

sion are discussed. Usually, the discussion includes as a minimum, effects on the enemy's ability to defend and on his ability to attack. It also includes, as appropriate, the effects on the enemy's ability to delay, use his reserves, amphibious or airborne forces, nuclear fires, guerrilla forces, chemical and biological agents, cover and deception, surveillance devices, or to conduct special operations and support his forces administratively. The discussion of the effects on our courses of action is limited to those required for the accomplishment of the mission.

APPENDIX C

AVAILABILITY OF AGENCIES

1. Division, Corps, and Field Army

The agencies usually available at a division, corps, and field army are shown in figures 23, 24, and 25.

2. Army Group

The agencies normally available at the army group are—

- a. Subordinate forces.
- b. Army group special staff.
- c. Adjacent army groups.
- d. Tactical airforce.
- e. Theater task force.
- f. Theater army support command (TAS-COM), theater army civil affairs command, theater army air defense command, and theater army signal command.
- g. Theater army, theater navy, and theater airforce.
- h. Military intelligence units.

3. Communications Zone

Agencies available to major army commands located within the communications zone are shown in figures 26, 27, and 28.

4. Theater Army

The agencies available at theater army vary with the organization of the theater and generally include—

- a. Subordinate army commands.
- b. Theater army special staff sections.
- c. Army Security Agency units.
- d. Army special forces elements.
- e. Clandestine units.
- f. Military intelligence units.
- g. Agencies organized primarily for production of strategic intelligence, but which also develop combat intelligence and information. Such agencies may include interrogation centers, enemy documents centers, and materiel centers.
- h. Comparable headquarters of other services, Allied forces, and joint commands subordinate to theater headquarters.
- i. Higher headquarters.




Figure 23. Intelligence collection agencies available to division.




Figure 24. Intelligence collection agencies available to corps.




Figure 25. Intelligence collection agencies available to field army.




Figure 26. Intelligence collection agencies available to theater army support command (TASCOM).





Figure 27. Intelligence collection agencies available to theater army civil affairs command.



LEGEND ——— Assigned or attached.
 - - - - - Support available by request.

Figure 28. Intelligence collection agencies available to theater army air defense command.

APPENDIX D

HANDLING AND REPORTING OF CAPTURED ENEMY EQUIPMENT AND DOCUMENTS

STANAG 2084
(Edition No. 2)

DETAILS OF AGREEMENT (DofA)

- Annexes: A (DofA). Types of Captured Enemy Equipment.
B (DofA). PRETECHREP.
C (DofA). COMTECHREP—TYPE A.
D (DofA). COMTECHREP—TYPE B.
E (DofA). COMTECHREP—TYPE C.
F (DofA). Technical Intelligence Teams.

AGREEMENT

1. It is agreed that the NATO Armed Forces are to use the procedure detailed in Part I for the handling of captured enemy equipment and associated technical documents and in Part II for handling captured enemy documents. It is further agreed to use the item list of equipment and the description and procedure for these reports in Annexes A–F (DofA). Nothing in this Agreement is to prejudice any national right on the equipment proper.

DEFINITIONS

2. Document. For the purpose of this Agreement, 'document' is defined as any recorded information regardless of its physical form or characteristics including, but not limited to, all:

- a. Written material, whether hand written, printed or typed.
- b. Painted, drawn or engraved material.
- c. Sound or voice recordings.
- d. Printed photographs and exposed or printed film, still or motion pictures.
- e. Reproductions of the foregoing, by whatever process produced.

PART I
HANDLING OF CAPTURED ENEMY EQUIPMENT AND
ASSOCIATED TECHNICAL DOCUMENTS

GENERAL

3. Captured Enemy Equipment (CEE) and Associated Technical Documents. CEE and associated technical documents are to be handled for exploitation with the minimum delay through the following processing channels (see Note 1*):

- a. Preliminary screening and reporting for information of immediate tactical value by national units assigned to NATO.
- b. Secondary screening and complementary reporting by special intelligence support teams (Technical Intelligence Teams).
- c. Detailed exploitation by specialists in the rear area.

4. Technical Intelligence Reports and Documents. The technical intelligence reports and documents considered are:

- a. Preliminary Technical Reports (PRETECHREP) (submitted by the capturing unit). Annex B(DofA).
- b. Complementary Technical Reports (COMTECHREP) (submitted by Technical Intelligence Teams). Annexes C, D and E(DofA).
- c. Detailed Technical Reports (DETECHREP) (submitted by specialists as appropriate).
- d. Captured Enemy Technical Documents (TECHDOC) (Maintenance Handbooks, Operation Manuals, Drawings, etc.).

5. National Army, Navy, and Air Technical Intelligence Teams. National Army, Navy and Air Technical Intelligence Teams should be provided to carry out the examination of captured enemy equipment for the information of immediate tactical value (where no requirement exists for a permanent Naval Technical Intelligence Team, such groups may be set up on an ad hoc basis). They should be in a position to:

- a. Receive at the earliest possible moment any Preliminary Technical Reports.
- b. Prepare and transmit the results of Complementary Technical reports.
- c. Dispatch items of equipment for specialist examination at base or to the captured equipments depot (which are to be established at a minimum of one per Army Group).
- d. Liaise with prisoner of war (PW) interrogation units.
- e. Ensure that new equipment in possession of a PW is examined as soon as interrogation units have finished with the items concerned. Full use should be made of voluntary information which the PW may give. (See STANAG 2033 and Note 2**.)

NOTE

* (1) A detailed list of the types of CEE to be processed is given in Annex A (DofA).

** (2) Items of equipment taken from the PW to be examined, which, according to Article 18 of the 3rd Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, must be left with the PW, must be replaced by equivalent items serving the same purpose (See STANAG 2044).

- f. Receive from intelligence channels all copies of technical documents which may assist them in their examination.
6. Technical Intelligence Teams should as far as possible be independent, or organic to the units earmarked or assigned to NATO and be sufficiently flexible to cater for a variety and number of equipments. They need to be equipped with suitable tools, transport and facilities for compiling and sending their reports from the field. Suggested allocation for these teams is given at Annex F(DofA).
7. Specialist Teams. Specialist Teams are required to carry out the more detailed examination of captured enemy equipments to supplement the more superficial data which can be obtained in the field. Such teams should be in a position after their examination to render the Detailed Technical Report. No suggested allocation is given for these teams as they are dependent on national resources available.

HANDLING OF CEE BY CAPTURING UNIT

8. Units locating enemy equipment of intelligence value are to submit the Preliminary Technical Report given at Annex B(DofA). This report is transmitted by the accelerated intelligence reporting procedures when it contains intelligence information which could have an immediate effect upon the current situation. Reports not containing such information are transmitted by the quickest possible means, with the precedence as determined by the commander initiating the report. These reports contain a general description of the equipment and any technical information of immediate tactical importance.
9. Unit Commanders are responsible for placing the CEE under guard in order to prevent looting, misuse or destruction before the arrival of the Technical Intelligence Teams.
10. Making of Technical Documents. All technical documents are to be clearly tagged or otherwise identified so as to avoid defacing and marked 'TECHDOC' by the capturing unit or appropriate agency. In the normal exploitation of captured documents, the Command concerned can provide duplicate copies for the guidance of all Technical Intelligence and Specialist Teams in their examinations. All such copies should accompany captured equipment until technical exploitation is finalised.

HANDLING OF CEE BY STAFFS AND TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE TEAMS

11. The command concerned is to notify the appropriate Technical Intelligence Team, which arranges to examine the CEE, either on the spot or nearby where better field facilities may exist. (See Annex F (DofA)).
12. Having completed the field examination, the relevant parts of the Complementary Report are completed and sent through normal staff channels. The description of such equipment and any additional information of tactical value as can be extracted is sent directly to such headquarters as is specified by NATO Authorities. The formats of these reports are given in Annexes C, D and E (DofA).

HANDLING OF CEE BY SPECIALISTS

13. Arrangements should then be made for the speedy evacuation of the equipment to the rear areas where suitable facilities exist for a detailed examination of the equipment by specialists.

14. This enables the completion of a Detailed Technical Report. No illustration is given of this type of report in view of the great variety of equipments involved. It should, however, follow the pattern already used by national technical exploitation agencies. Such reports are submitted as soon as possible by specialists through the same channels as those laid down for Complementary Reports. If directed, national intelligence agencies should also be informed after either the Complementary or the Detailed Technical Reports have been forwarded.

15. In the case where the capturing nation is not in a position to conduct an exhaustive field or rear area exploitation of the equipment, the appropriate NATO Authority advises the capturing nation as to further action. In these cases, the exploitation agency should inform the capturing nation of the results of that exploitation.

PART II

HANDLING AND REPORTING OF CAPTURED ENEMY

DOCUMENTS

GENERAL

16. Captured Enemy Documents (CED). CED, except those belonging to CEE (TECHDOC) or reproductions thereof, are forwarded for exploitation to the appropriate 'Captured Document Centre' (CDC). These centres are, as a rule, organic to Major NATO Commands. Captured documents are sent with the minimum delay through the following processing channels:

- a. National units assigned to NATO for preliminary screening for information of immediate tactical value.
- b. Special Intelligence Support Teams for CED for secondary screening, reproductions and dissemination to all concerned.
- c. CDC for detailed exploitation and indexing.

17. Categories of CED. CED are to be divided as follows:

- a. Category 'A'. Category 'A' documents are those which contain information concerning significant intelligence subjects, such as enemy order of battle, the employment of new weapons, and equipment by the enemy, his logistic situation (stock levels, shortages, supply systems, especially supply systems for missiles), his morale, his losses, etc. Such documents require immediate operational exploitation, and the originals of microfilm copies must reach appropriate operational intelligence staffs at the earliest possible moment.
- b. Category 'B'. Category 'B' documents are cryptographic documents, all encrypted items and all documents relating to enemy radio systems. These documents must reach the appropriate intelligence staffs at the earliest possible moment.

- c. Category 'C'. Category 'C' documents are those of lesser intelligence value.
- d. Category 'D'. Category 'D' documents are those which contain no information of intelligence value.

HANDLING OF CAPTURED DOCUMENTS BY THE CAPTURING UNIT

18. Captured documents must be forwarded without delay by the capturing unit to the staff under which the unit is operating, with details of the date, time and place of capture (with map coordinates), together with the name of the capturing unit and the circumstances under which the documents were found.

19. Marking of CED. Documents are to be clearly tagged, or otherwise identified so as to avoid defacing, by the capturing unit in the following way:

- a. Identification Letters. Documents are to be tagged showing the nationality of the capturing force by the national identifying letters prescribed in STANAG 1059.
- b. Designation of Capturing Units. This is to include the service to which the unit belongs.
- c. Serial Number. Units are to give each document a serial number and should record the dispatch of the document in a war diary.
- d. Date—Time of capture.
- e. Place of capture (with map coordinates).
- f. Summary of circumstances under which the document was found.

20. In cases where documents are discovered by personnel of NATO staffs and units, and not by national forces assigned to or earmarked for NATO, then the identification letters to be used are 'NA'. Other instructions in paragraph 19, however, apply.

21. Whenever intelligence derived from a captured document is included in a unit or information intelligence report, the identification letters and number of the document concerned are to be quoted to avoid subsequent false confirmation.

HANDLING OF CED BY INTELLIGENCE STAFFS AND SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TEAMS

22. All captured documents must be categorized and forwarded. The detailed procedures for handling captured documents include the following main tasks:

- a. Screening.
- b. Recording.
- c. Translation.
- d. Reproduction.
- e. Dissemination.

23. Intelligence staffs must ensure that there is no delay in the exploitation of captured documents. If for any reason, qualified personnel of microfilming facilities are temporarily not available or are insufficient to

handle the volume or type of documents concerned, the documents are to be forwarded immediately to the next higher echelon and are not to be retained by the staff in question.

24. Methods of Handling Documents. The staff concerned are to handle the documents in one of the following ways:

a. Category 'A'.

- (1) Where microfilming facilities exist, they are to photograph documents with attached comments, and forward original documents direct to either the national agency or the appropriate NATO Intelligence Support Unit for exploitation, by-passing intermediate headquarters. Where suitable linguists are available, microfilms are to be examined for information of tactical value to local commanders.
- (2) Where microfilming facilities do not exist, but suitable linguists are available, they are to examine documents for information of tactical value to local commanders, attach appropriate comments, and forward without delay to the appropriate higher headquarters.
- (3) Where linguists are not available within the formation headquarters, the documents should go to the PW interrogators for evaluation.

b. Category 'B'. These are to be forwarded without delay to the naval, army, or air force headquarters which are primarily interested. The NATO International Headquarters under which the capturing unit operates should be informed of the capture and disposition of important documents in this category as soon as possible; the nearest ASA unit should be notified immediately of the existence of such documents so they can initiate an immediate review of them.

c. Category 'C'. The staff concerned are to forward Category 'C' documents direct to the appropriate NATO Intelligence Support Unit for exploitation. Exceptions to this procedure include:

- (1) Unmarked maps and charts of previously unknown types which are to be forwarded to the nearest engineer unit or topographical section.
- (2) Personal mail and paybooks taken from a PW, which are to be returned to the PW after exploitation by interrogation personnel or intelligence staffs.
- (3) Other documents acquired from a PW which, after they have served their purpose in interrogation, are to be forwarded to the appropriate intelligence staffs for further exploitation.
- (4) Documents specifically related to equipment which, if of intelligence value, are to accompany the equipment to the intelligence agency responsible for exploitation and then sent without delay to the CDC.

d. Category 'D'. Captured documents are not to become final as Category 'D' until they have been thoroughly scrutinized by document translation specialists at the highest command echelon interested,

preferably at least two levels above division. Category 'D' documents are to be disposed of as directed by appropriate authority.

25. Documents of the Categories 'A', 'B', 'C', and 'D' captured from crashed enemy aircraft or, in particular, related to enemy anti-aircraft defense or enemy control and reporting systems, are to be transmitted to the nearest air force headquarters without delay. The same procedure applies to all captured maps and charts of enemy air forces. After evaluation by the responsible air force intelligence staff they are to be transmitted to the topographical or other appropriate unit. Documents taken from a ship, including Category 'B' code books, call signs, frequency tables, identification symbols, etc., should be forwarded without delay to the nearest naval force headquarters.

26. As a general rule, Maintenance Handbooks, Operation Manuals and drawings should accompany the captured equipment until the intelligence exploitation is completed.

HANDLING OF CED BY CDC

27. Lists of documents which have been exploited are to be distributed to all intelligence staffs by the CDC to avoid duplication in translating and processing identical documents by different units. A master list of all captured documents which have been exploited in NATO commands is to be maintained.

28. When action on captured documents at CDC has been completed, the original documents are sent to the national staff whose forces captured them.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT

29. This STANAG will be considered to have been implemented when the necessary orders/instructions putting the procedures detailed in this Agreement into effect have been issued to the forces concerned.

ANNEX A (DofA) TO STANAG 2084 (Edition No. 2)

TYPES OF CAPTURED ENEMY EQUIPMENT

Types of enemy equipment to be collected and examined by Technical Intelligence Teams. (New equipment or equipment in the process of development ('significant equipment') are the main concern of these teams.) (See Note 1.)

1. Army Equipment.

COMTECHREP

- | | |
|---|----------------------|
| a. Guided missiles. |) TYPE B |
| b. Ammunition, all types including mines, demolitions, pyrotechnics and chemical. |) See Annex D (DofA) |
| c. Infantry weapons. |) |
| d. Sabotage equipment. |) |
| e. Armoured fighting vehicles. (AFVs) |) |

- f. Military vehicles excluding AFVs.)
- g. Artillery, including anti-tank, anti-aircraft and field rocket weapons.)
- h. Guided missile launching systems.) TYPE C
- i. Engineering, amphibious and river crossing equipments.) See Annex E(DofA)
- j. Electronics, infra-red detection and communication equipment.)
- k. Airborne equipment.)
- l. Special weapons, including nuclear biological and chemical warfare equipment, flame and incendiary weapons, equipment for dispersion of chemical and biological warfare agents, together with protective devices.)
- m. Miscellaneous equipments:)
 - (1) Camouflage equipment.)
 - (2) Clothing and personal equipment.)
 - (3) Medical equipment.)
 - (4) Rations.)

2. Air Force Equipment

- a. Aircraft, airframe and power plant.)
- b. Airborne armament and ammunition, bomb sights, gun sights and photographic equipment.)
- c. Airborne radio and electrical equipment.)
- d. Airborne sea mine countermeasures.)
- e. Miscellaneous airborne equipment, including instruments and controls, dinghies, parachute and other safety equipment.) TYPE A
- f. Ground equipment and installations.) See Annex E(DofA)
- g. Fuels, lubricants, greases and propellants.)
- h. Guided missiles and associated equipment.)
- i. Equipment for dispersion of chemical and biological warfare agents.)
- j. Miscellaneous equipments:)
 - (1) Flying clothing equipments, including G-suits, pressure breathing equipment, etc.)
 - (2) Medical equipments and flying rations.)

3. Navy Equipment. (See Note 2.)

- a. Ships.
- b. Missiles and launching systems.
- c. Shipboard ordnance, including guns, fire control equipment, i.e., radar, range finders, stable elements, range keepers, spotters, telescopes, gun mounts and turrets, ammunition hoists, rammers, fuzes, fuze setters, recoil mechanisms, ammunition, ammunition stowage

facilities; ahead thrown weapons of all types including Hedgehogs, Mousetraps, Weapon 'A' equivalents, Limbo types, depth charge racks and 'Y' and 'K' gun launchers; torpedoes and torpedo tubes, including Anti-submarine Warfare (ASW) launchers; rockets and rocket launchers.

- d. Sea mines (all types, including moored, bottom and floating; contact and influence).
- e. Mine Countermeasures.
- f. Harbour defense equipment including nets, booms, alerting, devices, net tenders and ASDICS.
- g. Navy electronics, infrared, detection and communication equipment, sonars, fathometers and sonobuoys.
- h. Fuels, lubricants, greases and propellants.
- i. Special weapons, including chemical warfare equipment, flame and incendiary equipment for dispersion of chemical and biological warfare agents, together with protective devices such as clothing, gas masks and canisters; salt water spray deck washing equipment for AER protection.
- j. Medical supplies and medical instruments.
- k. Demolition and sabotage equipment, UDT equipment (sleds, masks, etc.).
- l. Naval engineering systems, including: main propulsion machinery, steam or gas turbines, boilers, diesel engines, auxiliary equipment including motor generators, heat exchanges, pumps evaporators, fuel oil systems for boilers and diesel engines, including fuel pumps and fuel oil heaters; pressure gauges, boiler accessories including safety valves, steam control valves, gauge glasses, feed water check valves, propellers, hull zincs, refrigerating machinery, submarine storage batteries and their ventilating equipment, ammeters, voltmeters, amp/hr meters; steering engines, engine room telegraph systems, submerged atmospheric gas analyzers, CO² scrubbers, compressors, and ships underwater logs; samples of metals, used in shipbuilding and any information (description) of welding technique used in shipbuilding.
- m. Hydrofoil and hovercraft, small boats and boat handling equipment, life rafts and signal apparatus or any of their components such as hydrofoil foils.
- n. Anchors, chains, windlasses, winches, fuelling and transfer at sea rigs, and cargo handling gear.
- o. Hydrographic survey ships equipment including high altitude research rockets and their launching equipment, sonars and fathometers, sea bottoms amplifying gear such as drags and coring equipment, deep sea anchors, sea current measuring devices, biological sampling equipment, Nansen bottles, possible helicopters and other equipment such as laboratory instruments.

NOTES

- (1) Although cryptographic material is not specifically mentioned in the above lists, technical intelligence teams also are responsible for the collection of such material. Special instructions for the handling of this equipment are to be issued by the appropriate NATO Command.
- (2) Where no requirements exist for permanent Naval Technical Intelligence Teams, such groups may be set up on an ad hoc basis.

ANNEX B (DofA) TO STANAG 2084
(Edition No. 2)

PRETECHREP

To be submitted by accelerated intelligence reporting procedures immediately following the acquisition of significant enemy equipment (see paragraph 8 (DofA)).

- A. Date found, location (map reference).
- B. Type of equipment and quantity.
- C. Origin.
- D. Brief description with distinguishing marks.
- E. Technical characteristics with an immediate value.
- F. Signature of the commander of capturing unit.
- G. Time and origin of the message.

ANNEX C (DofA) TO STANAG 2084
(Edition No. 2)

COMTECHREP—TYPE A

To be submitted by the fastest available means immediately following initial examination of enemy aircraft.

- A. Date and location of crash and map of reference.
- B. Type of aircraft and:
 - (1) Overall length.
 - (2) Overall wing-span.
- C. Identification and distinguishing marks.
- D. Type of engine(s) and condition.
- E. Cause of crash; number, location and calibre of projectile strikes; condition of aircraft.
- F. Armament:
 - (1) Guns of all types, installation positions, quantity.
 - (2) Ammunition and number of magazines.
 - (3) Bombs and bomb installations.
 - (4) Mines and mine carriers.
 - (5) Rocket projectiles and carriers.
 - (6) Pyrotechnics, number and type.
- G. Armour-plate: quantity, positions, thickness, strikes, penetrations.
- H. Number of crew and fate.
- I. Wings and control surfaces: leading edge, if protected against balloon cables by cutters, strengthening or other special devices; de-icing.
- J. State if samples are obtainable of:
 - (1) Gasoline.
 - (2) Oil.
 - (3) Coolant.
 - (4) Hydraulic fluids.
 - (5) De-icing fluids.
- K. Internal equipment; state condition and whether bombsights, radio, photographic equipment and electronics equipment and instruments are standard. If not, specify modifications, alterations or omissions. Obtain radio frequency setting, if possible.

- L. Landing gear: type and condition.
- M. General remarks and special points or unusual features not mentioned.
- N. Name plates photographed:
 - (1) Airframe.
 - (2) Engine.
 - (3) Others.
- O. Other information.
- P. Name of officer in Command of Technical Intelligence Team making examination.
- Q. Time and origin of message.

ANNEX D (DofA) TO STANAG 2084
(Edition No. 2)

COMTECHREP—TYPE B

1. COMTECHREP TYPE B is used for reporting information about ammunition, missiles, bombs, shells, rockets, projectiles, mines, torpedoes, etc.
2. To be submitted by the fastest available means immediately following initial examination.
3. Only use those letters for which information is available.

-
- A. Nationality, designation and mark number.
 - B. Description.
 - C. Overall length of missile, including fuze, tail, vanes and fittings.
 - D. Maximum diameter of missiles.
 - E. Shape and design of missiles (streamlining shells).
 - F. Length and width of tail.
 - G. Span of vanes.
 - H. Thickness of casing at nose.
 - I. Thickness of casing at sides.
 - J. Thickness of casing at base.
 - K. Material of body.
 - L. Material of tail or vanes.
 - M. Colour and marking of nose.
 - N. Colour and marking of body.
 - O. Colour and marking of tail or vanes.
 - P. Weight and nature of main filling.
 - Q. Total weight of missile.
 - R. Method of suspension.
 - S. Detonation system.
 - T. Fusing systems and markings.
 - U. Anti-handling or booby-trap devices.
 - V. Method of propulsion.
 - W. Date and location of missile.
 - X. Other information.
 - Y. Name of officer in command of the Technical Intelligence Team making examination.
 - Z. Time and origin of message.

ANNEX E (DofA) TO STANAG 2084
(Edition No. 2)

COMTECHREP—TYPE C

To be submitted within 72 hours following the acquisition of an item of captured equipment not covered under Types A and B.

- A. Date found, location (map reference).
- B. Type of equipment and quantity.
- C. Origin.
- D. Description with distinguishing marks (additional details).
- E. Conditions of equipment.
- F. Technical characteristics of immediate tactical value (additional details).
- G. Recommended disposal.
- H. Name plates photographed.
- I. Photographs taken.
- J. Other information.
- K. Name of team chief.
- L. Time and origin of message.

ANNEX F (DofA) TO STANAG 2084
(Edition No. 2)

TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE TEAMS

1. Army and Air teams should be provided by national forces assigned to NATO to the extent deemed necessary and preferably on the following minimum bases:

- a. Where forces concerned are operating on one front or on a peninsula (Norway, Denmark, Italy, Greece) : two army and two air teams.
- b. Where forces concerned are operating on two fronts on a peninsula (Turkey) : two army and two air teams per front.

2. See paragraph 5 (DofA), regarding naval teams.

3. It is recognized that as these teams are to be furnished on a national basis, their composition will be partly determined by national characteristics. However, the following composition of army and air teams is suggested as a standard in order to give adequate technical intelligence support to the fighting forces:

a. Air Team.

- (1) Airframe-engine equipment.
- (2) Armament.
- (3) Radio-electronics.
- (4) Administrative-photos, reports, transport and equipment.
- (5) Guided missile ordnance.

b. Army Team.

- (1) Vehicles, tanks.
- (2) Engineering equipment.
- (3) Armament.
- (4) Radio-electronics.
- (5) Guided-missile ordnance.
- (6) Administrative.
- (7) Nuclear-biological-chemical specialist.

UNIT: 20th Inf Div
Period covered: From 131530 Jul. To: Capture of high ground at 1055-1457.

(1) Essential elements of information and other required intelligence items	(2) Indications (analysis of items in column 1)	(3) Basis for specific orders or requests and notes for future action	(4) List all available agencies												(5) How and destination of reports	(6) Remarks			
			1st Bde	2d Bde	3d Bde	1/21 Cav	Div Art	20th Eng Bn	20th Asn Bn	20th Sig Co	20th Div Sp L	55th Inf Div	22d Inf Div	1st Corps			Auxiliary agencies		
EEI 1. What are the enemy dispositions? Special attention to organiza- tion of the ground, troops occupying strongpoints, and loca- tions and activities of reserves. OTHER INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS. 2. Will the enemy at- tack prior to 140430 July? If so, when, where, and in what strength? Special at- tention to the axis LEON (1647)-OSTRO (2046): Hill 408 (1849)- Hill 418 (1848).	a. Location and strengths of- (1) Units in contact. (2) Reserves. (3) Artillery. (4) Others.	(1) Report location, strength, and activities of troops on JANINA-CELINA Ridge. (2) Report location and strength of occupied strongpoints vicinity Hill 408 (1851) and Hill 282 (1251). (3) Report location and strength of occupied strongpoints vicinity Plateau BELLE-RIVE. (4) Report location and strength of occupied strongpoints vicinity BRAZOS Woods. (5) Report location and strength of occupied strongpoints on PETROV Woods Ridge vicinity 2050. (6) Report location and strength of occupied strongpoints on PETROV Woods Ridge vicinity 1849. (7) Report location and strength of troops in LARUNA River Valley vicinity LEON (1647). (8) Report location and strength of troops vicinity Hill 325 (1133). (9) Report location of all artillery and mortar positions in zone to include those unoccupied and number of pieces.	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	(1) As obtained. Negative reports every 2 hours starting 131800 July. (2) Same as (1).	Assign to 3d when committed. ✓ ✓		
			⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	(3) Same as (1).	+		
			⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	(4) Same as (1).	✓	
			⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	(5) Same as (1).	✓	
			⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	(6) Same as (1).	✓	
			⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	(7) Same as (1).	✓	
			⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	(8) Same as (1).	✓	
			⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	(9) As obtained.	✓	
		b. Presence of demolitions, gassed areas, radiological and biological contamination, obstacles, and minefields.	(10) Report location and extent of demolitions, gassed areas, radiological and biological contamination, obstacles, and minefields to front, flanks, and forward of present position.	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	(10) As obtained.	SOP. +
		c. Entrenching and erecting bands of wire.	(11) Report hostile entrenching and erection of bands of wire along present line of contact. (12) Report hostile entrenching and bands of wire on JANINA-CELINA Ridge.	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	(11) As obtained.	Cancel at 140430. ✓
		d. Dumping ammunition and engineer supplies and equipment, fortifying buildings.	(13) Report evidence of fortification of buildings in zone, particularly WACO (1451) and ST GEORGE (1554).	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	(12) As obtained.	✓
		e. Location of command posts and supply and evacuation installations.	(14) Report location of command posts and supply and evacuation installations in division zone north of road LA PALOMA. WACO special attention to vicinity CR 1356.	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	(13) As obtained.	✓
			(15) Report volume and type of traffic across TAKASAN Canal and on roads leading south from CELINA, JANINA, CR 1356, and CR 1255.	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	(14) As obtained.	✓
		a. Movement of hostile units forward.	(16) Report location of troops, types, and numbers, vicinity 1550. (17) Report location of troops, types, and numbers, vicinity 1851.	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	(15) Same as (1).	+
		b. Location of enemy troops in forward assembly areas.	(18) Report clearing of lanes through obstacles within Aggressor position in zone.	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	(16) As obtained.	Assign to 1st Bde, 2d Bde when railroad through LAY is reached. ✓
		c. Clearing of lanes through obstacles within own position.	(19) Report the number, size, composition, routes, and time observed of enemy patrols in zone.	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	(17) As obtained.	Cancel at 140430. ✓
		d. Increased patrolling.	(20) Report activity and size of units blocking our patrolling along line of contact.	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	(18) As obtained.	✓
		e. Establishment and strengthening of counterreconnaissance screen.	(21) Report any marked change in artillery fire to include time, location, direction of fire, number of rounds, rate and caliber received in zone or area.	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	(19) As obtained.	Cancel at 140430. +
		f. Extensive artillery preparations.	(22) Report amount and type of air activity in zone or area.	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	(20) As obtained.	✓
		g. Increased air reconnaissance.	(23) Report new identifications.	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	(21) As obtained.	SOP. +
		h. Forces in contact being replaced or reinforced by new units.		⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	(22) As obtained.	SOP. +
				⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	(23) As obtained.	SOP. +

EXAMPLE OF A PARTIALLY COMPLETED COLLECTION PLAN

APPENDIX E

APPENDIX F

FORMAT AND EXAMPLE OF AN INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY (INTSUM)

1. Format of an Intelligence Summary.

Note: Omit items not applicable unless otherwise indicated.

1. Issuing unit (always included).
2. Time and date of issue (always included).
3. Summary of enemy activity for period.
 - a. Ground activity.
 - b. Trace of forward elements.
 - c. Potential targets for nuclear weapons.
 - d. Nuclear activity.
 - e. CBR activity.
 - f. Air activity.
 - g. Other (new tactics, counter-intelligence, etc.).
4. Personnel and equipment losses.
 - a. Personnel (KIA).
 - b. Prisoners of war.
 - c. Equipment destroyed or captured.
5. New obstacles and barriers.
6. Administrative activities.
7. New identifications.
 - a. Units.
 - b. Personalities.
8. Enemy movements.
9. Estimates number and types of vehicles.
10. Weather and terrain conditions.
11. Brief discussion of capabilities and vulnerabilities (always included).
12. Conclusions (always included).

2. Examples of a Division Intsum (full distribution not indicated) FM CG 52D MECH DIV

IMMEDIATE

TO CG 2D CORPS

INTSUM NUMBER 144 ENDING 040600
PARA 3 ALFA AGGRESSOR CONTINUED
DEFENSE IN ZONE EXCEPT FOR LOCAL
ATTACK AT 0415 VICINITY R376759 WITH
ESTIMATED 90 MEN CMM 3 MEDIUM
TANKS CMM AND LIGHT ARTILLERY
SUPPORT PD ATTACK REPULSED PD
PARA 3 DELTA ATTACK PRECEDED AT
0410 BY VERY HIGH AIR BURST NU-
CLEAR WEAPON CMM GROUND ZERO
R374761 CMM DELIVERY MEANS UNDET-
ERMINED CMM YIELD ESTIMATED AT
0 PD 5 KT PD PARA 3 FOXTROT ATTACK
SUPPORTED BY 2 JET ATTACK AIR-
PLANES BOMBING AND STRAFING
VICINITY R396756 FOR 5 MINUTES
STARTING AT 0425 PD PARA 4 ALFA
CONFIRMED 20 KIA CMM ESTIMATED 5
KIA CMM ESTIMATED 30 WIA PD PARA
4 BRAVO 10 INCLUDING 2 WIA PD PARA 4
CHARLIE 2 MEDIUM TANKS DESTROYED
CMM 1 DAMAGED CMM 1 JET ATTACK
AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN PD PARA 6
PRISONER STATES AMMUNITION SUP-
PLY IN FORWARD UNITS RUNNING LOW
PAREN CHARLIE DASH 3 PAREN PD
PARA 7 ALFA PATROL REPORTS BAT-
TERY 152 MM HOWITZERS AT R303292 PD
PRISONERS CONFIRM LOCATION 2D
BATTALION CMM 17F MECH RIFLE REGI-
MENT VICINITY R375758 PAREN BRAVO
DASH 1 PAREN PARA 8 AIRBORNE RA-
DAR RECONNAISSANCE DETECTED 10
TRUCKS MOVING SOUTH ON ROAD AT
R330280 AT 0345 PD PARA 9 PROBABLY
ROUTINE SUPPLY VEHICLES PD PARA
10 SNOW STARTED AT 040545 AND CON-

TINUING PD GROUND FROZEN HARD
AND SUPPORTS ALL TYPES OF VEHI-
CLES PD PARA 11 LOCAL ATTACK RE-
PORTED PROBABLY WAS TO SEIZE HILL
405 PD ENEMY IS CAPABLE OF CONTIN-
UING DEFENSE IN PRESENT POSITION

CMM MAKING LOCAL ATTACKS TO IM-
PROVE HIS DEFENSIVE POSITION CMM
WITHDRAWING TO STRONGER POSITION
ALONG LAURIEX RIVER PD PARA 12
CONTINUED DEFENSE IN PRESENT
POSITION MOST PROBABLE.

APPENDIX G

BOMBING, SHELLING, AND MORTARING REPORTS

STANAG 2008
(Edition No. 3)

DETAILS OF AGREEMENT (DofA)

Annex: A (DofA). Format for Bombing, Shelling and Mortaring Reports.

c. BOMREP (in the case of enemy air attack).

AGREEMENT

1. It is agreed that the NATO Armed Forces are to use the format shown at Annex A (DofA) when rendering enemy bombing, shelling and mortaring reports. (Additional reporting required when NBC weapons are involved is covered in STANAG 2103.)

2. It is further agreed that this format is to be completed as detailed in the following paragraphs of this Agreement.

CLASSIFICATION OF REPORTS

3. Completed reports are to be classified in accordance with current security regulations.

METHOD OF RENDERING AND TRANSMISSION

4. Reports are rendered as normal messages and are to be transmitted by the fastest means available.

CODE WORDS

5. Each transmission is to be preceded by one of the following code words:

- a. SHELREP (in the case of enemy artillery fire).
- b. MORTREP (in the case of enemy mortar or rocket fire).

SECURITY OF MESSAGES

6. The message is always transmitted in clear except as follows:

- a. Unit of Origin—Paragraph A of Annex A (DofA). The current call sign, address group or equivalent is to be used.
- b. Position of Observer—Paragraph B of Annex A (DofA). This is to be encoded if it discloses the location of a headquarters or an important observer post.
- c. When the originator considers that the conditions prevailing warrant a higher classification. (e.g., paragraph K. if required).

PARAGRAPHS

7. Each paragraph of the report has a letter and a heading. The headings may be included for easy reference to facilitate completion, but only the letters are to be transmitted if the report is sent by radio or telephone.

8. Paragraphs which cannot be completed or are not applicable are omitted from the report.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT

9. This STANAG will be considered to have been implemented when the necessary orders/instructions to adopt the method described in this Agreement have been issued to the forces concerned.

FORMAT FOR BOMBING, SHELLING AND MORTARING REPORTS

(SECURITY CLASSIFICATION)

BOMREP, SHELREP OR MORTREP

(Indicate which)

- A. UNIT OF ORIGIN. (Use current call sign, address group or code name.)
- B. POSITION OF OBSERVER. (Grid reference preferred—encode if this discloses the location of a headquarters or important observation post, or if sub-paragraph F.2., below is used to give information on location.)
- C. DIRECTION measured clockwise from GRID NORTH in degrees or mils (state which) of FLASH, SOUND OR GROOVE OF SHELL (state which). (Omit for aircraft.)
- D. TIME FROM.
- E. TIME TO.
- F. AREA BOMBED, SHELLED OR MORTARED. May be sent either as:
1. Grid reference (Clear reference is to be used).
- OR
2. Direction measured clockwise from grid north to impact points (Degrees or mils—state which) and distance in yards or meters (state which) from observer. This information must be encoded. (When this method is used, maximum accuracy possible is essential.)
- G. NUMBER AND NATURE OF GUNS, MORTARS, ROCKET LAUNCHERS, AIRCRAFT, OR OTHER METHODS OF DELIVERY.
- H. NATURE OF FIRE. (Registration, bombardment, harassing, etc.) (May be omitted for aircraft.)
- I. NUMBER, TYPE AND CALIBRE. (State whether measured or assumed) of SHELLS, ROCKETS (OR MISSILES) BOMBS, ETC.
- J. TIME OF FLASH TO BANK. (Omit for aircraft.)
- K. DAMAGE. (Encode if required.)

APPENDIX H

**REPORTING NUCLEAR DETONATIONS, RADIOACTIVE FALLOUT,
AND BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL ATTACKS**

STANAG NO. 2103
NAVY/ARMY/AIR

DETAILS OF AGREEMENT

GENERAL

1. a. It is agreed that the NATO Armies and Air Forces will follow the reporting organization in Annex A, use the NBC forms at Annex C, use the Fallout Prediction System at Annex D and follow the procedures outlined herein for:
 - (1) The reporting of enemy or unidentified nuclear detonations.
 - (2) The reporting of radioactive contamination.
 - (3) The reporting of enemy or unidentified biological or chemical attacks and the resulting contamination.
 - (4) The interchange of reports in (1), (2) and (3) above with NATO Naval Commands and the National Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) defense organizations of the NATO countries.
- b. It is also agreed that, because of the differences in the land and sea problems, the procedures outlined in ATP-25(NAVY)—Nuclear Fallout Forecasting and Warning Organization will be used by the NATO Navies for reporting fallout predictions.

DEFINITION

2. The definitions that follow are for the purpose of this STANAG only.
3. NBC Zone of Observation. A geographical area which defines the responsibility for reporting and collecting information on enemy or unidentified nuclear detonations, biological or chemical attacks, and resultant contamination. Boundaries of NBC Zones of Observation, which may overlap, will be determined by the organization of the forces concerned.
4. NBC Area of Observation. A geographical area consisting of several NBC Zones of Observation, comparable to the area of responsibility of an Army or Army Group or an ATAF.
5. NBC Collection Centre. The agency responsible for the receipt, consolidation and evaluation of reports of nuclear detonations, biological and chemical attacks and resultant contamination within an NBC Zone of

Observation and for the production and dissemination of appropriate reports and warnings. Agencies with similar functions, but with responsibilities for only part of the NBC Zone of Observation may be termed Sub Collection Centres.

6. NBS Control Centre. The agency responsible for coordinating the effort of all collection centres within the NBC Area of Observation. A control centre may assume the function of the collection centre for the area in which it is located.

7. Surface Burst. An explosion of a nuclear weapon at the surface of land or water; or above or below the surface less than the maximum radius of the fireball.

8. Radiological Survey. The directed effort to determine the distribution and dose rates of radiation in an area.

9. Radiological Monitoring. The assessing with instruments of known or suspected radioactive hazards at a point.

ORGANIZATION

10. The NBC reporting organization will be as shown in Annex "A."

FUNCTIONS

11. The functions of the various agencies in the NBC reporting organization are set forth as a guide in Annex "B."

FORMS

12. Forms to be used by the agencies of the NBC reporting organization are prescribed in Annex "C."

NBC 1

Purpose: Observers' Initial Report, giving basic data.

- Notes: a. NBC 1 follows the same format as the SHELLREPS, MORTREPS and BOMREPS which are included in STANAG 2008 dealing with conventional enemy attacks.
- b. The Items "Type of Report," D, H, and either Items B and C or Item F must always be reported; other items are optional.
- c. Users of NBC 1 are not confined solely to the use of letter items shown in the examples; other letter items may be added at the users' discretion.

LETTER	MEANING	EXAMPLE NUCLEAR	EXAMPLE TOXIC	EXAMPLE BIOLOGICAL
	Precedence			
	Date/Time (ZULU)			
	Security			
	From			
	To			
	Type of Report	NBC 1 (NUCLEAR)	NBC 1 (TOXIC)	NBC 1 (BIOLOGICAL)
A.	Strike Serial Number (if known)			
B.	Position of Observer (UTM or place)	B. LB 196400	MARVILLE	
C.	Grid or magnetic (say which) bearing or azimuth of at- tack from observer (in de- grees or mils, say which)	C. Grid 60 degrees	C. Magnetic 60 degrees	
D.	Date/Time attack started (ZULU)	D. 201405 Z	D. 201405 Z	D. 201405 Z
E.	Illumination time (secs) or time attack ended	E. 4	E. 201412 Z	
F.	Location of attack (UTM or place) (actual or estimated, say which)			F. LB 2030 actual
G.	Means of delivery, if known		G. Aerial spray	
H.	Type of burst, Air, Surface or unknown, or type of toxic agent, if known, or type of attack (BW, CW, registration, harassing, etc.)	H. Surface	H. Nerve	H. Biological
I.	Number of shells, etc.			
J.	Flash to bang time (secs)			
K.	Crater present or absent and diameter, if known (meters)			
L.	Fireball width, immediately after passage of shock wave (sound of detona- tions) (degrees or mils, say which)			

LETTER**MEANING****EXAMPLE
NUCLEAR**

M. Cloud height top or bottom, 10 mins after burst (degrees, mils, meters or feet, say which)

M. 40,000 feet TOP

NBC 2

Purpose: Report used for passing evaluated data.

- Notes:**
- a. This report is normally based on two or more NBC Forms 1. It includes as estimated GZ and in the case of nuclear detonations an evaluated yield.
 - b. When adjacent agencies e.g., Navy and National NBC Defense use a different fallout prediction system, this form may be sent to provide basic data for their fallout computations.
 - c. Items A, D, F, H and N may be repeated as often as necessary to produce a summary report.
 - d. Users of NBC 2 are not confined solely to the use of the letter items shown in the examples; other letter items may be added at the users' discretion.

LETTER	MEANING	EXAMPLE NUCLEAR	EXAMPLE TOXIC
	Precedence		
	Date/Time (Z)		
	Security		
	From		
	To		
	Type of Report	NBC 2 (NUCLEAR)	NBC 2 (TOXIC)
A.	Strike serial number	A. 24	A. 1
D.	Date/Time attack started (ZULU)	D. 201405 Z	D. 200945 Z
F.	Location of attack (UTM or place) (actual or esti- mated, say which)	F. LB 187486 actual	F. LB 126456 actual
G.	Means of delivery, if known		
H.	Type of burst, Air, Sur- face or unknown (say which), or type of toxic agent.	H. Surface	H. Nerve
N.	Estimated Yield (KT)	N. 50	

NBC 3

Purpose: To issue immediate warning of expected contamination.

- Notes:**
- a. When adjacent agencies e.g., Navy and National NBC defense organizations use a different fallout prediction system, NBC 2 may be sent to provide basic data for their fallout computation.
 - b. Users of NBC 3 are not confined solely to the use of the letter items shown in the examples; other letter items may be added at the users' discretion.

LETTER	MEANING	EXAMPLE NUCLEAR	EXAMPLE TOXIC
	Precedence		
	Date/Time (Z)	(A telephone or radio message)	
	Security		
	From		
	To		
	Type of Report	NBC 3 (NUCLEAR)	NBC 3 (TOXIC)
D.	Date/Time Attack started (ZULU)	D. 201405 Z	D. 201415 Z
F.	Location of Attack (UTM or place) (actual or estimated, say which)	F. LB 187486 actual	F. LB 206300 actual
P.	Area of Expected contamination (UTM)	Y. 0272-0312 degrees	P. LB 208320 LB 210320 LB 206310
Y.	Bearing of azimuths of left then right radial lines (degrees or mils, say which, four (4) digits each)		
Z.	Effective wind speed (KPH), 3 digits; Downwind distance of Zone 1 (km), 3 digits; Cloud radius (km), 2 digits	Z. 019-025-05	

NBC 4

Purpose: To report radiation dose-rate measurements.

- Notes: a. Letter items Q, R, and S may be repeated as often as necessary.
- b. Radiation dose rates are measured in the open, one meter above ground. Other conditions will be specified in the message.
- c. Users of NBC 4 are not confined solely to the use of the letter items shown in the examples; other letter items may be added at the users' discretion.

LETTER	MEANING	EXAMPLE
	Precedence	
	Date/Time (Z)	
	Security	
	From	
	To	
	Type of Report	NBC 4
Q.	Location of reading	Q. LB 123987
R.	Dose rate (r per hour). The words "Initial", "Increasing", "Peak", or "Decreasing" may be added. When decay rate is reported, the words "Decay Normal", "Decay Fast", or "Decay Slow", or the actual value of decay constant may be inserted.	R. 35

LETTER MEANING

S. Date/Time of Reading (ZULU) (this is
 NOT normalized to H + 1 hour)

EXAMPLE

S. 201735 Z
Q. LB 129965
R. 60
S. 201650 Z
Q. LB 146808
R. 27 Increasing
S. 201710 Z

NBC 5

Purpose: To report areas of contamination.

- Notes: a. The form is best sent by means of a trace or overlay if time and distance permit.
- b. When the contamination arises from a single enemy or unidentified burst, the dose rate will always refer to H + 1 hour, and the letter Item T will be used. But when there have been several detonations at different times or on different days and no single H + 1 hour is possible, then the dose rates will be reported as at a specified time using letter Item O. Letter Items O and T are therefore alternative and cannot both be used in the same report.
- c. It is not necessary or even desirable to report all four of the contours of different dose rates. Four are given to provide flexibility. (In the example only two are reported.)
- d. Letter Item X is used for chemical areas of tactical significance.
- e. When a contour closes to form a complete ring, the first coordinate is repeated at the end (see example for 300 r/hr).
- f. Colors when used in plotting, and when sending the report by means of a trace, are as follows:
 Red for 1000 r per hour
 Green for 300 r per hour
 Blue for 100 r per hour
 Black for 30 r per hour
 and Yellow for Chemical and Biological contamination.
- g. Contour lines will be annotated with the dose rates.
- h. Decay rates will be transmitted when requested.
- i. Users of NBC 5 are not confined solely to the use of the letter items shown in the examples; other letter items may be added at the users' discretion.

LETTER MEANING

Precedence
Date/Time (Z)
Security
From
To
Type of Report

EXAMPLE

NBC 5
(NUCLEAR)
A. 24

EXAMPLE

NBC 5
(TOXIC)
A. 1

- A. Strike Serial number(s)
 causing contamination
 (if known)
- O. Reference Date/Time for
 estimated contours (see
 note b, above) when not
 H + 1 hour
- S. Date/Time toxic contami-
 nation detected

S. 201045 Z

<i>LETTER</i>	<i>MEANING</i>	<i>EXAMPLE</i>	<i>EXAMPLE</i>
T.	H + 1 Date/Time	T. 201505 Z	
U.	1000 r/hr contour line co-ordinates		
V.	300 r/hr contour line co-ordinates	V. ND 651455 ND 810510 ND 821459 ND 651455	
W.	100 r/hr contour line coordinates	W. ND 604718 ND 991686 ND 114420 ND 595007	
X.	30 r/hr contour line co-ordinates, or area of tactical significance of TOX contamination (STATE IF TOXIC)		X. TOXIC ND 206991 ND 201575 ND 200787 ND 206991

PREDICTION

13. Procedures for predicting fallout are prescribed in Annex "D."

COORDINATION

14. NATO Major Subordinate Commanders will coordinate with National Military and Civil Defense Authorities to provide for interchange of information not only at Major Subordinate Command level but also at corresponding National Military District level and NATO Military units. This coordination will include arrangements with adjacent NATO Naval Commands.

POSITION REFERENCING

15. All ground locations given when using NBC forms will, whenever possible, be sent in Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) Grid Coordinates, except in areas to which the UTM Grid has not yet been extended. At sea, geographical coordinates will be used. In exceptional circumstances, GEOREF may be used. SOPs must cater for any situation where the use of differing systems may cause confusion.

APPENDIX I

EXAMPLE OF CLIMATIC SUMMARY

CLIMATIC SUMMARY FOR THE MONTH OF JULY 3d CORPS AREA

1. General Circulation

Generally air flows from the west and northwest. Occasionally warm, dry continental air from Russia causes a relatively intense, dry heat with temperatures 90° or more.

2. Temperatures

Afternoon temperatures generally are in the 70s and morning temperatures are in the 50s. There are occasional periods of hot, dry spells that last more than a week with temperatures in the 90s.

The highest temperature ever recorded was 101°F.

3. Thunderstorms

Occur frequently. They usually develop during the day and reach maximum intensity in the late afternoon and evening.

4. Surface Winds

Average wind speed is 5.8 knots. The most predominant direction is northeast, with a mean speed of 8.4 knots. The strongest mean wind is from the east-northeast 10.0 knots. Calms are frequent occurring 25.2 percent of the time, and usually in the early morning. Calms or near calms often last the whole day.

Percentage frequency of surface winds by direction for month of July

S	SSW	SW	WSW	W	WNW	NW	NNW	N	NNE	NE	ENE	E	ESE	SE	SSE
2.1	2.0	8.6	1.0	0.7	0.3	0.4	0.0	1.2	2.1	19.5	10.9	12.2	2.7	9.6	1.0

Average surface wind speed by direction for month of July

S	SSW	SW	WSW	W	WNW	NW	NNW	N	NNE	NE	ENE	E	ESE	SE	SSE
5.6	9.4	8.8	7.6	6.8	8.3	3.2	0.0	5.0	6.3	8.4	10.0	7.1	6.6	6.0	4.0

5. Cloudiness

Mornings frequently are clear. Clouds develop by noon and cloud cover reaches a maximum in the late afternoon, decreasing to nil just before sunset.

6. Visibility

Normal visibilities are 7 to 13 kilometers and

occasionally farther. Occasional haze may reduce visibility to about 3 kilometers.

7. Precipitation

Thunderstorms are the usual cause of precipitation. Occasionally a southwesterly wind will cause continued drizzle and low, overcast skies for 1 to 3 days. This is the only time low visibilities occur.

	Jun	Jul	Aug	Annual	Years recorded
Mean precipitation (inches)	2.56	2.48	2.36	26.97	40
Mean number of days with thunderstorm	4	4	3	18	11
Temperature (°F.)					
Absolute max	95	101	97	-----	10
Absolute min	50	43	43	-----	10
Mean daily max	71	74	73	-----	40
Mean daily min	51	55	53	-----	40
Mean number of days with fog	2	2	4	57	11

APPENDIX J

INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

Note. The titles of section I, II, III, IV, and V of this appendix correspond in sequence with the paragraphs of the form for the intelligence estimate as given in FM 101-5. The titles of paragraphs 2 to 18 correspond in sequence with subparagraphs of the intelligence estimate form.

Section I. THE MISSION

This is a statement of the assigned or assumed mission of the command or unit.

Section II. THE AREA OF OPERATIONS

1. General

- a. (1) Weather and terrain always are included in the characteristics of the area of operations discussed in paragraph 2 of the intelligence estimate. Other characteristics are included if they are important in selecting courses of action by either force to carry out their mission, assigned or assumed. Characteristics, other than weather and terrain, are of greater importance in areas of operations which have large civilian populations and to commands with extensive territorial or combat service support responsibilities.
- (2) The effects of each characteristic on nuclear weapons and chemical and biological agents are discussed when either combatant has the capability to use them. The discussion includes consideration of both the weapons effects and the effects on the delivery means.
- b. The discussion of the effects of each characteristic of the area of operations on possible enemy courses of action normally includes consideration of ability to attack and to defend. It also includes, as applicable, con-

sideration of effects on other possible enemy courses of action, such as delay, and on the enemy's possible use of particular weapons, methods, techniques, or forces.

c. The extent of consideration of the effects of each characteristic on broad friendly courses of action is limited by the mission. When the mission is offensive, the discussion does not include consideration of defensive courses of action. It does, however, include considerations of security.

2. Weather

The estimate usually includes a current weather forecast. When operations cover a long period, or are at a future time, climatic information may replace weather forecasts. Light data, in tabular form, include the beginning of morning nautical and civil twilights, the ending of evening nautical and civil twilights, moonrise, moonset, phase of the moon, and other information as required.

3. Terrain

The existing terrain situation usually is described in terms of the tactical aspects of the area, observation and fire, cover and concealment, obstacles, key terrain features, and avenues of approach. The discussion of each of these aspects is oriented on their influence on

the selection of broad courses of action by either force. For example, for a combat service support unit, the discussion of cover and concealment is oriented on their influence on those courses of action, including installation locations, required to accomplish the combat service support mission and on enemy forces which can interfere with the accomplishment of the mission. In combat service support unit intelligence estimates, discussion of key terrain features is omitted unless the enemy has the capability to seize or control terrain features

which will materially affect the accomplishment of the mission.

4. Other Characteristics

The following additional subparagraphs are considered, as pertinent, in separate subparagraphs: sociology, politics, economics, psychology, and other factors. Other factors may include such items as science, materiel, transportation, manpower, and hydrography. They are analyzed under the same headings as weather and terrain.

Section III. ENEMY SITUATION

5. Dispositions

Reference may be made to overlays or enemy situation maps or previously published documents.

6. Composition

a. This subparagraph lists the data used for later determination of the strength the enemy may use to prevent the accomplishment of the mission. It lists all the units, including insurgent and guerrilla-type forces, with identifications, that can affect the accomplishment of the mission. Included are such supporting units as air, nuclear delivery, and electronic warfare units that also can affect the accomplishment of the mission. In determining which enemy units can affect the accomplishment of the mission, time and space factors are considered.

b. This subparagraph also lists the guerrilla and paramilitary forces that are operating in the area. These are important considerations for combat service support units and in cold war and in limited war. Other forces, including long-range weapons delivery units, that may be used in support of the enemy ground elements in time to affect the accomplishment of the mission also are listed. Enemy units believed to be under control of the opposing comparable command but which are committed outside the zone of the friendly unit also are listed by tactical units. Elements of the opposing enemy force deployed in areas where time and space factors do not permit their use in time to affect the accomplishment of the mission are indicated specifically.

7. Strength

a. This subparagraph lists all the opposing enemy forces which can be logically employed against the command in time to affect the accomplishment of the mission. The total forces listed cannot exceed, but can equal or be less than, the total forces listed in the "composition" subparagraph.

b. Enemy strength is categorized as committed forces, reinforcements, air, nuclear, chemical, and biological warfare. Air, nuclear, chemical, or biological warfare units are omitted as appropriate, when the enemy lacks such capabilities to interfere with the accomplishment of the mission.

8. Committed Forces

a. Committed forces are those enemy ground units in contact, their immediate reserves, and supporting ground fire units, whose area of employment is not expected to change to counter the specific course of action selected by the friendly commander. Committed forces may change disposition within their area of employment, but no significant delay is involved in their employment. Designation of enemy forces as committed forces depends primarily upon their disposition, location at the time of the estimate, and the echelon at which the estimate is being prepared. If there is doubt whether an enemy unit is a committed force, it is considered as a reinforcement (para 9, this app). This reduces the risk of the friendly command being surprised.

b. Usually a G2 accounts for committed enemy forces by the size unit used to oppose

the friendly size unit used in his headquarters as a basis for planning and conducting operations. For example, against Aggressor organized as given in FM 30-102, a division G2 usually counts committed forces in terms of battalions; a corps G2 in terms of regiments; and field army and higher headquarters, in terms of divisions. At headquarters above field army a statement of the number of armies and army groups the enemy has committed also is included. For example, "The committed forces facing this army group consist of 1 army group (3 combined arms armies with a total of 11 motorized rifle divisions and 3 tank divisions) * * *." Where the committed forces, such as guerrillas, do not have a known organization, the strength is stated in total numbers.

c. Illustrative example:

- (1) Situation. See figure 29. The 20th Inf Div, an interior division, is advancing to the south. The advance of the division has been stopped by elements of two reinforced mechanized rifle regiments of the Aggressor 17th Mech Rifle Div. Each of these 2 mechanized rifle regiments has 2 mechanized rifle battalions (reinforced) in contact and 1 mechanized rifle battalion (reinforced) in regimental reserve. The third mechanized rifle regiment of this division is in contact with the 72d Inf Div on the flank of the 20th Inf Div. About 25 miles in rear of the 17th Mech Rifle Div, and in the area of the 20th Inf Div objective, 2 mechanized rifle regiments of the Aggressor 11th Mech Rifle Div are preparing field fortifications.
- (2) Discussion. Only the 4 committed battalions (those in contact) of the 2 mechanized rifle regiments in contact with the 20th Inf Div are considered as committed forces by the division G2. Regardless of the specific courses of action selected by the commander of the 20th Inf Div to continue the advance, the area of employment of these four battalions in contact will not change appreciably, even if they shift subordinate elements within

their areas. Their reserve battalions can be employed in differing areas. The battalions of the 17th Mech Rifle Div are not considered as committed forces as they are not launched in action against the 20th Inf Div. The two regiments of the 11th Mech Rifle Div are not considered as committed forces because they are not committed against the 20th Inf Div and the area of their commitment, considering their present location, may depend on particular courses of action selected by the commanders of the 20th Inf Div and the adjacent divisions, and enemy plans. At this time, the enemy commander is free to commit all or part of them against the 20th Inf Div or adjacent divisions, at various points subject to time and space consideration. The regiment of the 17th Mech Rifle Div in contact with the 72d Inf Div is mentioned in the "composition" subparagraph. Only the reserve battalion is mentioned in the reinforcement portion of the strength subparagraph because the other two battalions are committed outside the zone of the 20th Inf Div.

d. Illustrative example:

- (1) Situation. The 20th Inf Div is attached to the east (fig. 30).
- (2) Discussion. The committed forces are 1 battalion of the 3d Mech Rifle Regt, 3 battalions of the 5th Mech Rifle Regt, and 1 battalion of the 6th Mech Rifle Regt. The 1st Bn of the Aggressor 3d Mech Rifle Regt is, from its location, in regimental reserve and has not been committed. As all battalions of the 5th Mech Rifle Regt appear to be committed against the 20th Inf Div, they are committed forces. The 2d Bn of the 6th Mech Rifle Regt on the south is, from its location, the reserve of the 6th Mech Rifle Regt and has not been committed. The other units not discussed are not committed forces because they are not committed against the 20th Inf Div and their area of commitment depends





Figure 29. Schematic sketch.



on the courses of action selected by the commanders of the 20th Inf Div and the adjacent divisions and enemy plans.

e. The brigade S2 considers as committed forces—

- (1) Enemy rifle, tank or reconnaissance companies in contact with the brigade, plus
- (2) Their reserves at the next higher echelon; i.e., normally the reserve company of the enemy rifle battalion in contact.
- (3) Although the enemy company is the basic size unit used by the brigade S2 in accounting for committed forces, he will also account for smaller units which have been located as separately employed; e.g., tank platoons.

f. The battalion S2 considers as committed forces—

- (1) Enemy rifle, tank or reconnaissance platoons in contact with the battalion, plus
- (2) Their reserves at the next higher echelon; i.e., normally the reserve platoon of the enemy rifle company in contact.
- (3) Although the enemy platoon is the basic unit used by the battalion S2 in accounting for committed forces, frequently available intelligence does not enable the individual platoons composing an enemy company to be located. Therefore, the battalion S2 will consider that a located enemy company normally consists of three platoons; a company minus consists of two platoons.

g. The designation of enemy units as committed forces depends primarily on their disposition and location at the time the estimate is made. Enemy unit identification may facilitate determining if a particular unit is the reserve of elements in contact with the brigade or battalion.

h. When an enemy unit of the size used in accounting for committed forces is in contact with two adjacent friendly units, the entire enemy unit is considered to be committed by

the S2 of both friendly units. For example, if an enemy platoon is in contact with two adjacent U.S. battalions, both battalion S2 consider the entire platoon as committed against their respective battalions. This points up the need for identification computations of enemy strength at each echelon.

i. All ground fire support weapons organic to the enemy rifle battalion or regiment are referred to as "normal regimental artillery" and are always considered as in support of committed forces. That is, each committed unit is assumed to have available to it, its normal proportion of the available supporting weapons organic to the regiment. These weapons therefore need not be enumerated. Fire support weapons not organic to the enemy rifle battalion or regiment which can be identified as within supporting range are enumerated as in support of committed forces. In the event that the forces committed against the brigade or battalion have no known TOE: i.e., "volunteer" or irregular type units, all fire support weapons which can be identified are enumerated.

j. When attacking U.S. Forces are in contact with enemy security elements; e.g., forces on the enemy combat outpost line, these security elements are normally considered "reinforcements" until contact with these forces is made.

k. In addition to determining the enemy's ground combat unit strength in terms of committed forces and reinforcements, the S2 also considers the enemy's air and nuclear weapons strength. However, as estimates of enemy air, nuclear, chemical and biological warfare strength are usually prepared only at field army level and higher, the S2 simply restates these capabilities in his estimate.

l. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE #1.

- (1) SITUATION: 1st Brigade, 21st Infantry Division, with 1st Battalion, 69th Infantry and 1st Battalion, 70th Infantry forward, is defending positions as indicated on figure 31. Reports from 21st Inf Div indicate that Aggressor has an unknown number of air and nuclear weapons available.
- (2) S2, 1st Bde determines Aggressor




Figure 31. Schematic sketch.

strength now opposing the brigade as follows:

- (a) Committed Forces: 1st Bde is opposed by three mechanized companies, one reconnaissance platoon and one medium tank company (10 tanks), supported by normal regimental artillery, plus two 160mm mortars, six 122mm howitzers, six 100mm guns and all available air and nuclear weapons.
- (b) Reinforcements: Aggressor reinforcement available for commitment in the sector of 1st Bde is: unidentified mechanized battalion located vicinity HILL 250.
- (c) Discussion: The three mechanized platoons northwest of HIGHWAY 82 BRIDGE are disposed so as to logically constitute one mechanized rifle company in contact with, and therefore committed against 1st Bde. The reconnaissance platoon southwest of HILL 200 and the mechanized rifle company northeast of HIGHWAY 82 BRIDGE are in contact with, and therefore committed against both 1st Bde and its respective adjacent brigades. The mechanized company immediately south of CHIGGER Woods is located so as to logically be the reserve company of an enemy battalion in contact with 1st Bde and is therefore committed. The mechanized companies of the 25th and 23d regiments, located to the east and west of the sector of the 1st Bde are totally committed against adjacent brigades and are therefore neither committed nor available as reinforcements against 1st Bde, 21st Inf Div. Ten medium tanks are located in the vicinity of the mechanized rifle companies committed against 1st Bde and are therefore also committed. S2, 1st Bde would be equally correct to account for these committed medium tanks as "three medium tank platoons" or "ten medium tanks." The medium

and light tanks (3 each) organic to the reconnaissance company, although not specifically located at this time, are accounted for as normal components of "one reconnaissance company." The 107mm recoilless gun, 85mm SP gun and 120mm mortars located north of the MUDDY River are part of the "normal regimental artillery" in support of committed forces.

- 1. The 160mm mortars, 100mm guns and 122mm howitzers are not organic to the Aggressor regiment or battalion and are therefore *not* part of the "normal regimental artillery." However, they are within supporting range and are therefore *enumerated* as in support of committed forces. The enemy also has an unknown number of air and nuclear weapons which can be employed in support of committed forces.
 - 2. Using the data in FM 30-102 it can be determined that a mechanized rifle battalion could move from HILL 250 to the bridge across the ZILCH River, on carriers, in daylight, cross country in approximately 30 minutes after starting movement. Therefore, the uncommitted mechanized battalion located vic HILL 250, could logically be employed against 1st Bde in time to affect the accomplishment of the brigade mission and is therefore considered as a reinforcement.
- (3) S2, 1-69 Inf determines Aggressor strength now opposing the battalion as follows:
- (a) Committed Forces: 1-69 Inf is opposed by two mechanized platoons, one reconnaissance platoon and one medium tank platoon, supported by normal regimental artillery, plus two 160mm mortars, six 122mm howitzers, six 100mm guns and all available air and nuclear weapons.

- (b) Reinforcements: Aggressor reinforcements available for commitment in the sector of 1-69 Inf are: Unidentified mechanized battalion located vic HILL 250 and unidentified mechanized company and medium tank platoon located vic CHIGGER Woods.
- (c) Discussion: One mechanized rifle platoon is in contact with and therefore committed against 1-69 Inf. The mechanized rifle platoon north of boundary 1-69 Inf—1-70 Inf is located so as to logically be the reserve platoon of a company in contact and is therefore committed against both 1-69 Inf and 1-70 Inf. The medium tank platoon in the same vicinity is in contact with and therefore committed against both 1-69 Inf and 1-70 Inf. S2, 1-69 Inf considers all of the recon platoon in contact because this is the size force for which the battalion S2 uses for computation of enemy strength. None of the tanks organic to this platoon have been specifically located at this time; however, they are accounted for as a normal component of the reconnaissance platoon. The mechanized rifle company and tank platoon located vic CHIGGER Woods which are considered as committed by S2, 1st Bde could logically be employed against 1-69 Inf in time to affect the accomplishment of the battalion mission and are therefore considered as reinforcements. The discussion above (para 1 (2) (c)), concerning the battalion vic HILL 250, the "normal regimental artillery" and nonorganic weapons in support of committed forces applies also to the determination by S2, 1-69 Inf.
- (4) S2, 1-70 Inf determines Aggressor strength now opposing the battalion as follows:
- (a) Committed Forces: 1-70 Inf is opposed by four mechanized platoons and two medium tank platoons supported by normal regimental artillery, plus two 160mm mortars, six 122mm howitzers, six 100mm guns and all available air and nuclear weapons.
- (b) Reinforcements: Aggressor reinforcements available for commitment in the sector of 1-70 Inf are: Unidentified mechanized rifle battalion located vic HILL 250 and unidentified mechanized company and medium tank platoon located vic CHIGGER Woods.
- (c) Discussion: S2, 1-70 Inf considers the individually located mechanized platoons vic boundary 1-69 Inf—1-70 Inf in the same manner as does S2, 1-69 Inf. The mechanized company northeast of HIGHWAY 82 BRIDGE is considered similarly to the manner in which S2, 1-69 considered the reconnaissance company; i.e., a mechanized rifle company consists of three mechanized platoons, two of which are estimated as committed against 1-70 Inf. (S2, 4-80 Mech would also consider two of these platoons to be committed against his battalion.) The discussion above (para 1 (2) (c) and (3) (c)) concerning reinforcements and supporting fires applies also in the determination by S2, 1-70 Inf.

9. Reinforcements

a. Reinforcements are those enemy forces whose area of possible employment against the friendly force depends on the friendly selection of a specific course of action and enemy plans. Reinforcements include all known enemy forces which are neither committed against a friendly force nor committed outside the friendly zone or sector, but which can reasonably be considered capable of closing with the friendly force in time to affect the accomplishment of the mission. All uncommitted enemy forces are considered as reinforcements if they can be committed in time to affect the accomplishment of its mission.

b. Illustrative example:

- (1) Situation. Same as described in paragraph 8c(1), this appendix.
- (2) Discussion. The 2 regiments of the Aggressor 11th Mech Rifle Div and the 3 mechanized rifle battalions apparently in regimental reserve are considered as reinforcements. These units are not committed against the friendly force and can be committed in time to affect the mission of the 20th Inf Div. Although the two regiments of the 11th Mech Rifle Div are digging field fortifications in the vicinity of the division objective, the enemy commander can employ them against the 20th Inf Div at various times and places in time to affect the accomplishment of the mission. The enemy also can employ these units against the divisions adjacent to the 20th Inf Div.

c. Illustrative example:

- (1) Situation. See figure 30.
- (2) Discussion. The two Aggressor rifle regiments in the assembly area astride the 20th Inf Div north boundary, the Aggressor rifle regiment south of the south boundary and the two uncommitted battalions forward, are reinforcements. None of these units is committed. From their locations and dispositions, it is apparent that they are the reserves of the two Aggressor divisions and the reserves of the regiments committed against the 20th Inf Div. Depending on the course of action selected by the commander of the 20th Inf Div and the enemy plans, all or part of these Aggressor elements can be employed against the 20th Inf Div at various times and places, in time to affect the accomplishment of the division mission.

d. Reinforcements are stated in convenient and meaningful terms. For example, if the opposing division has a rifle regiment in reserve, this reinforcement is referred to as a "rifle regiment," rather than "three rifle battalions." When enemy units, either committed forces or reinforcements are very much under-

strength, the estimated remaining strength is expressed. Two divisions, each at half strength, are usually more formidable than a single division at full strength because of the added flexibility of employment and the additional combat support probably available. A half strength field artillery battalion is more than half as effective as a full strength battalion.

10. Air

The enemy air capability is based upon numbers of enemy aircraft within operational radius, maintenance facilities, expected attrition, the ground tactical situation, and other factors. The supporting tactical air force furnishes intelligence on the number of sorties, by type, which the enemy can be expected to make within the field army or comparable areas. The estimate usually is not prorated below the field army level. Usually no attempt is made to calculate the number of sorties the enemy can or may make against a subordinate command of the field army or communication zone section. Corps, division, and communication zone section intelligence officers usually quote the estimate furnished by the higher headquarters in stating enemy air capabilities. For example, a corps or division G2 might state, "30th Army estimates that the enemy can be expected to attack within the army area with as many as 150 fighter, 100 attack, and 75 bomber sorties daily. By massing all aircraft within operational radius, the enemy can make a maximum of 250 fighter, 300 attack, and 250 bomber sorties daily."

11. Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Warfare

a. Estimates of these enemy capabilities usually are prepared at field army and higher headquarters. Units below field army level usually lack the means to gather the information to make such estimates, and use the estimates of the higher headquarters, modifying them with available information.

b. The determination of enemy nuclear, chemical, and biological warfare capabilities is based primarily on estimates of numbers and types of weapons and amount and types of agents available, knowledge of enemy doctrine, past experience, and estimates of enemy capa-

bilities involving the employment of ground troops. As with the enemy air capability, it is rarely feasible to estimate what proportion of the available enemy nuclear or CB effort may be used against a division or corps within a field army or a command in the communication zone. It is also rarely feasible to estimate the number of nuclear weapons the enemy is capable of using within a period as short as one day. The period selected is a month or other period depending on the available information and past experience.

c. The statement of the enemy capabilities to use chemical and biological warfare agents includes, if known, the amount type, and delivery means of available chemical and biological munitions.

12. Recent and Present Significant Activities

This paragraph summarizes recent and current enemy activities which may point to future enemy actions. Significant enemy failures to take actions also are listed. For example, if the enemy is apparently defending behind a river obstacle but has failed to destroy certain bridges, the omission is listed as a significant activity. Any basis for belief that the enemy has specific knowledge of the friendly situation or intentions also is listed. For example, mention is made of capture by the enemy of an operation order, or compromise of current signal operation instructions of cover and deception operations.

13. Peculiarities and Weaknesses

a. This paragraph lists peculiarities and weaknesses and briefly discusses each, indicating the extent to which it is a vulnerability and how the selection of broad friendly courses of action are affected. For example, if the enemy has an open flank, the fact is stated in the "operations" part of the subparagraph and the extent to which the open flank constitutes an exploitable vulnerability is discussed briefly. If enemy reserves are small and are poorly positioned to extend the flank, the vulnerability may be great. If the enemy reserves are large and in position to extend the flank or to counterattack an enveloping force, the vulnerability is probably insignificant. The G2 might state it as, "The enemy north flank is open. Avail-

able reserves are adequate to extend this flank a distance of only about 3,000 meters. Positions to extend the flank have not been prepared. The enemy is vulnerable to a flank attack." Conversely, it might be stated as, "The enemy north flank is open. However, available reserves are adequate either to extend this flank beyond our zone, or to counterattack an enveloping force. Positions suitable to block an attempted envelopment have been prepared as shown on the enemy situation map." In the first case, the enemy's vulnerability to a flank attack is carried forward to the "Conclusions" paragraph of the intelligence estimate. In the second case, the open flank apparently is not a vulnerability, and is not carried any further. Another example, if the guerrilla forces are poorly equipped with anti-tank means of all types, the fact is stated in the "logistics" part of the subparagraph and the extent to which this is an exploitable vulnerability is discussed briefly. The intelligence officer might state, "The guerrilla forces in our area are poorly equipped with antitank means. They cannot effectively defend against armored vehicles." The inability to defend against armored vehicles is carried forward to the "Conclusions" paragraph as a vulnerability.

b. Typical peculiarities and weaknesses include—

(1) Personnel.

Replacement situation (shortages or overages, particularly in specialists).

Morale less than excellent, or exceptionally high. Disproportionate number of very young or very old men.

High rate of sickness.

Percentage of authorized strength, if less than 80 percent.

(2) Intelligence.

Susceptibility to deception or neutralization of certain enemy information collecting agencies.

Overdependence on one or more categories of information sources.

Ineffectiveness of enemy intelligence.

(3) Operations.

Habitual repetition of certain schemes of maneuver, or unconventional patterns of operations.

- Faulty organization of the ground.
- Faulty disposition of reserves.
- Susceptibility to electronic counter-measures.
- Inadequate troop training, especially in defense against nuclear weapons or chemical and biological agents.
- Lack of adequate mobility.
- Inadequate air or artillery support, or nuclear weapons delivery systems.
- Pronounced failure to disperse and dig in.
- Habitual failure to attack certain types of targets.

(4) *Logistics.*

- Shortages or inadequacies of particular supplies and materiel, including nuclear weapons.
- Status of equipment, if less than 80 per cent.
- Large concentrations of supplies.

- Location of vulnerable points and bottlenecks in the logistics system or lines of communication.

- Inability to resupply during action.

- Failure to equip troops with protective masks or protective clothing.

(5) *Civil affairs.*

- Hostile attitude toward the civil populace, or of the civil populace toward the enemy.

- Inadequacies in the control of civil communications, to include movement of civilians.

(6) *Personalities.*

- Peculiarities or weaknesses of the enemy commander, major subordinate commanders, or principal staff officers, as disclosed by or deduced from their past performance, education, politics, experience, or other basis.

Section IV. ENEMY CAPABILITIES

14. Enumeration

This paragraph lists the enemy capabilities. Enemy capabilities are courses of action which the enemy can adopt and which will influence the accomplishment of the friendly mission, either favorably or unfavorably. A properly stated enemy capability indicates what the enemy can do, when he can do it, where he can do it, and in what strength he can do it. For example, "Attack (what) now (when) along our front (where) the five motorized rifle battalions supported by all available nuclear weapons, artillery and air (strength)." Another example, "Conduct harassing operations (what) at any time (when) in our area (where) with about 200 guerrillas equipped only with small arms (strength)." For determination of enemy capabilities see paragraphs 19 through 25, this appendix.

15. Analysis and Discussion

a. The evidence considered in the analysis and discussion of enemy capabilities includes characteristics of the area of operation and positive or negative evidence of enemy activity. A major obstacle across part of the friendly area is evidence that attack elsewhere is more

likely. Low ceilings and low visibility are evidence that the enemy may not use all his available aircraft. Open, flat areas without any appreciable cover are evidence that the enemy may not use guerrilla or infiltration forces.

b. In analyzing and discussing each enemy capability, or appropriate combination, the intelligence officer judges from the enemy point of view the advantage or disadvantage in adopting the capability. In making this judgment, the G2 also considers the enemy doctrine and practices and the ultimate results of adoption or rejection of the particular capability. For example, "The enemy employment of the unidentified tank division at TNOMYEH will deprive him of the reserves to counterattack a penetration by either of the two friendly divisions to our south. Commitment of this tank division too early will result in the later defeat of the enemy."

c. If there is no evidence of the enemy possible adoption of a particular capability, and the capability does not represent a major threat to the accomplishment of the mission, the intelligence officer does not judge it. For example, the enemy usually can withdraw beyond our objective. Ordinarily, such withdrawal is

not a threat to the accomplishment of the mission. If there is no evidence that the enemy may withdraw, a statement, of conclusions is

omitted. The intelligence officer merely states, "There is no indication of withdrawal."

Section V. CONCLUSIONS

16. Effects of the Area on Our Courses of Action

For a defense mission, this conclusion identifies the best defense area(s) and the best avenues of approach into the defense sector. For an offensive mission, the conclusion describes the best avenues of approach to the objective(s).

17. Probable Courses of Action

a. The determination of probable enemy courses of action is fully justified by the previous analysis and discussion of enemy capabilities. In this determination, consideration also is given to how the enemy views his own vulnerabilities as indicated by his doctrine, past experiences, and personality of the enemy commander. Consideration also is given to previous enemy selection of courses of action under similar circumstances. The determination is objective and not a guess at what the enemy will do. It is the conclusion, based on the available evidence, what he is most likely to do.

b. In determining the relative probability of adoption of enemy courses of action, the intelligence officer avoids conclusions based on our doctrines and practices. The available evidence considered in the determination includes the enemy doctrine and practices as well as positive or negative enemy activity. If the available evidence of enemy activity is not definitive enough alone to justify selection of an enemy course of action most probable of adoption, the intelligence officer selects one based on the characteristics of the area of operations, enemy doctrine, enemy practices, and the available evidence. Conclusions reached on this basis are so indicated to the commander.

c. In the statement of course of action most likely of adoption by the enemy, several capabilities may be combined for brevity and clarity. All the enemy capabilities combined in one statement must be capable of being implemented at the same time. For example, the

most probable enemy course of action may be, "Attack to envelop our north flank reinforced by his corps reserve and using all available nuclear weapons, artillery, and air support and conduct harassing operations in our rear areas with guerrillas and infiltrating forces."

d. If more than one enemy course of action is stated, they are listed in the order of their relative probability of action.

18. Enemy Vulnerabilities

a. An enemy vulnerability is any condition or circumstance of the enemy situation or the area of operations which makes the enemy especially liable to damage, deception, or defeat. In this paragraph, only those enemy vulnerabilities which may be exploited are considered. In studying the enemy peculiarities and weaknesses to determine such vulnerabilities, the characteristics of the area of operations, all aspects of the enemy situation, and the enemy's doctrine and practices are considered. Only actual vulnerabilities are presented. An open north flank which the enemy cannot, with available forces, extend or refuse, is a vulnerability. If, however, the enemy has reserves which can readily extend the flank to an impassable obstacle, or counterattack to pin enveloping troops against that obstacle, the open flank is a vulnerability only if the enemy reserves are destroyed. In such a case the open flank is mentioned as a possible vulnerability subject to destruction of the enemy reserves.

b. Each exploitable enemy vulnerability is listed as a brief statement of the effect of the vulnerability rather than a repetition of the peculiarity or weakness. For example, "Shortage of antitank means" is not stated. Instead, the effect of that weakness is given by stating, "Limited capability to oppose armored vehicles." The vulnerability discussed in *a* above, could be stated as, "Enemy north flank open to envelopment subject to destruction of enemy reserves at ***." The order of listing vulnerabilities does not matter.

c. In determining the enemy vulnerabilities to list, the G2 considers the feasibility of their exploitation by his own, higher, and subordinate commanders. However, recommendation to the commander of courses of action to be adopted is the responsibility of the G3. The listing of enemy vulnerabilities does not mean

that they can all be exploited at the same time. Frequently, the exploitation of one vulnerability precludes the exploitation of another vulnerability. For example, the enemy may be vulnerable to both a night penetration and a daytime flank envelopment.

Section VI. DETERMINATION OF ENEMY CAPABILITIES

19. General

a. Commanders base plans and actions upon estimates of enemy capabilities and the probability of their adoption. Enemy capabilities can be estimated objectively because they are based upon knowledge of the area of operations, enemy situation, enemy doctrine, and time and space factors. Indications of enemy intentions may be a consideration; however, intentions can seldom be determined. The enemy commander may change his mind or his higher commanders may change his orders. The enemy may practice cover and deception to indicate actions different from those which he actually intends.

b. In considering enemy capabilities, actions which are grossly disadvantageous to the enemy, or unreasonable, are not included. For example, the enemy may be physically capable of disengaging troops committed outside our zone in order to employ them against us. However, in most circumstances the G2 does not consider this to be a capability because it is unreasonable.

20. The "What" of an Enemy Capability

a. Four general tactical operations are usually possible. The enemy can attack, defend, or withdraw, and can usually reinforce his committed troops. These operations are usually divisible into a variety of specific courses of action. For example, an attack may be a penetration, an envelopment, or a turning movement. A defense may be in one position or in successive positions, and may be either static or mobile.

b. The specific activities which the enemy can physically adopt depend upon the available means and conditions under which those means can be used. Consequently, the "what" of each of the enemy's capabilities is determined by

considering the characteristics of the area of operations, the order of battle of the opposing forces, and time and space factors. Study of the characteristics of the area of operations, our situation, and the means available to the enemy, usually indicates that the enemy is physically capable of certain actions, but that others are impracticable. For example, the enemy can envelope only when we have an assailable flank, and can conduct airborne operations only when he has the necessary troops and aircraft.

21. The "When" of an Enemy Capability

a. The time at which the enemy can put into effect any of his capabilities depends upon the dispositions of his forces and equipment. Committed forces can be employed without significant delay, and can attack or defend now. Forces disposed at some distance behind the edge of the battle area cannot be committed immediately; they must first be moved to the place of employment. Complicated weapons systems, such as long range missiles, may require time to set up after reaching launching sites before missiles can be fired.

b. An enemy capability involving displacement of forces cannot be put into effect until some time after the force has started to move. Reserves cannot reinforce an attack or defense until they have been moved to appropriate locations such as attack positions or forward assembly areas. Consequently, time and space factors are computed in determining the "when" of a capability involving the displacement of forces or equipment. These computations are discussed in paragraph 25, this appendix.

c. References to "when" usually are omitted from a statement of the enemy air, nuclear, chemical, and biological capabilities and other

capabilities if "at any time" is intended. References to "when" usually are omitted from statements of enemy capabilities pertaining to withdrawal and delay in successive positions as "at any time" is implied. Such actions can be started at any time. In withdrawal capabilities, reference may be made to the time of the start of the withdrawal. For example, "The enemy can withdraw beyond our objective at any time before our attack."

22. The "Where" of an Enemy Capability

a. The "where" of an enemy capability depends upon the weather, terrain, and disposition of his forces. Under existing and predictable conditions of weather, the terrain may provide avenues of approach into our position from the front, flanks, or rear. Conversely, it may prevent the enemy's use of armored, mechanized, or airborne forces in certain areas. Cross compartments may provide the enemy with suitable defense or delaying positions. The existence of suitable objectives, drop or land zones, indicates where airborne forces may be employed. The presence of suitable beaches suggests where enemy amphibious forces may land. The locations of adequate assembly areas and attack positions indicate where enemy missile launchers may be located. Accordingly, the intelligence officer determines the "where" of each enemy capability through analysis and integration of the characteristics of the area of operations with the situations of the opposing forces. If the enemy is physically capable of launching an attack, the G2 asks himself in effect, "Where can he do it?" If the enemy defends, he asks, "Where are suitable defensive positions and to what places must reinforcements be moved before they can be committed?" If the enemy delays in successive positions, he asks, "Where are the favorable delaying positions?"

b. Examples.

- (1) If the enemy can attack, and the situation and the area of operations indicate that the attack may strike anywhere along our front, the partially stated enemy capability becomes: "Attack along our front ***." In other circumstances, enemy capabilities, stated in part, may include: "Attack to envelop our north flank ***," or

"Attack in the direction BEIRUT-ACRE," or "Land (amphibious or airborne) forces in the vicinity of ***."

- (2) Partial statements of an enemy defense capability may include: "Defend in his present position ***," or "Defend the line of the OB River ***."
- (3) Delay capabilities may include: "Delay in present and successive positions to the line of the HAN River ***," or "Delay along the general lines PAULUS-JOANA, PENNYAWILL-THIR, ***."
- (4) Partial statements of the enemy's reinforcement capability may include: "Reinforcement an envelopment of our north flank ***," or "Reinforcement his defense of the line ***."

23. The "In What Strength" of an Enemy Capability

a. The strength the enemy can use in any particular capability depends primarily upon the composition, disposition, and strength of his available forces. Order of battle intelligence furnishes necessary data.

b. Forces which the enemy has committed against us can be employed in almost any capability the enemy chooses to adopt. If six mechanized rifle battalions are committed against a division, the enemy can attack with six mechanized rifle battalions, supported by all available artillery, air, and nuclear weapons, etc. He also can defend in his present position with the same six battalions and the same support. In addition to the forces committed, the enemy also can use the reserves available at any echelon. If the enemy has six battalions committed and a regiment in reserve, he usually can reinforce either his attack or his defense with the reserve regiment. A partial statement of this capability could be, "Attack now to envelop our north flank with six mechanized rifle battalions supported by all available artillery, and nuclear weapons, air, reinforced by one mechanized rifle regiment at the following times and places ***."

c. The statement of strength is usually confined to close combat units such as infantry, armor, guerrilla, and mechanized (including reconnaissance) units and their combat support means such as artillery, air, nuclear weapons,

and chemical agents. The usual unit of enemy strength is the battalion or a larger unit. Guerilla strength is expressed in total numbers, if more appropriate. Units smaller than the battalion may be used, if appropriate. The number and details of artillery, air, and similar units, available to support the enemy's operations, are specified in the "strength" subparagraph of the intelligence estimate and are usually not repeated in the statement of a capability involving support of close combat units. The numbers and types of sorties or weapons such units can deliver are usually stated in detail only in a separate capability distinct from support of close combat units.

d. Reference to "in what strength" usually is omitted in the statement of enemy capabilities for withdrawal and delay in successive positions capabilities as it is implied that such actions involve all the available forces.

24. Capabilities in Support of Combat Forces

a. Some enemy capabilities refer specifically to the support of close combat forces rather than to the capabilities of close combat units. Such capabilities include air, nuclear and chemical and biological warfare, cover and deception, and electronic warfare capabilities.

b. Enemy combat support capabilities, such as use of electronic warfare and cover and deception, are stated when enemy implementation of such activities will significantly affect the accomplishment of the friendly mission. Statements of such capabilities include, when the capability can be implemented, the area over which the capability will be effective and the enemy resources available or the results that can be accomplished. The "where" is omitted if it is meant anywhere throughout the unit area of operations. For example, "Start cover and deception operations at any time to include initiative and manipulative transmissions and use of special units capable of depicting two divisions, either tank or mechanized rifle," or "Aggressor can intercept and jam our electromagnetic radiations at any time from any areas where he has line of sight to our transmitters and to the receivers to be jammed."

25. Reinforcement Capabilities

a. The time required for an enemy to move

troops from one place to another and then commit them to action is determined on the basis of factors derived from careful analysis of past similar enemy movements. The considerations described below are applicable in training and as a point of departure for the development of experience factors in operations against an enemy force. See FM 30-102 for Aggressor troop movements.

b. To determine the time when the enemy can employ an uncommitted unit, the travel time from the unit location to a logical point where the unit can be committed is calculated. To the travel time is added the closing time (time length of column). Except when observation of enemy units is continuous, it is assumed that any unit could have started to move immediately after its last reported location. Therefore, to determine the earliest time at which the enemy can reinforce, it is only necessary to add the travel plus closing time to the time last seen. For example, if an enemy reinforcement was last seen at 0800 hours and it can be employed to envelop our north flank one hour after starting movement, it is assumed that the attack can be launched as early as 0900 hours (0800 plus one hour). In the exceptional case involving piecemeal commitment of enemy reinforcements, travel time only is considered. Forces which are committed piecemeal do not close into an assembly area or attack position.

c. Because observation of reinforcements is rarely continuous, statements of enemy reinforcing capabilities preferably include both the earliest time and the time after starting movement when the reinforcement can be accomplished. For example, "The enemy can reinforce his attack with the 45th Mech Rifle Regt at 0900 hours, or one hour after starting movement." When the time since the last report is greater than the after starting movement time, only the after starting movement time is given. For example, "The enemy can reinforce his attack with the 45th Mech Rifle Regt now, or one hour after starting movement." When the number of reinforcements is large, or the enemy is capable of reinforcing in several areas, reinforcing capabilities are presented in tabular form. For example, the enemy can reinforce his attack or his defense with all or part of the

following units at the places and times indicated below:

Unit	Place	Motor	Foot
45th Mech Rifle Regt -----	RJ 638	Now or 1 hr after starting movement.	091205 Jun or 4 hr 5 min after starting movement.
	RJ 888	090930 Jun or 1 hr 30 min after starting movement.	091605 Jun or 3 hr 5 min after starting movement.
37th Mech Rifle Regt -----	RJ 638	091000 Jun or 2 hr after starting movement.	100740 Jun or 23 hr 40 min after starting movement.
	RJ 888	090920 Jun or 1 hr 20 min after starting movement.	091430 Jun or 6 hr 30 min after starting movement.

d. In selecting a logical point for reinforcement, the effect of such characteristics of the area of operations as avenues of approach and logical enemy reactions to friendly course of action are considered. For reinforcement of an attack capability, attack positions are selected for battalions and regiments and forward assembly areas for division and larger units. For units moving to reinforce a defense, defense or counterattack positions are selected. For movements by aircraft, logical landing or drop zones from which the enemy forces can materially affect the accomplishment of the mission are selected.

e. The time required by the enemy to entruck, detruck, issue extra ammunition, make detailed reconnaissance, issue orders, deploy, or move from an attack position to a line of departure, is not considered because all may be completed before starting the operation or simultaneously with the movement.

f. The guidance below is applicable until experience factors against a particular enemy are developed.

- (1) Compute foot marching time for all appropriate reinforcements. Compute motor movement time only for distance greater than 5 miles. If a unit is observed in trucks, compute only the motor movement time.

- (2) Consider a foot march of more than 20 miles as a forced march. Consider a motor movement of more than 175 miles as a forced march for mechanized infantry units, and a movement of more than 140 miles as a forced march for armored, tank, and mechanized units.
- (3) At the beginning of morning nautical twilight (BMNT), if the column is not closing, change the rate of march from night to day. If the column is closing at BMNT, close the column at the night rate of march. At the end of evening nautical twilight (EENT), if the column is not closing, change the rate of march from day to night. If the column is closing at EENT, close the column at the day rate of march.
- (4) To move an enemy infantry battalion, move and close the entire unit. To move a unit of regimental or larger size, move and close two-thirds of the combat elements, that is, 2 battalions of an infantry regiment, 2 regiments of an infantry division. To move a U.S. type armored division, or other unit with a similar flexible organization, move and close two-thirds of the entire division.

APPENDIX K

ENEMY STRENGTH COMPUTATION

1. General

a. Enemy strength is seldom constant in combat. It undergoes continuous fluctuation through casualties and subsequent replacements. This inherent fluctuation establishes the basic premise that strength figures computed on any military force not under our control can only be approximations.

b. Enemy strength is categorized as committed forces, reinforcements, air, and capability to employ nuclear weapons and CBR agents. Enemy strength is normally presented in terms of numerical strength and strength by type of unit. Nuclear weapons are expressed in terms of total number and size of weapons available; CBR agents are expressed in terms of weight and type of agent that can be employed in a given time frame.

2. Definitions

a. Numerical strength is the expression of a unit or force in terms of numbers of personnel, weapons, and equipment.

b. Initial strength of an enemy unit or force comprises the number of personnel, weapons, and equipment authorized by established and approved tables of organization and equipment (TOE).

c. Effective strength of an enemy unit or force consists of that part, including logistical components, of its initial strength which is currently capable of combat employment.

d. Strength by type unit is the expression of units or forces in terms of numbers of units by type, such as infantry, armor, artillery, and air.

3. Numerical Strength Computation (STANAG 2706)

a. Prior to and at the onset of hostilities, the initial compilation of effective strength is nor-

mally compiled from intelligence estimates made at theater level, based upon initial strength and such other factors as—

- (1) The degree to which the enemy unit force is up to initial strength at the time.
- (2) Whether war was premeditated.
- (3) Whether any warning of war was, or would be, received.
- (4) Whether large military forces were maintained by the enemy prior to the outbreak of hostilities.
- (5) Whether the enemy was, or would be, committed in other theaters of operation.
- (6) Lines of communication—whether interior or exterior; whether by land, sea, or air.

b. Further effective strength estimates are based upon—

- (1) Consideration of the previous estimates (if any) of effective strength.
- (2) Recent intelligence.
- (3) The effects of nonnumerical factors such as logistical capability, time and space.
- (4) Losses of personnel (killed, wounded, noneffectives, PW) and equipment destroyed or captured. These figures are based on physical count. In nuclear war, however, when physical count is impossible, losses are computed from statistical tables.
- (5) Reinforcements and replacements (in the absence of other intelligence and where the enemy has secure routes of communications it is assumed that personnel reinforcement can be accom-

plished within 72 hours and equipment can be resupplied within 6 days).

c. Resultant calculations are expressed as percentages of TOE strength; however, numerical expression may be necessary to present a better understanding of the combat capability of a force and provide the commander with a basis for comparison.

d. The computation of enemy strength requires the utmost caution and alertness for intelligence that may reveal the enemy's actual strength. This is especially true at the onset of hostilities when *accurate* intelligence pertaining to enemy strength is lacking or inadequate, and the initial strength figure is only an approximation.

4. Numerical Strength Computation Formulas

a. Effective strength—TOE strength minus losses, plus replacements.

b. Percentage of

$$\text{TOE strength} = \frac{\text{Effective strength} \times 100}{\text{TOE strength}}$$

c. In time of peace, strength can generally be computed by annual induction quota times term of conscript service, plus cadre.

5. Computation of Strength by Type of Unit

a. Strength by type of unit includes the total number of enemy units listed by category and type. Normally, order of battle analysts account for enemy units down to and including

two echelons below their own level of command. For example, an analyst at division level would express enemy strength in battalion size units.

b. Expressing strength in terms of number of units by type within an enemy force is stressed because it is a simple, reliable, and a readily understood method of computing enemy strength. At the same time, the order of battle specialist cannot ignore individual unit strength computations. This is particularly important in arriving at a true picture of the enemy's strength compared to friendly forces. The enemy may have eight battalions of infantry in a given area, and only five friendly battalions may be located in the same area. However, because of differences in organization, the total friendly strength may exceed that of the enemy force.

c. Techniques for computing strength by type of unit are thoroughly discussed in paragraphs 6, 7, 8, and 9, appendix J. Organic or supporting artillery and reconnaissance units are considered and counted as committed forces unless known otherwise. For example, organic divisional artillery is considered committed unless it is located outside the friendly commander's area of influence and not capable of firing support missions. Frequently, artillery units are listed as fire support units when categorizing enemy strength. Numerical tabulation of the committed forces and reinforcements, as well as their individual strengths in personnel and equipment, is maintained on a strength worksheet (fig. 21).

APPENDIX L

FORMAT AND EXAMPLE OF ORDER OF BATTLE ANNEX TO PERINTREP

1. Format of Order of Battle Annex

- Note. 1. Omit items not applicable and renumber remaining paragraphs.
2. All entries are followed by a comment.
 3. Evaluation of source and information, including type of source, accompanies each entry.

(Classification)

ORDER OF BATTLE

Annex -----, (OB) to PERINTREP NO. -----, ----- Corps, -----

1. COMPOSITION AND DISPOSITION (see appendix 1, Overlay).
An overlay is usually attached to present the graphic display of enemy units. The initial subparagraphs always consist of identification and disposition; the remaining subparagraphs contain information pertaining to organization. Information concerning identification and disposition is listed by mentioning the highest echelons first, followed by subordinate units from left to right, or top to bottom as displayed on the overlay. Related items may be combined and presented in a single entry.
2. STRENGTH. This paragraph contains information pertaining to enemy personnel, weapons, and equipment losses during the period. Replacement rates and strength figures of individual units may be listed.
3. TACTICS. Only new tactics and deviations from prescribed tactical doctrine are reported.
4. TRAINING. New development and recent changes in training programs or methods of special training undertaken by the enemy since the initiation of hostilities are reported.
5. LOGISTICS. Enter data concerning those items which will affect current enemy operations such as supply status, supply system, and locations of supply facilities.
6. COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS. This paragraph includes data on the combat effectiveness of enemy units, either of the entire force

(Classification)

(Classification)

or of a major tactical unit. Items indicating morale, esprit, quality of troops and commanders are listed. The ability of the enemy unit to accomplish its expected mission is expressed.

7. MISCELLANEOUS DATA. Personalities, unit history, field post numbers, code numbers and names, order of battle changes, and any other item of order of battle intelligence that cannot be properly inserted in preceding paragraphs are listed.

Acknowledge.

(SIGNATURE)

Appendixes :

Distribution :

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(NAME OF G2)

(Classification)

2. Example of Order of Battle Annex

Annex B (OB) to PERINTREP 29, 3 Corps, 201800 August 19_____

ORDER OF BATTLE

1. COMPOSITION AND DISPOSITION (see appendix 1, Overlay).

a. All PW captured during period are from Aggressor 2d Combined Arms Army. Unit identifications include: (C-1)

<u>17 Mech Rifle Div</u>	<u>30 Mech Rifle Div</u>	<u>32 Mech Rifle Div</u>
283 Mech R. Regt	141 Mech R. Regt	132d Mdm Tk Regt
290 Mech R. Regt	142 Mech R. Regt	
	130 Mdm Tk Regt	
	130 Recon Bn	

COMMENT: 32 Mech Rifle Div accepted as being organic to 2d.CAA. 52 Tk Div previously accepted, completing organization of 2d CAA.

b. Two large missile type weapons mounted on large amphibious armored carriers and several smaller vehicles identified in position vic MP 420513. (B-2)

COMMENT: Probably elements of Free Rocket Regt, 2d CAA, previously unlocated.

c. Captured Aggressor field order reveals plan to attach 40 TK Div to 2d CAA effective 22 August. (B-1).

COMMENT: PW previously reported 40th Tk Div moving to reinforce 2d CAA. Aggressor main effort probably planned for this area.

2. STRENGTH.

En losses reported during period:

	<u>PW</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>ARTY</u>	<u>ARMOR</u>	<u>AIR</u>	<u>VEH</u>
16 Mech Rifle Div	37	302	2	4	1	21
30 Mech Rifle Div	16	52	8	1	-	16
32 Mech Rifle Div	8	12	-	-	-	4
Total 3 U.S. Corps Sector	61	366	10	5	1	41

COMMENT: Personnel losses, which have shown a marked increase during the period, have been sustained mostly by Aggressor combat patrols. Aircraft loss was H1, Observation Helicopter equipped with AERO radar. Overall strength of 2d CAA is generally not affected.

3. TACTICS.

a. PW from 16 Mech Rifle Div and 30 Mech Rifle Div state they have been instructed in the event their units are cut off to continue fighting as guerrilla units or in small groups, live off the land, and destroy as much U.S. Army property as possible before gradually infiltrating back to friendly lines. (F-6)

COMMENT: Intensive guerrilla activity in our rear areas could be expected should elements of these units be cut off.

b. Enemy documents captured 07 Aug included a training pamphlet for battalion, company and platoon commanders, written by G/D GRIBOY-EDOV entitled "Tanks Out Front," (appendix 3). It advocates tactics permitting U.S. patrols and advancing forces to pass through Aggressor lines. A coordinated tank-infantry attack is then made on open flanks and rear elements, with tanks continuing momentum of attack to destroy remaining U.S. forces. (B-2)

COMMENT: Considering Aggressor doctrine that tanks are the decisive arm, the above tactic is assumed a possibility, particularly in view of reports of probable employment of 40 Tk Div (para 1).

4. TRAINING.

a. Reference paragraph 3b.

b. Indications of Aggressor concern for COMSEC is noted in document captured from 2d CAA dated 10 Aug, directing all subordinate units to immediately initiate intensive training in radio security and communications procedures. (B-2)

COMMENT: ASA confirms Aggressor lack of radio discipline and states that security violations increase during reinforcement and relief operations. Numerous Aggressor security violations have been noted since 17 Aug, further substantiating reinforcement or relief of 2d CAA units.

5. LOGISTICS.

a. PW state Aggressor supply personnel have recently contacted local merchants, farmers, and fishermen for supplies of most Class I items. (C-6)

COMMENT: Aggressor either has critical shortage of Class I items or has a bottleneck in supply system requiring local procurement of Class I items.

b. Air and ground reconnaissance patrols have reported Aggressor stockpiling large quantities of supplies and equipment in rear areas of frontline divisions. (B-2)

COMMENT: Not normal supply procedures. Significance as yet undetermined. Would indicate Aggressor may be planning major offensive soon.

6. COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS.

a. PW from 16 Mech Rifle Div and 30 Mech Rifle Div state morale is high but senior officers are disgruntled because their units always receive difficult missions while the 32 Mech Rifle Div and 56 Tk Div have, until recently, been assigned less hazardous missions. (F-6)

COMMENT: Analysis of unit history and recent operations of Aggressor 2d CAA indicates it has usually been highly successful in combat. This, and the fact that 2d CAA has always had fine commanders, would account for high morale in units. This is first indication of dissatisfaction among officer personnel. Report seems cogent, however, since 32 Mech Rifle Div has not been engaged in combat with U.S. forces in this campaign.

b. PW reports 30 Mech Rifle Div to be redesignated 30 "Fusilier" Mech Rifle Div for superior combat record. (F-6)

COMMENT: 3 U.S. Corps rates combat effectiveness of 30 Mech Rifle Div from excellent to outstanding in comparison to other Aggressor divisions in same sector. 30 Mech Rifle Div casualties have been comparatively small; no deserters have been apprehended and its operations have been executed with determination.

7. MISCELLANEOUS DATA.

a. Personalities identified by PW: (C-1)

CG, 40th Tk Div	G/D GRIBOYEDOV, Semyon P. (Ref 3b)
CO, 282 Mech Rifle Regt	Col CARDUCCI, Gherardo S.
CO, 283 Mech Rifle Regt	Col UNDSET, Bjornstjerne (Acting CO)
CO, 130 Mdm Tk Regt	Col STEENWYK, Martin J.
CO, 132 Mdm Tk Regt	Col MATTEZ, Mario

COMMENT: Confirms previously obtained information.

b. Unit History: Officer PW stated his unit (32 Mech Rifle Div) trained extensively during 1959 and 1960 in special tactics for assault of river lines. (F-6)

COMMENT: Special training received by 32 Mech Rifle Div should increase its overall effectiveness when employed in rivercrossing operations. No evidence of other units so trained.

c. Field Post Numbers: Captured document reveals Aggressor field post numbers being used as identification symbols on documents and messages. First two and last three digits are transposed. Field post number of 46 Mech Rifle Div will appear as 75031 instead of 31750. (B-1)

COMMENT: Aggressor has employed this system previously as a security measure. Expect this system of transposing digits will occur in different patterns during future operations.

Acknowledge.

LINDEN
Lt Gen

Appendixes: 1-En Disp Overlay

2-Aggressor Army Org Chart

3-Aggressor Training Pamphlet

Distribution: Same as PERINTREP 29

OFFICIAL

RICE

G2

APPENDIX M

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE FORMAT

(Classification)

Issuing section and headquarters¹

Place

Date and time

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NO .

Reference: Maps or charts or other documents.

1. MISSION

State the assigned or assumed mission.

2. THE AREA OF OPERATIONS

This paragraph discusses characteristics of the area and their effect on enemy intelligence, subversive, and sabotage operations and on our counterintelligence operations and measures.

a. Weather.

(1) Existing situation.

(2) Effect on enemy intelligence, subversive, and sabotage operations.

(3) Effect on our counterintelligence operations and measures.

b. Terrain.

Analyze under the same headings as weather.

c. Other characteristics. The following additional characteristics are considered, as pertinent, in separate subparagraphs: sociology, politics, economics, psychology, and other factors. Other factors may include such items as science, material, transportation, manpower, and hydrography. They are analyzed under the same headings as weather.

3. ENEMY INTELLIGENCE, SABOTAGE, AND SUBVERSIVE SITUATION

a. Disposition.

b. Composition .

c. Strength, including efficiency of enemy intelligence, subversive and sabotage organization.

d. Recent and present significant intelligence, subversive, and sabotage activities (including enemy's knowledge of our intelligence situation).

e. Peculiarities and weaknesses.

¹ If distributed outside the headquarters, the first line of the heading is the official designation of the issuing command and the ending modified accordingly.

(Classification)

(Classification)

4. ENEMY INTELLIGENCE, SABOTAGE, AND SUBVERSIVE CAPABILITIES

a. List all capabilities under the following headings:

(1) Intelligence. (Include all methods of which the enemy is known or estimated to be capable.)

(2) Sabotage. (Include all capabilities of military, political, and economic sabotage possible of execution by agents and guerrillas.)

(3) Subversion. (Include all types, such as propaganda, sedition, treason, disaffection affecting own troops, allies, and local civilians, and assistance in evasion and escape of hostile civilians.)

b. Analysis and discussion of enemy capabilities to provide a basis for conclusions as to relative probability of adoption of enemy intelligence, subversive, and sabotage capabilities.

5. CONCLUSIONS

a. Relative probability of adoption of enemy intelligence, subversive, and sabotage capabilities.

b. Effects of enemy capabilities on our courses of action.

c. Effectiveness of own counterintelligence measures and additional requirements or emphasis needed.

/s/-----
Chief, Counterintelligence Branch

(Classification)

APPENDIX N

PARTIALLY COMPLETED COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MEASURES WORKSHEET

EXAMPLE, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MEASURES WORKSHEET (PARTIAL)

UNIT: 20th Inf Div

Period covered: From 180800 August

TO: Seizure of SHMENDRICK and destruction of enemy in zone.

(1) Phase or periods of the operation	(2) Categories of counter- intelligence activities involved	(3) Counterintelligence measures to be adopted	(4) Agencies responsible for execution of counterintelligence measures							(5) Instructions regarding entries in columns 3 and 4 notes for future action and staff coordination measures		
			Civil affairs platoon	Signal officer	Public information officer	Provost marshal	ASA support company	All units	Aviation officer	Division artillery	Security section	
Period in assembly areas before attack.	1. MILITARY SECURITY a. Secrecy disciplines.	(1) Cover or paint all vehicle and aircraft markings.						⊗	⊗			Coordinate with G4. Provost marshal report violations.
		(2) Remove identifications from uniforms.						⊗				Coordinate with G1. Provost marshal report violations.
		(3) Restrict personnel to areas except when on official business.						⊗				Coordinate with G1. Provost marshal report violations.
		(4) Emphasize security discipline in command posts, and elsewhere, with particular reference to handling of documents and maps, phone conversations, loose talk, and speculation which might convey information to the enemy. All personnel will be instructed regarding same.						⊗				Coordinate with G3. Security section assist with instruction and check.
		(5) Report all breaches and suspected compromise of security at once to G2.					⊗	×			⊗	SOP.
	b. Security of nuclear weapons and delivery systems.	(6) Disseminate location of nuclear weapons on need-to-know basis.	⊗							⊗		Coordinate with G1, G3, and G4.
		(7) Nuclear weapons units draw all supplies from division distributing points by use of own vehicles.								⊗		Coordinate with G4.
	c. Safeguarding of classified defense information and equipment.	(8) Collect and place under guard or evacuate, as determined appropriate by unit commander, civilians in position to observe nuclear weapons, storage, and delivery sites.								⊗		Coordinate with G5.
		(9) Check SOP plans for security of cryptographic devices for destruction and for report of loss or compromise.	×				⊗	×			⊗	SOP. Security section check.
		(10) Check plans and equipment for destruction of documents in event of imminent capture.	×					×				SOP. Security section check.
	d. Communication security.	(11) Maintain radio silence until future orders. No signal panels displayed.	×					×				Coordinate with G3 and signal officer.
		(12) Check that unauthorized personnel are prohibited from entering message centers.	×					×			⊗	SOP.
		(13) Patrol all wire lines used by units of division.	×					×				SOP. Check with signal officer for compliance.
		(14) Cut all wire lines leading into Aggressor-occupied territory.	×					×				Coordinate with 1st Corps and 22d Inf Div.
	e. Security of troop movements.	(15) Prohibit movement of all military vehicles during hours of daylight except for staff parties and messengers authorized by battalions, separate brigades, trains commander, and higher headquarters.						⊗				Coordinate with G3 and G4. Provost marshal report violations.
		(16) Establish control posts to restrict unauthorized vehicle movements in and out of assembly areas. Prevent congregation of vehicles at command posts. Start control measures before establishment of command posts.				⊗		×				Coordinate with G1 and G4.
	f. Concealment.	(17) Take oblique and vertical photos of bivouac area daily.						⊗	⊗			Coordinate with G3 and aviation officer.
		(18) Ensure that all stationary vehicles and installations are under natural concealment or camouflage.						×				SOP.
		(19) Black out all installations during darkness.						×				SOP. Provost marshal report violations.
		(20) Vehicles use blackout lights in night movement.						×				SOP.
		(21) Permit no open fires (except mess ranges) in assembly areas.						×				SOP.
		(22) Personnel and vehicles stop and remain motionless if a flare appears at night.						×				SOP.
		(23) Leave no paper, trash, or laundry exposed in assembly areas.						×				SOP. Security section inspect areas.
		(24) Conduct at least one inspection daily for violations of camouflage discipline.						⊗				SOP.
	g. Counterespionage.	(25) Establish check points to prevent movement of unauthorized civilians into or out of troop areas. Violators taken to civilian enclosures at *** and ***			⊗			⊗				Coordinate with G5 and G1.
		(26) All arrests of civilians violating security regulations made by military police or other overt personnel. Only those suspected of being enemy agents turned over to the security section.			×			×				SOP. Coordinate with G5 and G1.

APPENDIX O

EXAMPLE OF A DIVISION INTELLIGENCE ANNEX

(When issued separately from an operation order)

(Classification)

Copy No 4
20th Inf Div
ZELLE (4671), BUTTANO
101900 September 19_____
BQ 13

Annex A (Intel) to OPORD_____

Reference: Map, BUTTANO, 1:50,000, ZELLE—PAGT.

1. SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION

See INTSUM, this HQ, 101800 September, and Appendix 1, Situation Overlay.

2. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION

a. Essential Elements of Information. Will Aggressor reinforce his forces along the FLOOD River before the time of attack? If so, when, where, and with what forces? Special attention to the mechanized rifle regiment and the medium tank regiment in vicinity of BURG.

b. Other Intelligence Requirements.

(1) Will Aggressor continue to defend in his present positions? If so, how will he organize the ground, and with what troops? Special attention to locations and activities of reserves, and vulnerability to nuclear attack.

(2) Will Aggressor attack prior to 110500 September? If so, when, where, and in what strength? Special attention to the axis Hill 536—Hill 524—CR 981.

(3) Will Aggressor employ nuclear weapons against us? If so, when, where, how many, of what yields, and by what delivery means?

(4) Will Aggressor use CB agents? If so, what agents, when, how, and where?

3. INTELLIGENCE ACQUISITION TASKS

a. Orders to attached and subordinate units.

(Classification)

(Classification)

(Anx A to OPOD—20 Inf Div)

(1) 1st Bde.

(2) 2d Bde.

(a) Report as obtained.

1. Status of construction of defensive positions and mine-fields on and to the east of the FLOOD River.
2. Location and size of ammunition dumps and location, size, and content of engineer equipment parks.
3. Clearing of lanes through obstacles within Aggressor position in division zone.
4. Number, size, and composition of enemy patrols, and time they were observed.
5. Activity and size of units blocking our patrolling in forward areas.
6. The interception of any enemy patrols equipped for CB activity.
7. The presence of enemy troops carrying protective masks and/or wearing protective clothing.

(b) Report as obtained. Negative reports by 110400 September.

1. Activity in medium tank regiment (-) and tank battalion assembly area in vicinity of BURG.
2. Location and activity of mechanized rifle regiment in vicinity of BURG.

(3) 3d Bde.

(a) Report as obtained.

1. Activity of mechanized rifle battalion north and east of CR 987.
2. Activity of mechanized rifle battalion on Hill 503.
3. Status of construction of defensive positions and mine-fields on and to the east FLOOD River.
4. Location and size of ammunition dumps and location, size, and content of engineer equipment parks.
5. Clearing of lanes through obstacles within Aggressor position in division zone.
6. Number, size, and composition of enemy patrols and time they were observed.
7. Activity and size of units blocking our patrolling in forward areas.
8. The interception of any enemy patrols equipped for CB activity.
9. The presence of enemy troops carrying protective masks and/or wearing protective clothing.

(Classification)

(Classification)

(Anx A to OPORD—20 Inf Div)

(b) Report as obtained. Negative reports by 110400 September.

1. Activity in medium tank regiment (-) and tank battalion assembly area in vicinity of BURG.

2. Location and activity of motorized rifle regiment in vicinity of BURG.

(4) 1/21 Cav. Report as obtained.

(a) Activity of mechanized rifle battalion on Hill 503.

(b) Status of construction of defensive positions and minefields on and to the east of the FLOOD River.

(c) Location and size of ammunition dumps and location, size, and content of engineer equipment parks.

(d) Clearing of lanes through obstacles within Aggressor position in division zone.

(e) Number, size, and composition of enemy patrols, and time they were observed.

(f) Activity and size of units blocking our patrolling in forward areas.

(g) The interception of any enemy patrols equipped for CB activity.

(h) The presence of enemy troops carrying protective masks and/or wearing protective clothing.

(5) Div Arty.

(a) Report as obtained.

1. Status of construction of defensive positions and minefields on and to the east of the FLOOD River.

2. Clearing of lanes through obstacles within Aggressor position in division zone.

3. Number, size, and composition of enemy patrols, and time they were observed.

4. Activity and size of units blocking our patrolling in forward areas.

5. The interception of any enemy patrols equipped for CB activity.

(b) Report as obtained. Negative reports by 110400 September. Locations of artillery positions, including number of weapons, caliber, and state of preparation of positions.

(6) 20 Avn.

(a) Report as obtained.

1. Activity of mechanized rifle battalion north and east of CR 987.

2. Activity of mechanized rifle battalion on Hill 503.

(Classification)

(Anx A to OPORD—20 Inf Div)

3. Location, size, and type of unit in vicinity of Hill 536 (north of BURG).

4. Status of construction of defensive positions and minefields on and to the east of the FLOOD River.

5. Location and size of ammunition dumps and location, size, and content of engineer equipment parks.

6. Preparation of emplacements suitable for, and presence of equipment appropriate to, atomic demolition munitions (ADM's).

7. The interception of any enemy patrols equipped for CB activity.

(b) Report as obtained. Negative reports by 110400 September.

1. Movement on the following roads:

a. North on Highway 25.

b. West on Highway 2.

c. West on Highway 4.

2. Activity in medium tank regiment (-) and tank battalion assembly area in vicinity of BURG.

3. Location and activity of mechanized rifle regiment in vicinity of BURG.

4. Locations of artillery positions, including number of weapons, caliber, and state of preparation of positions.

(7) 20 Engr. Report as obtained.

(a) Status of construction of defensive positions and minefields on and to the east of the FLOOD River.

(b) The interception of any enemy patrols equipped for CB activity.

b. Requests to higher, adjacent, and cooperating units.

(1) 1st Corps is requested to provide:

(a) As obtained.

1. Location, size, and type of unit in vicinity of Hill 536 (north of BURG).

2. Number, types, direction of movement, and time of movement of air or surface vehicular traffic within the division zone, with special attention to Highway 2.

3. Troop concentrations, including types of vehicles, each of Highway 25 within the divisional area of interest.

4. Evidence of field fortifications and troop concentrations along the following lines:

a. Hill 503—CR 987.

b. Hill 518—Hill 536—Hill 499.

5. Location and size of ammunition dumps and location, size, and content of engineer equipment parks.

(Classification)

(Anx A to OPORD—20 Inf Div)

6. Instances of heavily guarded vehicular movement. Special attention to Highway 2 from ZILCH to BURG.

7. Areas under unusual security restrictions in the divisional area of interest.

8. Presence of special security troop units in any area east of Highway 25.

9. Any location in the divisional area of interest from which civilians have been evacuated.

10. Launcher sites for guided missiles or rockets within divisional area of interest.

11. Preparation of emplacements suitable for, and presence of equipment appropriate to, ADM's.

12. The interception of any enemy patrols equipped for CB activity.

13. All CB supply movement and dumping in zone.

14. The presence of enemy troops carrying protective masks and/or wearing protective clothing.

(b) As obtained; negative reports by 110400 September.

1. Movement on the following roads:

a. North on Highway 25.

b. West on Highway 2.

c. West on Highway 4.

2. Activity in medium tank regiment (-) and tank battalion assembly area in vicinity of BURG.

3. Location and activity of mechanized rifle regiment in vicinity of BURG.

4. Location and activity of mechanized rifle regiment southwest of CR 994.

5. Locations of artillery positions, including number of weapons, caliber, and state of preparation of positions.

6. Command posts, supply points, and medical facilities east of Highway 25.

(2) 18 Inf Div is requested to provide:

(a) As obtained.

1. Troop concentrations, including types of vehicles, east of Highway 25 within the divisional area of interest.

2. Instances of heavily guarded vehicular movement. Special attention to Highway 2 from ZILCH to BURG.

3. Areas under unusual security restrictions in the divisional area of interest.

4. Presence of special security troop units in any area east of Highway 25.

(Classification)

(Classification)

(Anx A to OPORD—20 Inf Div)

5. Any location in the divisional area of interest from which civilians have been evacuated.

6. Launcher sites for guided missiles or rockets within divisional area of interest.

7. Locations of heavy artillery positions, including number of weapons, caliber, and state of preparation of positions.

8. Preparation of emplacements suitable for, and presence of equipment appropriate to, ADM's.

9. The interception of any enemy patrols equipped for CB activity.

10. All CB supply movement and dumping in zone.

11. The presence of enemy troops carrying protective masks and/or wearing protective clothing.

(b) As obtained; negative reports by 110400 September.

1. Movement on the following roads :

a. North on Highway 25.

b. West on Highway 2.

c. West on Highway 4.

2. Location and activity of mechanized rifle regiment southwest of CR 994.

(3) 52 Mech Div is requested to provide as obtained :

(a) Troop concentrations, including types of vehicles, each of Highway 25 within the divisional area of interest.

(b) Instances of heavily guarded vehicular movement. Special attention to Highway 2 from ZILCH to BURG.

(c) Areas under unusual security restrictions in the divisional area of interest.

(d) Presence of special security troop units in any area east of Highway 25.

(e) Any location in the divisional area of interest from which civilians have been evacuated.

(f) Launcher sites for guided missiles or rockets within divisional area of interest.

(g) Locations of heavy artillery positions, including number of weapons, caliber, and state of preparation of positions.

(h) Preparation of emplacements suitable for, and presence of equipment appropriate to, ADM's.

(i) The interception of any enemy patrols equipped for CB activity.

(j) All CB supply movement and dumping in zone.

(k) The presence of enemy troops carrying protective masks and/or wearing protective clothing.

(Classification)

(Classification)

(Anx A to OPORD—20 Inf Div)

4. MEASURES FOR HANDLING PERSONNEL, DOCUMENTS, AND MATERIEL

See Division SOP.

5. DOCUMENTS AND/OR EQUIPMENT REQUIRED

a. Maps. SOP distribution of map, BUTTANO, 1:50,000, ZELLE-PAGT.

b. Photos. Following airphotos will be furnished:

(1) Basic cover of division zone (1:10,000 approximate), six copies each brigade and Div Arty; one copy each tank battalion, mechanized infantry battalion, 1/21 Cav, division engineer, and division signal officer.

(2) Annotated airphotos distributed automatically as available.

6. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

a. Appendix 2, Counterintelligence.

b. All units coordinate use of Army aircraft through division tactical operations center to minimize number of aircraft in air over division zone prior to attack.

7. REPORTS AND DISTRIBUTION

Effective 110800 September units will submit INTSUM's at 0800, 1200, 1600, 2000, 2400, and 0400 hours daily in lieu of times prescribed in division SOP.

8. MISCELLANEOUS INSTRUCTIONS

Nil

Acknowledge.

ABLE

Maj Gen

Appendixes: 1—Situation Overlay
2—Counterintelligence

Distribution: Same as OPORD _____

OFFICIAL:

/s/Guess

GUESS

G2

(Classification)

APPENDIX P

EXAMPLE WORKBOOK HEADINGS FOR INTERNAL DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

1. ENEMY OPERATIONS

- a. Units
 - (1) Guerrillas
 - (2) Political
 - (3) Underground
 - (4) Others
- b. Modus Operandi
 - (1) Tactical
 - (2) Political
 - (3) Propaganda
 - (4) Logistics
 - (5) Sabotage, Assassination, etc.

2. CIVILIAN POPULACE

- a. Hostile
- b. Friendly
- c. Neutral

3. THIRD COUNTRY OPERATIONS

- a. Units
- b. Personnel
- c. Command
- d. Organizations
- e. Logistics
- f. Training Areas and Programs
- g. Other Support Operations

4. ORGANIZATIONS

- a. Political
- b. Military/Guerrilla
- c. Paramilitary
- d. Command

- e. Logistical
- f. Propaganda
- g. Subversive

5. TARGETS AND LOCATION

- a. Command and Tactical Units
- b. Paramilitary
- c. Political Cells
- d. Propaganda Cells
- e. Supply Installations and Caches
- f. Line of Communications and Supply

6. EFFECTS OF WATER AND TERRAIN

- a. Military Operations
- b. Political Activities
- c. Economic Factors

7. LOGISTIC SUPPORT SYSTEMS

- a. In-Country
- b. Third Country

8. RECRUITING AND TRAINING

- a. Military/Guerrilla
 - (1) In-Country
 - (2) Third Country
- b. Political
 - (1) In-Country
 - (2) Third Country
- c. Others
 - (1) In-Country
 - (2) Third Country

9. MISCELLANEOUS

APPENDIX Q

SAMPLE METHOD OF INTEGRATING INTELLIGENCE WITH OTHER TRAINING

INTEGRATION OF INTELLIGENCE INTO OTHER SUBJECTS		
Principal subject	What to integrate	How to integrate
CHARACTER GUIDANCE AND THE CODE OF CONDUCT.	Security.	Stress the moral obligation of all military personnel to report violations of security.
EMPLOYMENT OF THE ARMED FORCES.	The intelligence chain.	Show intelligence structure from the individual soldier to DA.
RULES OF LAND WARFARE AND GENEVA CONVENTION.	Handling of PW.	Correct treatment of enemy PW means more information during interrogations.
TROOP INFORMATION.	Orientation in foreign armies. Aggressor, the maneuver enemy.	Use foreign armies as a topic, if possible. Otherwise integrate as much information as is possible considering the primary topic scheduled.
CONCEALMENT AND CAMOUFLAGE.	Counterintelligence. Patrolling.	Good concealment and camouflage denies the enemy information about our dispositions, both troops and supplies. Discussion of sound and light discipline should be included.
FIELD SANITATION.	Counterintelligence.	Clean bivouac areas mean less information for the enemy.
FIRST AID.	Survival. Patrolling.	Troops on patrol or evading capture must often treat injuries without professional aid or medical supplies.
GUARD DUTY.	Counterintelligence. Use of Aggressor. Security.	Use challenge and password in the field as well as garrison. Maintain bivouac security guard against infiltration and guerrilla activities. Practice camouflage and concealment. Use Aggressor to add realism in demonstrations and practical exercises.
INDIVIDUAL PROTECTIVE MEASURES AGAINST CBR ATTACK.	Reporting. Necessity for speed in reporting.	Report CBR equipment whenever observed. Each person detecting use of CBR must report: (a) location; (b) time of attack; and (c) method of release (if known).
INSPECTIONS.	Patrolling. All intelligence subjects.	Troops, especially NCO's, must know the difference between a formal field inspection and the inspection of a patrol. During garrison inspection, question individuals about the meaning of combat intelligence, observation, counterintelligence, etc.
EVASION AND ESCAPE.	Collecting and reporting information.	Remember and report information of intelligence value; practice camouflage and

Principal subject	What to integrate	How to integrate
	Camouflage and concealment. Scouting and patrolling. Observation. Map and compass reading. Survival.	concealment techniques during escape and evasion training. Apply the principles of scouting and patrolling as insurance for successful evasion. Weather may be used as a cover for evaders and escapers but may complicate the escape effort.
MAINTENANCE, SUPPLY ECONOMY, AND COST CONSCIOUSNESS.	Counterintelligence. Security.	Do not leave equipment where the enemy can pick it up. Discarded equipment is as important a source of information to the enemy as any other data. Littered bivouac areas mean more information for the enemy. Practice security measures.
SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS, ELEMENTARY.	Patrolling. Reporting. Security.	A patrol acts as the eyes and ears of the commander. Messages used to report information must be clear, concise, and timely. Be security conscious.
ANTIGUERRILLA AND ANTI- INFILTRATION TRAINING.	Counterintelligence. Collection of information. Handling of PW.	Guards and sentries should practice camouflage and concealment at all times; discover the enemy before being discovered; get the drop on the enemy and attempt to capture him for interrogation. Report guerrilla activities. Other troops must be alerted and antiguerrilla operation conducted.
DEFENSE AGAINST AIR ATTACK.	Collecting and reporting. Counterintelligence.	Good camouflage and concealment prevent detection from both air and ground. Practice light discipline. Use Aggressor to test camouflage effectiveness and discipline.
HASTY FORTIFICATIONS.	Observation. Counterintelligence.	Select a position that affords good observation, camouflage it well, and practice light and sound discipline.
INDIVIDUAL DAY TRAINING.	Observation. Counterintelligence. Security.	Observation must be continuous. Practice camouflage and concealment. Use cover at all times. The chances of avoiding capture are enhanced by following the simple rules taught in scouting and patrolling and use of cover and concealment.
INDIVIDUAL NIGHT TRAINING.	Counterintelligence. Map and compass reading. Collecting and reporting information. Evasion and escape.	Practice light and sound discipline. Use compass and the stars to determine direction. Use night observation and listening techniques to collect information.
MAP AND AIRPHOTOS.	Reporting information. Patrolling. Counterintelligence.	Learn how to use coordinates in reporting information. The airphoto is valuable both for obtaining and verifying information. Use map and airphoto to select patrol routes that afford maximum cover and concealment. All patrol members must be versed in map and airphoto reading.

Principal subject	What to integrate	How to integrate
MARCHES AND BIVOUACS.	Map and airphotos. Counterintelligence. Collecting and reporting information. Handling PW and captured documents. Security.	Use map and airphotos for planning routes and selecting bivouac areas. Practice camouflage and concealment, communications security, sound and light discipline. Leave a clean bivouac area. Remove all unit signs, etc. Unit intelligence officer should check area. Use Aggressor to add realism to problem. Observe for enemy activity, report unusual activity. Attempt to capture Aggressor PW during problem. Search for documents and properly process them.
MINES AND BOOBYTRAPS.	Collecting and reporting information. Patrolling.	Importance of reporting and marking enemy mines and boobytraps. Patrols must be proficient in detecting and skirting or passing through enemy minefields. Knowledge of the patterns used by both friendly and enemy forces is very important as well as methods by which mines and boobytraps may be disarmed.
SQUAD AND PLATOON TACTICAL TRAINING.	Collecting and reporting information. Counterintelligence. Map, compass, and airphotos. Handling enemy PW and material. Security.	Review observing, listening, reporting of information, camouflage and concealment, sound and light discipline. Use challenge and password, compass, map, and airphoto. Use Aggressor to add realism and to teach handling of PW and enemy documents.

APPENDIX R

INTELLIGENCE REPORTS

STANAG 2022
(Edition No. 3)

DETAILS OF AGREEMENT (DofA)

Annex: A(DofA). Evaluation.

AGREEMENT

1. It is agreed that the NATO Armed Forces at all levels are to use the standard titles and guidance detailed in the subsequent paragraphs in the preparation of the intelligence reports considered herein.

GENERAL

2. Intelligence reports transmit observed facts. Analysis, integrations and conclusions based on the reported facts should be included in so far as is practicable, but must be clearly separated and identified as such.

3. In order to avoid confusion, transliteration of non-Roman alphabet place names and other words and terms used in intelligence reports are to be in accordance with the transliteration tables shown in STANAG 2208.

4. Intelligence reports must have four basic qualities: brevity, interest, clarity and pertinence.

5. When it is necessary to evaluate the accuracy of the information and/or the reliability of the source, these are to be graded in accordance with the system shown in Annex A(DofA).

6. The intelligence reports considered are:

- a. Intelligence Report (short title INTREP).
- b. Intelligence Summary (short title INTSUM).
- c. Supplementary Intelligence Report (short title SUPINTREP).

SECURITY GRADING

7. The value which the enemy would obtain from the information contained in the reports dictates the degree of security classification to be given in each case.

INTELLIGENCE REPORT (INTREP)

8. Description.

- a. An INTREP is a report which is sent spontaneously and without regard to a specific time schedule in all cases where the information might be of importance for the recipient's appreciation of enemy capabilities and intentions (1) where facts influencing these:
 - (1) Have been newly observed.

OR

- (2) Have undergone changes as compared with previous reports.
- b. In so far as is practicable, the INTREP should include the intelligence staffs, deductions (2).
- 9. Recipients. This report is passed to higher, lower and flanking (adjacent) formations/units at the discretion of the Commander of the formation or unit producing the report.
- 10. Time of Issue. This report is issued as soon after the receipt of the information as is practicable.
- 11. Dispatch of Report. This report is to be passed by the quickest means appropriate.
- 12. Content and Format. INTREPs have no prescribed content nor format, except that the word 'INTREP' is to be the first item to appear in the report.

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY (INTSUM)

- 13. Description.
 - a. This report is a brief summary of items of intelligence information.
 - b. It includes negative information.
 - c. Non-operational intelligence is rigidly excluded.
 - d. It should give a lead to recipients in assessing the situation.
 - e. It is a summary of the enemy situation in forward and rear areas, operations and capabilities, and of the weather and terrain.
 - f. It shows the intelligence staffs' deductions (3).
- 14. Recipients. This report is passed to higher, lower and flanking (adjacent) formations/units at the discretion of the Commander of the formation or unit producing the report, or according to directions received from higher headquarters.
- 15. Time of Issue. The number of reports issued each day varies according to the situation and the wishes of the Commander of the formation or unit producing the report, or according to directions received from higher headquarters.
- 16. Dispatch of Report. This report is to be passed by the quickest means appropriate.
- 17. Content and Format. INTSUMs have no prescribed format, except that the word 'INTSUM' is to be the first item in the report. Nonessential detail should be excluded.

SUPPLEMENTARY INTELLIGENCE REPORT (SUPINTREP)

- 18. Description.
 - a. This report is the report form for more comprehensive reviews concerning:
 - (1) One or several specific intelligence target(s).
 - (2) All intelligence data collected over an extended period of time.

NOTE

- (1) Applicable to NATO Nations in which the doctrine of intentions is acknowledged.
- (2) These deductions should, in principle, be approved by the Commander of the formation or unit producing the INTREP.
- (3) These deductions should, in principle, be approved by the Commander of the formation or unit producing the INTSUM.

- b. It may contain all available intelligence, including items contained in previous INTREPs or INTSUMs.
- 19. Recipients. The nature of any SUPINTREP dictates the specific dissemination required. It may be passed to higher, lower or flanking (adjacent) formations/units.
- 20. Time of Issue. The SUPINTREP is normally produced on special request or in preparation of particular operations.
- 21. Dispatch of Report. This report is to be sent by the most suitable means.
- 22. Content and Format. No set format is prescribed for the SUPINTREP, except that the word 'SUPINTREP' is to appear at the beginning of the report.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT

- 23. This STANAG will be considered to have been implemented when the necessary orders/instructions have been issued directing the forces concerned to put the content of this Agreement into effect.

EVALUATION

I—RELIABILITY OF SOURCE

- A. Completely reliable.
- B. Usually reliable.
- C. Fairly reliable.
- D. Not usually reliable.
- E. Unreliable.
- F. Reliability cannot be judged.

II—ACCURACY OF INFORMATION

The following classifications and ratings are used :

1. Confirmed by Other Sources. If it can be stated with certainty that the reported information originates from another source than the already existing information on the same subject, it is classified as confirmed by other sources and is rated '1'.
2. Probably True.
 - a. If no proof in the above sense can be established, but if there is, however, no reason to suspect that the reported information comes from the same source as the information already available on this subject, it is classified as 'probably true' and is rated '2'.
 - b. Provided that the contents of the report are confirmed in essential parts by already available information, the above procedure also applies to unconfirmed information contained in the report.
3. Possibly True. If the investigation reveals that the reported facts—on which no further information is available yet—comply with the behavior of the target as observed up to now, or if the known background of a person leads to the conclusion that he might have acted as reported, the received information is classified as 'possibly true' and is rated '3'.
4. Doubtful. Reported unconfirmed information, the contents of which rather contradict the estimate of the development or the hitherto known behavior of the target, is classified as 'doubtful' and is rated '4' as long as this information cannot be disproved by available facts.
5. Improbable. Reported information which is not confirmed by available data but is rather contradicting the experience hitherto assumed to be reliable with regard to the development of a case is 'improbable', and is rated in category '5'. The same classification is to be given to reported information which contradicts the existing data on that subject which has originally been rated '1' or '2'.
6. Truth Cannot be Judged.
 - a. If the investigation of a report reveals that a basis for allocating

rating '1' to '5' is not given, the reported information is classified as 'Truth cannot be judged' and is rated '6'.

- b. The statement that a report cannot be judged to its accuracy must always be preferred to an inaccurate use of the ratings '1' to '5'. However, a rating '1' or '2' should always be tried and only if this is not possible, because no information on the same target is available, should the rating '6' be given.

APPENDIX S
TYPICAL INFORMATION NEEDS IN ENTIRE AREA
OF INFLUENCE OF VARIOUS UNITS

(Located in back of manual)

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By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

Official:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM,
Major General, United States Army,
The Adjutant General.

HAROLD K. JOHNSON,
General, United States Army,
Chief of Staff.

Distribution:

To be distributed in accordance with DA Form 12-11 for Combat Intelligence.

CATEGORY OF INFORMATION	SUBCATEGORY OF INFORMATION (RAISED FOOTNOTE NUMBERS REFER TO SAME NUMBERS IN TIMELINESS AND LOCATION COLUMNS)	TIMELINESS	GENERAL LOCATION (ACCURACY IN METERS)	SPOT LOCATION (ACCURACY IN METERS)
PERSONNEL				
COMPANY	RIFLEMEN ¹ , MORTAR OBSERVERS ¹ , ARTILLERY OBSERVERS ¹ , SQUADS ¹ , PLATOONS ²	IMMEDIATE	10 ¹ , 50 ²	50
BATTALION	ARTILLERY OBSERVERS ¹ , PLATOONS ²	IMMEDIATE	10 ¹ , 100 ²	50
BRIGADE	ARTILLERY OBSERVERS ¹ , COMPANIES ²	IMMEDIATE	100 ¹ , 500 ²	50
DIVISION	BATTALIONS	IMMEDIATE	200	100
CORPS	REGIMENTS	IMMEDIATE	500	100
FIELD ARMY	DIVISIONS	IMMEDIATE	500	NA
VEHICLES				
COMPANY	GROUND, AERIAL	IMMEDIATE	10	50
BATTALION	GROUND, AERIAL	IMMEDIATE	100	50
BRIGADE	GROUND, AERIAL	IMMEDIATE	100	50
DIVISION	GROUND, AERIAL	IMMEDIATE	200	50
CORPS	GROUND, AERIAL	IMMEDIATE	500	100
FIELD ARMY	GROUND, AERIAL	IMMEDIATE	500	100
WEAPONS				
COMPANY	DIRECT FIRE ¹ , DIRECT FIRE (SP) ¹ , INDIRECT FIRE ² , AERIAL ³	IMMEDIATE	10 ¹ , 50 ² , 200 ³	50
BATTALION	DIRECT FIRE ¹ , DIRECT FIRE (SP) ¹ , INDIRECT FIRE ¹ , AERIAL ²	IMMEDIATE	100 ¹ , 200 ²	50
BRIGADE	DIRECT FIRE ¹ , DIRECT FIRE (SP) ¹ , INDIRECT FIRE ¹ , ANTI-AIRCRAFT ¹ , AERIAL ²	IMMEDIATE	100 ¹ , 200 ²	50
DIVISION	COMPANY-SIZE DIRECT FIRE (SP) ¹ , COMPANY-SIZE INDIRECT FIRE (NON NUCLEAR) ¹ , NUCLEAR ARTILLERY ¹ , ANTI-AIRCRAFT ²	IMMEDIATE	200 ¹ , 100 ²	100
CORPS	BATTALION-SIZE DIRECT FIRE (SP) ¹ , BATTALION-SIZE INDIRECT FIRE ¹ , NUCLEAR ARTILLERY ¹ , ANTI-AIRCRAFT ²	IMMEDIATE ¹ , 3 HOURS ²	500 ¹ , 100 ²	100
FIELD ARMY	REGIMENT-SIZE DIRECT FIRE (SP) ¹ , NUCLEAR ARTILLERY ¹ , ANTI-AIRCRAFT ²	IMMEDIATE ¹ , 3 HOURS ²	500 ¹ , 100 ²	100
STRUCTURES				
COMPANY	ALL	IMMEDIATE	25	50
BATTALION	ALL	IMMEDIATE	100	50
BRIGADE	ALL	IMMEDIATE	100	50
DIVISION	FIELD DEFENSES, BRIDGES, AIR-LANDING-FACILITIES, SUPPLY FACILITIES, LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS, ADM	30 MINUTES	150	100
CORPS	FIELD DEFENSES, BRIDGES, AIR-LANDING-FACILITIES, SUPPLY DEPOTS, LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS, BUILDINGS, NUCLEAR WEAPONS STORAGE, ADM	1 HOUR	200	100
FIELD ARMY	FIELD DEFENSES, BRIDGES, AIR-LANDING-FACILITIES, SUPPLY DEPOTS, LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS, BUILDINGS, NUCLEAR WEAPONS STORAGE, ADM	2 HOURS	500	100
TERRAIN & WEATHER				
COMPANY	WEATHER FORECASTS ¹	IMMEDIATE, EACH 12 HOURS ¹	25	25
BATTALION	WEATHER FORECASTS ¹	IMMEDIATE, EACH 12 HOURS ¹	25	25
BRIGADE	WEATHER FORECASTS ¹	IMMEDIATE, EACH 24 HOURS ¹	50	25
DIVISION	RELIEF AND DRAINAGE, VEGETATION, SURFACE MATERIALS, MAN MADE FEATURES, HYDROGRAPHY, WEATHER FORECASTS ¹	30 MINUTES, EACH 24 HOURS ¹	100	100
CORPS	TOPOGRAPHY, VEGETATION, SURFACE MATERIALS, RIVERS AND STREAMS, LAKES AND PONDS, SWAMPS, MINES AND QUARRIES, URBAN AREAS, WEATHER FORECASTS ¹	1 HOUR, EACH 6 & 48 HOURS ¹	200	100
FIELD ARMY	TOPOGRAPHY, VEGETATION, SURFACE MATERIALS, RIVERS AND STREAMS, LAKES AND PONDS, SWAMPS, MINES AND QUARRIES, URBAN AREAS, WEATHER FORECASTS ¹	2 HOURS, EACH 6 & 48 HOURS ¹	500	100
ELECTROMAGNETIC RADIATIONS				
COMPANY	GROUND SURVEILLANCE RADARS ¹ , COUNTERWEAPONS RADARS ²	IMMEDIATE	10 ¹ , 100 ²	50
BATTALION	GROUND SURVEILLANCE RADARS ¹ , COUNTERWEAPONS RADARS ²	IMMEDIATE	10 ¹ , 100 ²	50
BRIGADE	GROUND SURVEILLANCE RADARS ¹ , COUNTERWEAPONS RADARS ²	IMMEDIATE	100 ¹ , 500 ²	50
DIVISION	GROUND SURVEILLANCE RADARS ¹ , COUNTERWEAPONS RADARS ¹ , ANTI-AIRCRAFT RADARS ² , RADIOS ³	30 MINUTES	100 ¹ , 200 ² , 500 ³	100
CORPS	GROUND SURVEILLANCE RADARS ¹ , COUNTERWEAPONS RADARS ¹ , ANTI-AIRCRAFT RADARS ² , RADIOS ¹	1 HOUR	500 ¹ , 100 ²	100
FIELD ARMY	ANTI-AIRCRAFT RADARS ¹ , RADIOS ²	3 HOURS ¹ , 2 HOURS ²	100 ¹ , 500 ²	100
NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS				
COMPANY	FRIENDLY ¹ , ENEMY ²	PRIOR ¹ , IMMEDIATE ²	100	NA
BATTALION	FRIENDLY ¹ , ENEMY ² , ADM ²	PRIOR ¹ , IMMEDIATE ²	100	NA
BRIGADE	FRIENDLY ¹ , ENEMY ²	PRIOR ¹ , IMMEDIATE ²	100	NA
DIVISION	FRIENDLY ¹ , ENEMY ²	PRIOR ¹ , IMMEDIATE ²	100 ¹ , 200 ²	NA
CORPS	FRIENDLY ¹ , ENEMY ²	PRIOR ¹ , IMMEDIATE ²	300	NA
FIELD ARMY	FRIENDLY ¹ , ENEMY ²	PRIOR ¹ , IMMEDIATE ²	500	NA
CONTAMINATED AREAS				
COMPANY	AREA OF OPERATIONS, AREA OF INTEREST	IMMEDIATE	100	NA
BATTALION	AREA OF OPERATIONS, AREA OF INTEREST	IMMEDIATE	100	NA
BRIGADE	AREA OF OPERATIONS ¹ , AREA OF INTEREST ²	IMMEDIATE	200 ¹ , 500 ²	NA
DIVISION	AREA OF OPERATIONS ¹ , AREA OF INTEREST ²	IMMEDIATE ¹ , 1 HOUR ²	200 ¹ , 500 ²	NA
CORPS	AREA OF OPERATIONS ¹ , AREA OF INTEREST ²	IMMEDIATE ¹ , 1 HOUR ²	300 ¹ , 500 ²	NA
FIELD ARMY	AREA OF OPERATIONS ¹ , AREA OF INTEREST ²	IMMEDIATE ¹ , 1 HOUR ²	500	NA

CHANGE }
No. 1 }

HEADQUARTERS
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON, D.C., 1 August 1968

COMBAT INTELLIGENCE

FM 30-5, 27 June 1967, is changed as follows:
Page 2. Table of Contents, Chapter 6, Section VII. Change title to read, "Aerial Photographic Imagery."

Page 3. The title of appendix P is changed to read, "Example Intelligence Workbook Headings for Stability Operations."

The title of appendix S is changed to read, "Typical Information Needs in the Area of Interest of Various Units."

Page 4. Paragraph 1. In line 2, after "staff officers," the following is added "military intelligence officers,".

In line 3, after "with the production" is changed to read "with the collection production".

Paragraph 2a. In line 2, after "intelligence organization" is changed to read "intelligence section organization".

In lines 8 and 9, "(including internal defense and development operations)" is deleted.

Paragraph 2b is superseded as follows:

b. The material presented herein is applicable to general war, limited war, and cold war situations, to include stability operations, and both nuclear and nonnuclear warfare environments. This manual is in consonance with the following International Standardization Agreements: STANAG 2008, SEASTAG 2008, and SOLOG 5R2 (Bombing, Shelling, and Mortaring Reports); STANAG 2014, SEASTAG 2-14, and SOLOG 17R (Operations Orders, Annexes to Operation Orders, and Administrative/Logistic Orders); STANAG 2020, SEASTAG 2020, and SOLOG 16R (Operational Situation Reports); STANAG 2022, SEASTAG 2022, and SOLOG 2R2 (Intelligence Reports); STANAG 2029 and SOLOG 34R (Method of Describing Ground Locations, Areas, and Boundaries); STANAG 2033 and SOLOG 69 (Interrogation of Prisoners of War); STANAG 2073 (NATO Intelligence Subject

Code); STANAG 2076 and SOLOG 93 (Methods of Enemy Army Forces Strength Computation); STANAG 2078 and SOLOG 109 (Enemy Order of Battle Records for Combat Intelligence); STANAG 2084, SEASTAG 2084, and SOLOG 94 (Handling and Reporting of Captured Enemy Documents and Equipment); STANAG 2097 (Nomenclature for Soviet Bloc Army Weapons and Equipment); STANAG 2098 and SOLOG 90 (Intelligence Annex to Operation Orders; STANAG 2103 and SOLOG 123 (Reporting Nuclear Detonations, Radioactive Fallout, and Biological and Chemical Attacks); STANAG 2118 and SEASTAG 2118 (Intelligence Estimate).

Page 7. Paragraph 11 is superseded as follows:

11. Area of Interest

a. *General.* Intelligence operations extend to the area of interest of the commander. This area includes a unit's sector in defense or a zone of action in the offense, areas adjacent thereto, and extending into enemy territory to the objectives of current or planned operations. It includes any area occupied by enemy forces who could jeopardize the accomplishment of the commander's mission.

b. *Capabilities.* The commander seldom, if ever, possesses the means for obtaining all the information he needs on the enemy, weather, and the terrain in his area of interest. Each commander does, however, possess means for obtaining some of the information he needs from within his zone of action in offensive operations and from within his sector in defensive operations. He turns to higher headquarters and other Services who normally assist in the collection effort and have the capability of obtaining information from deep within enemy territory.

c. *Interdependence.* Since areas of interest extend beyond operational boundaries, there

are large areas of overlap in unit areas of interest. It falls to the next higher headquarters to coordinate and consolidate the requirements of its subordinate units to use effectively the collection agencies that are available. Intelligence operations at any echelon of command are necessarily dependent on information obtained by adjacent and higher headquarters and by other Services operating within a command's area of interest. This produces an urgent requirement for the rapid exchange of information produced by the collection efforts of the units involved. The urgency of this requirement often means that information must be passed before being processed into intelligence and that, as soon as the interested commands have processed the information, the resulting intelligence is also promptly exchanged to keep all commands with overlapping areas of interest fully informed. This factor underscores the interdependence not only of areas of interest but of intelligence operations.

Page 8. Paragraph 13a(1). In line 1, "planning and collection" is changed to read "planning the collection".

Page 9. Figure 1. In the legend, "encompasses area of influence" is changed to read "encompasses operational boundaries."

Title of figure 1 is changed to read: "Relationship of operational boundaries and area of interest."

Page 10. Paragraph 16a(2). In line 5, the hyphen after "counter" is deleted.

Paragraph 16a(3). After the last sentence the following is added: "See chapter 10 for a brief discussion of intelligence aspects unique to an insurgent warfare environment. FM 30-31 provides detailed intelligence guidance and procedures applicable to the conduct of stability operations."

Page 12. Paragraph 18. After the last sentence the following is added: "Knowledge of enemy intelligence organizations and operational procedures are also key factors in estimating enemy capabilities, adopting adequate security measures, and for employing effective counter-measures."

Paragraph 20b. Line 1, "internal defense" is changed to read "stability".

In line 15, "internal defense" is changed to read "stability".

Paragraph 21. In line 6, after "friendly forces." the following is added: "All friendly units are involved in offensive and defensive security measures."

Page 20. Paragraph 25a. In line 1, "after" is changed to read "alter".

Page 23. Paragraph 26b. After the last sentence the following is added: "Organizational guidance required to accomplish the intelligence responsibilities at brigade and battalion levels is provided in FM of the appropriate branch and unit SOP. Intelligence guidance for units below battalion level where no intelligence staff section exists is provided in chapter 9."

Paragraph 26c. In line 2, "(see figure 2)" is changed to read "(see fig. 4)".

Paragraph 26c(2). In lines 14 and 15, "photography obtained is coordinated with the signal photo officer." is changed to read "imagery obtained is accomplished by the reproduction laboratory organic to the MI detachment."

In line 16, "the photographs are" is deleted.

In line 19, "those prints." is changed to read "the imagery."

Page 24. Paragraph 26c(3). In line 3, after "collaborators;" the following is added: "maintaining records on enemy intelligence organizations and procedures, and advising the command on methods to counter enemy intelligence collection efforts; providing assistance and advice for friendly countersurveillance and deception operations."

Page 25. Paragraph 26d. In lines 23 and 24, "and a new organization" is deleted and the following is added at the end of the sentence: "and the aerial surveillance company provides aerial reconnaissance and surveillance support for the corps. The engineer topographic company performs terrain analysis and provides reports and studies required by the intelligence officer in preparing his analysis at the area of operation."

Page 27. Paragraph 26e(9) is added as follows:

(9) Under the staff supervision of the G2, the engineer staff officer at field army is responsible for providing engineer topographic and geographic intelligence products. To accomplish this intelligence function, an engineer topographic battalion is assigned with the

mission of producing, storing, and distributing maps, performing topographic surveys, and preparing engineer intelligence reports as required for the field army. (See FM 30-10 and FM 5-1.)

Paragraph 27a is superseded as follows:

a. *General*. The G2/S2 section (separate brigade, division, corps, and field army) is authorized (by TOE) a section which may at times require augmentation. MI personnel from the attached MI detachment may be used as temporary augmentation to intelligence staff sections; however, prolonged use outside of their specialties will diminish their skills in order of battle, counterintelligence, imagery interpretation, and interrogation. Close personnel liaison between the intelligence officer and the MI unit commander is essential and they should work together as a team to insure maximum and proper utilization of intelligence personnel. The MI units place a minimal administrative burden on the supported units since administrative support is provided by the parent MI organization (see FM 30-9)."

Page 32. Chapter 4. Under the chapter title, the following is added: "(STANAG 2014, 2029, 2033, 2084, 2098; SEASTAG 2013, 2084; SOLOG 17R, 34R, 69, 90, 94)."

Paragraph 37b (5). In line 2, "the enemy" is changed to read "the enemy including the enemy intelligence and surveillance capabilities."

Page 37. Paragraph 45a. In line 11, "center of enemy" is changed to read "center on enemy".

Page 42. Paragraph 48b(3)(b). In line 1, "Long" is changed to read "Medium".

Paragraph 48c(3) is superseded as follows:

(3) At higher headquarters, information on terrain is included in the Analysis of the Area of Operation (app B). The primary source of terrain intelligence is provided by the engineer staff officer, engineer terrain, teams, and other engineer units; however, reports of surveillance and reconnaissance, interrogation, imagery interpretation, and other sources assist the intelligence officer in the overall analysis of the area of operation. At lower echelons, information may be provided by higher headquarters, adjacent units, local civilian inhabitants, patriots, ground reconnaissance, and aerial surveillance. The method

of describing ground locations, areas, and boundaries is standardized by STANAG 2029.

Page 44. Paragraph 53a. After the last sentence the following is added: "Enemy intelligence collection activities and surveillance methods also provide valuable information. Enemy intelligence organization, doctrine, procedures, strengths and weaknesses, communications, and relations with the local civilian population are examples of information that provide vital information for planning the countersurveillance and security measures of the command."

Paragraph 54b. In lines 6 and 7, "internal defense" is changed to read "stability".

Paragraph 54d. At the end of the paragraph the following is added: "STANAG 2033 standardizes the interrogation procedures and forms to be used in the interrogation of prisoners of war."

Paragraph 55a. In line 9, "repatriots" is changed to read "repatriates".

Page 46. Paragraph 62. In line 14, "(See TM 5-248)" is deleted and the following added: "Engineer topographic units are responsible for providing this data."

Paragraph 63b. In line 3, "metcorological" is changed to read "meteorological".

Page 48. Paragraph 66. In line 12, "the internal defense environment" is changed to read "stability operations".

Paragraph 70.1 is added after paragraph 70.

70.1 Special Security Detachments

Special security detachments (SSD) are attached to field army, corps, and division headquarters from the U.S. Army Special Security Group, a class II activity of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army. The detachments operate the secure area for the receipt, storage, distribution, limited processing of certain signal intelligence material within the supported command, and are responsible for security, dissemination, and use of this material (see AR 380-28 and AR 380-35). Each detachment is commanded by a Special Security Officer (SSO) who provides information, advice, and represents a direct link between the command, higher headquarters, and the Department of the Army on signal intelligence and other high-level, sensitive intelligence matters.

Paragraph 71. In line 3, "rear areas" is changed to read "areas of operations."

In line 6, after "FM 30-9A" add: "and FM 30-31A)."

Page 49. Paragraph 72b. In line 5, "indicated in appendix D." is changed to read "Standardized in STANAG 2084, SEASTAG 2084 (app D)."

Paragraph 72.1 is added after paragraph 72.

72.1 Engineer Topographic Units

Engineer topographic units collect, evaluate, and disseminate terrain data, produce terrain studies and provide consultant service in military geology and hydrology in support of programs of the intelligence officer of the appropriate command.

Page 50. Paragraph 73k is added as follows:

k. *Other.* Other special staff officers who may provide information of value to the intelligence officer include: aviation officer, psychological operations officer, information officer, civil affairs officer, fire support coordinator or artillery officer, and chemical officer.

Paragraph 75b. In line 3, "army corps" is changed to read "army or corps".

Paragraph 75d is rescinded.

Paragraph 75.1 is added after paragraph 75.

75.1 Aerial Reconnaissance and Surveillance Units

a. The aerial surveillance company assigned to corps and separate task forces as required is capable of performing near all-weather, day and night aerial surveillance and reconnaissance in support of the corps (see para 80 and FM 30-20).

b. A military intelligence battalion, air reconnaissance support (MIBARS) normally is assigned to each field army or independent corps. The MIBARS produces and disseminates intelligence information obtained from tactical Air Force reconnaissance elements operating in support of the field army and provides liaison between the field army and the reconnaissance elements of the supporting tactical Air Force (see FM 30-20).

c. Air Force and Navy aerial collection means and facilities are capable of providing much information useful in producing intelligence to meet Army requirements.

Page 55. Paragraph 78b. In lines 8 and 9, "internal defense" is changed to read "stability".

Page 57. Paragraph 80. Paragraph title is changed to read: "Aerial Reconnaissance and Surveillance Agencies".

Page 58. Paragraph 80b(1). In line 1 and in line 2, "photographic," is changed to read "imagery,".

In line 7, "observation" is changed to read "control system (TACS)".

Paragraph 80b(2)(c). Entire first sentence, lines 1 through 5, is deleted.

Page 59. Paragraph 81b(1). In line 6, after "aerial observers," the following is added: "LRPDS personnel employed with long range patrols,".

Page 61. Paragraph 83b(7). In line 2, "G4" is changed to read "G4 division surgeon, chemical officer, and elements of division support command as appropriate."

Paragraph 83b(14) is superseded as follows:

(14) Signal intelligence: ASA staff officer and special security officer (SSO).

Paragraph 83b(15) is added as follows:

(15) Engineer intelligence: Engineer staff officer.

Page 62. Paragraph 84c. In line 1, "suit" is changed to read "unit".

In line 4, after "the staff" the following is added: "in the form of an intelligence estimate (sec IV, ch 6)".

Paragraph 85a. In line 2, after "app O) is", the following is added: "a standardized intelligence report (STANAG 2098) and is".

Page 64. Paragraph 91a. In line 3, the following is added: "Fragmentary orders conform to the same format as the NATO-standardized operation order (STANAG 2014); however, those elements normally found in a complete order (FM 101-5) are omitted when they have not changed, are not essential, or are unavailable or incomplete at the time."

Page 65. Paragraph 92e is added as follows:

e. An invaluable aid in directing the collection effort and in preparing the collection plan is the use of a coverage map. Plotted on the coverage map are the extent and frequency of coverage of all collection sources and agencies, including aerial and ground reconnaissance

and surveillance missions, target acquisition, ground surveillance radars, long range patrols, and any other activities which provide information coverage to portions of the battlefield. By use of a coverage map, the intelligence officer can quickly determine existing gaps in coverage, as well as coverage that is already in effect against areas or targets of high interest. At lower levels, the coverage map may simply be an overlay to the situation map (para 107).
Page 69. Chapter 5. Under the chapter title, the following is added: (STANAG 2022, 2073; SEASTAG 2022; SOLOG 2R2).

Paragraph 103a. In line 5, "internal defense" is changed to read "stability operations".

Page 71. Paragraph 104a. In line 4, the following is added: "For example, intelligence information and reports submitted by U.S. Army elements at the Army group level and above, assigned to NATO commands, identify such information through the use of a standardized NATO intelligence code (STANAG 2073)."

Page 74. Figure 10 is superseded as follows:

(Classification) INTELLIGENCE WORKBOOK (INTSUM) HEADQUARTERS _____ PLACE _____ (Classification)	3. EN Activity a. Ground Activity Inf Arm Arty
	b. Trace of Forward Elements
	c. Potential nuclear targets
	d. Nuclear Activity
	e. CBR Activity
	f. Air Activity
	g. Other
	4. EN Losses a. KIA
	b. PW
	c. EN Equipment Captured or Destroyed
	5. New Obstacles and Barriers
	6. Administrative Activities
	7. New Identities a. UNITS
	b. Personalities
8. EN Movement	
9. EST Number and Type Vehicles	
10. Weather and Terrain	

Figure 10. Type intelligence workbook.

Page 78. Paragraph 114a(4). In lines 3 and 4, "Which one is more likely to be true?" is deleted.

Page 81. Chapter 6. Under the chapter title, the following is added: (STANAG 2008, 2020, 2022, 2097, 2098, 2103, 2118; SEASTAG 2008, 2020, 2022, 2118; SOLOG 2R2, 5R2, 16R, 90, 132).

Page 82. Paragraph 123. The title, "*Hot Reports*" is changed to read, "*Spot Reports*".

In line 1 and in line 3, "hot" is changed to read, "spot".

Paragraph 124 is superseded as follows:

124. Urgent Information Reports

Information or intelligence of such immediate value or tactical significance that it must reach the user without delay is assigned the highest transmission priority possible, consistent with established criteria. Such reports usually are concerned with an enemy activity—air, armor, CBR, or nuclear attack—which poses an immediate threat to the command. Because of their urgent nature, such reports usually will be disseminated, without evaluation or interpretation, as unconfirmed information, subject to later confirmation.

Paragraph 125a. In line 2, "STANG" is changed to read, "STANAG".

Paragraph 128a. In line 4, "(see FM 101-5). It" is changed to read: "The PERINTREP does not have an established format, but generally follows the same type format for all INTSUM. An example of a type INTSUM is contained in FM 101-5. The PERINTREP".

Paragraph 130 is superseded as follows:

130. Imagery Interpretation Reports

Information or intelligence obtained by imagery interpretation is disseminated by imagery interpretation reports. A detailed discussion and examples of these reports are contained in FM 30-20 and TM 30-245.

Page 84. Paragraph 131. In lines 6-9, the statement contained within parentheses is deleted.

Page 86. Paragraph 135b. In line 2, "extended period, and long period." is changed to read: "medium period, and extended period."

In line 7, "An extended" is changed to read, "A medium".

In line 8, "a long" is changed to read, "an extended".

Paragraph 135d. In line 17, "hot" is changed to read, "spot".

Page 87. Paragraph 139. At the end of the paragraph the following is added: "The current NATO standardized nomenclature for Soviet Bloc army weapons and equipment as prescribed in STANAG 2097 will be used in technical intelligence reports when possible (see FM 30-16)."

Paragraph 145. In line 12, after "form which" the following is added: "is based on STANAG 2118 and."

Page 88. Paragraph 149. In line 2, after "intelligence order" the following is added: "(STANAG 2098)."

Paragraph 150. In line 6, after "SITREP" the following is added: "(see FM 101-5)."

Page 89. Paragraph 152b. Subparagraphs (10) and (11) are added as follows:

(10) *PICTOMAP*. A photomap type product usually published at the scale of 1:25,000 or larger, depicting terrain and vegetation in near natural colors and with important cultural features and drainage systems overprinted in red and blue, respectively. Names, contours, grids, and marginal data are depicted.

(11) *Joint Operations Graphics (JOGS)*. A 1:250,000 scale series of maps printed in a ground (G) or air (A) version. JOGS are designed to provide a common base map of an area for combined air/ground operations. The ground version shows elevation and contours in meters while the air version emphasizes air landing facilities, and depicts elevation and contours in feet.

Page 91. Section VII. The title "AIR PHOTOS" is changed to read "AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHIC IMAGERY".

Paragraph 155 is superseded as follows:

155. Types of Aerial Photographic Imagery

a. Vertical. Coverage of a target photographed from directly overhead. It provides photography of relatively constant scale, and allows the interpreter to achieve the best stereovision and the most accurate measurements.

b. Oblique. Coverage of a target area photographed at an angle from the vertical. Oblique photography closely resembles the normal eye-view and allows the interpreter to "see" into

an area in a more normal fashion, rather than seeing the target as it appears from directly overhead. High oblique photography includes a portion of the skyline behind the target area; low oblique photography does not.

c. *Panoramic*. Panoramic photography is taken with a special camera capable of scanning a wide area of terrain, usually from horizon to horizon. It provides rapid coverage of large areas of the terrain on both sides of an aircraft's line of flight during one pass over the target area.

(1) Two photographs in which a portion of the total area projected thereon is common are called stereopairs. Examination of these pairs with a stereoviewing instrument gives the interpreter an exaggerated three-dimensional view of the area of terrain that is included in the area of overlap of both photographs.

(2) Limited stereoviewing can be accomplished with overlapping oblique and panoramic photography; however, the best stereoviewing is achieved through vertical and split-vertical type photography.

Page 92. Paragraph 156. Paragraph title is changed to read

Aerial Photographic Coverage.

Paragraph 156a. In line 1, "airphoto" is changed to read "aerial photographic".

In line 2, "airphotos" is changed to read "aerial photographs".

In line 3, "airphoto" is changed to read "aerial photographic".

In line 4, "intelligence" is changed to read "permanent record".

Page 94. Chapter 7. Under the chapter title, the following is added: "(STANAG 2076, 2078; SOLOG 93, 109)".

Paragraph 158c. In line 8, and in lines 10 and 11, "internal defense" is changed to read "stability".

In line 19, "guerrillas" is changed to read "insurgent forces".

Page 96. Paragraph 162. In line 19, "techniques are described" is changed to read "techniques are standardized in STANAG 2076 and described".

Page 100. Paragraph 174a. In line 5, "G2 worksheet." is changed to read, "intelligence workbook."

Page 110. Paragraph 186a. In the title and in line 1 and line 7, the word "passive" is changed to read "defensive".

Paragraph 186b. In the title and in lines 1 and 8, the word "active" is changed to read "offensive".

Paragraph 187b. In line 1, "specialist" is changed to read "personnel".

Paragraph 187d. In line 1, the word "Office" is changed to read "Director".

Page 111. Paragraph 188. In line 6, "specialists" is changed to read "personnel".

Page 112. Paragraph 188e is superseded as follows:

e. *Special Operations*. Counterintelligence special operations include both offensive and defensive operations of a special nature, directed against hostile and unfriendly intelligence organizations and activities. In an internal defense environment, these operations assist in neutralizing the insurgency. (See FM 30-17, 30-17A, and 30-31).

Page 113. Paragraph 191c. In line 4, "specialists" is changed to read "personnel".

Page 114. Paragraph 195a. In line 6, "specialist" is deleted.

Page 116. Paragraph 201. In line 9, "(see app O)" is deleted and the following added: "The impact of counterintelligence plans on friendly forces is an important consideration. The counterintelligence officer must coordinate with the G2/S2 and operations officer all counterintelligence measures, such as covering bumper markings, or imposing restrictions on movement of friendly forces during hours of darkness, to insure that imposition of such measures will not interfere with tactical operations. Care must be taken to include the duration or expiration time or date of all such measures."

Page 119. Paragraph 211b. In lines 11 and 12, "-teletype" is deleted.

Page 121. Paragraph 217b. In line 8, after "deception" add "and."

In lines 9 and 10, "and internal defense operations*" is deleted. The footnote contained at the bottom of the page is rescinded.

Paragraph 217d is added as follows:

d. Stability operations are a normal mission of the U.S. Army rather than operations designed for specialized purposes. They are, however, discussed briefly in this chapter to point

out unique intelligence requirements characteristic of such operations. A detailed discussion of the role of intelligence in stability operations is contained in FM 30-31 and 30-31A.

Page 122. Paragraph 222*b*. In line 7, "(FM 57-10)" is changed by "(FM 57-1)."

Page 123. Paragraph 225. In lines 3 and 4, "internal defense" is changed to read "stability operations".

Page 125. Paragraph 227. Paragraph title is changed to read, "Stability Operations".

Paragraph 227*a*. In lines 1 and 2, "internal defense" is changed to read "stability".

Page 126. Paragraph 227*d*(5). In lines 6 and 7, "internal defense involves" is changed to read "stability operations involve".

Page 127. Paragraph 227*e*(2). In line 8, "FM 30-18" is changed to read "FM 30-31A".

Paragraph 227*f*(1). In lines 1 and 9, "internal defense" is changed to read "stability".

Paragraph 227*f*(3). In line 4, "and units" is changed to read "personnel".

Paragraph 227*f*(3). In line 5, "and detection of" is changed to read "from".

Paragraph 228*a*. In lines 7 and 8, "internal defense/development" is changed to read "stability".

Paragraph 228*c*. In line 2, "friendly and those" is changed to read "personnel".

Page 130. Paragraph 233*a*. In line 2, "(see app L)" is changed to read "(see app Q)".

Page 131. Paragraph 238. In line 8, the following is added: "In order to insure uniformity throughout the command, the intelligence portion of the command SOP should standardize methods for directing the collection effort and for processing information, and prescribe dissemination and reporting format and procedures. The intelligence officer may select the SOP of one subordinate intelligence section as a model SOP for all subordinate units at the same echelon. For example, the division G2

may select the SOP of one brigade and direct that this SOP be adopted by all other brigades of the division."

Pages 132 and 133. Appendix A, REFERENCES. The following changes are made to indicate current classifications and titles of existing field manuals:

"FM 30-15, Intelligence Interrogations.

FM 30-17, Counterintelligence Operations.

(C) FM 30-31, Stability Operations-Intelligence (U).

FM 31-10, Denial Operations and Barriers.

FM 100-10, Combat Service Support."

The following are added to the list of references in proper numerical order:

"(C) FM 30-17A, Counterintelligence Special Operations (U).

(S) FM 30-31A, Stability Operations-Intelligence Collection (U).

FM 30-104, Handbook on Aggressor Insurgent War.

FM 57-1, U.S. Army/U.S. Air Force Doctrine for Airborne Operations."

The following is rescinded from the list of references:

"FM 57-10, Army Forces in Joint Airborne Operations."

Page 135. Appendix B, paragraph 2*c*(2). In lines 5 through 7, "technical service staff officer concerned with such features." is changed to read: "engineer staff officer for other than communications facilities."

Page 138. Appendix B, paragraph 14*c*. Lines 22 through 24 are changed to read: "attack, the control of this terrain feature is essential because it affords us a marked advantage. Thus, it is a key terrain feature."

Page 141. Appendix C, paragraph 4*e* is superseded as follows:

e. Special Collection Units.

Page 143. Figure 24 is superseded as follows:




Figure 24. Intelligence collection agencies available to corps.




Figure 25. Intelligence collection agencies available to field army.

Page 145. Figure 26 is superseded as follows:




Figure 26. Intelligence collection agencies available to theater army support command (TASCOM).

Page 146. Figure 27 is superseded as follows:




Figure 27. Intelligence collection agencies available to theater army civil affairs command.

Page 175. Paragraph 8*d*(1). In lines 1 and 2, "attached" is changed to read "attacking."

Page 190. Paragraph 3. In paragraph title, "(STANAG 2706)" is changed to read "(STANAG 2076)".

Page 197. Appendix M, paragraph 3*c*. In line 1, after "enemy intelligence," the following is added: tactical surveillance."

Paragraph 3*d*. In line 1, after "significant intelligence," the following is added: "tactical surveillance."

Page 206. Paragraph 8. Under the paragraph heading, "Nil" is changed to read "None."

Page 207. Appendix P. Change title to read, "EXAMPLE INTELLIGENCE WORKBOOK FOR STABILITY OPERATIONS".

Page 216. Appendix S. The title is changed to read as follows: "TYPICAL INFORMATION NEEDS IN THE AREA OF INTEREST OF VARIOUS UNITS".

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

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General, United States Army,
Chief of Staff.

Official:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM,
Major General, United States Army,
The Adjutant General.

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